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Final Report Overview
This report is a collection of seven reports that
relate to the theme of the research under this contract:
the applications of space technology. These reports
describe the research done by students and faculty at
Stanford and by interns in Washington during the first
year of the contract. Our procedure has been. first, to
prepare working papers which are discussed with interested
individuals at Stanford, NASA, and the Senate Subcommittee
Staff, and then to prepare reports of the type incorporated
in this final report.
The reports here center around two major subjects:
communication satellites and technology transfer. The
communication satellite area is represented here by three
reports: (1) an analysis of NASA's technological alterna-
tives in this field; (2) a report on the economic aspects
of orbit-spectrum allocation; and (3) a report on the cost
structure of local distribution systems for satellite
communication. The first report, on technological alterna-
tives, has been prepared on the assumption that the orbit-
spectrum resource will continue to be allocated to communi-
cation satellite service providers at zero price. The
second report questions this assumption and examines,policy
options that would place a nonzero price on this resource
as a technique for achieving increased economic efficiency
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in the use of this resource. The third report is a brief
exploration of the cost structure of local distribution
of satellite signals, a subject that strongly affects
overall satellite system design. One of our conclusions
from this work is that all three of these subjects are
closely linked. There is a need for future research on R&D
project selection that takes into account the possibility
that the orbit-spectrum resource will be used more effi-
ciently than would be the case under present FCC rules.
There is also a need for further study of orbit-spectrum
management techniques that takes more full account of
satellite system design and the expected future evolution
of satellite system technology.
The reports related to technology transfer in this
volume are: (1) a broad analysis of the economic basis
for national science and technology policy: (2) a study of
the economics of the household economy; (3) a study of
government patent policy; and (4) a study of screening and
evaluation in information dissemination. The first paper
provides an overview of the entire area of science and tech-
nology policy, with a view to obtaining an understanding of
the place of technology transfer policy in science and tech-
nology policy generally and of some of the broad policy
options in both technology transfer and other areas of sci-
ence and technology policy. The report on the household
economy is a detailed study of a specific question that
v
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arose in the study of science and technology policy. Just
how important is the household economy in comparison with
the market economy? Most science and technology policy
studies have-been focused on growth in GNP and on produc-
tivity in the market economy. An interesting result of
this household economy study is that the household economy
is comparable to the market economy in size and importance.
This result raises a number of questions about the rele-
vance and validity of policy studies that do not take the
household economy into account at all. The study of govern-
ment patent policy was conducted by an intern serving on
the staff of the Senate Subcommittee and is intended to pro-
vide a broad picture of this area. The report on screening
and evaluation in information dissemination represents the
results of a preliminary study of this aspect of NASA's
technology transfer program. Our preliminary work in this
field suggests the need for a more comprehensive and in-
depth study of the management options in this field.
I
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ABSTRACT
There are several indications that. the demand for satel-
lite communications services in the domestic market will soon
exceed the capacity of the satellites currently in place.
Two approaches to increasing system capacity are the expan-
sion of service into frequencies presently allocated but not
used for satellite communications, and the development of
technologies that provide a _greater level of service within
the currently-used frequency bands. This paper is directed
towards the development of economic models and analytic
techniques for evaluating capacity expansion alternatives
such as these.
The first part of the paper provides a brief overview
of the satellite orbit-spectrum problem, and also outlines
some suitable analytic approaches. This is followed by an
illustrative analysis of domestic communications satellite
technology options for providing increased levels of service.
The analysis illustrates the use of probabilities and decision
trees in analyzing alternatives, and provides insight into the
important aspects of the orbit-spectrum problem that would
warrant inclusion in a larger-scale analysis. Finally, the
application of such anal ytic methodologies to the examination
of satellite R&D decisions such as those faced by NASA is
discussed.
f
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tSection I
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
1. Introduction
This paper begins the development of economic models
and analytic techniques for evaluating NASA communications-
satellite R&D decisions. First, a brief overview of the
communications satellite orbit- spectr,= problem is provided.
This overview describes the need for structural economic
models that characterize both the systems demand for
satellite communications services as well as the supply of
such services under a wide range of technology and policy
options. The overview also describes the need for methodol-
ogy tc analyze NASA communications satellite R&D alternatives,
taking account of considerable market and technology
uncertainty.
The second part of the paper provides an illustrative
analysis of U.S. domestic communications satellite technol-
ogy options for providing increased levels of domestic com-
munications services within the constraints of orbit geom-
etry and present frequency spectrum allocation to domestic
communications satellites. The analysis illustrates the
use of probabilities and decision trees in analyzing tech.
nology alternatives and provides insight into the important
1
taspects of the orbit spectrum problem that must be dealt
with in a full-scale analysis.
The final section of the report outlines how analyses
of the type described in the preceding section can be used
to examine satellite R&D decisions such as those faced by
NASA.-
2. Background
The allocation of geosychronous orbit positions and
frequency spectrum to communications satellite use is a
complex technical, economic and political problem. The U.S.
domestic market will be considered in this discussion as an
illustration of these problems.
There are presently three frequency bands allocated to
U.S. satellite communications: 4/6 GHz (C band), 12/14 GHz
(Ku band), and 20/30 GHz (Ka band). Interference considera-
tions limit the use of the geosynchronous arc, and projec-
tions of demand growth indicate that the orbit-spectrum
capacity in the C band and Ku band will be fully utilized
t	
within a few years. The Ka band is not yet utilized for
satellite communications and presents some technical and cost
disadvantages relative to the C and Ku bands. One option for
expanding domestic satellite communication services is to
pursue development of Ka band capability.
In addition to increasing the amount of orbit-spectrum
allocated to communications satellites, there are many
2
technical alternatives for providing greater services within
a fixed orbit-spectrum. These technical alternatives include
changes in satellite and earth station design involving signal
processing, antenna design including polarization, demand
assignment among a pool of satellites, use of spot and inter-
satellite beams and changes in interference design parameters.
These technical alternatives offer the possibility of a
several-fold increase in communications services for a fixed
amount of orbit-spectrum resource.
The demand for domestic communications satellite services
has expanded rapidly. In some cases communications satellites
have diverted voice and data communications from possible new,
more costly terrestrial communications capacity. In other
cases, the increasing economic advantage of communications
satellites has reduced the costs of long-distance communica-
tions, particularly video, and has resulted in the development
of new,communications services that would otherwise have been
uneconomic.
It is very, difficult at this time to foresee what
balance o:- imbalance will result between the technical alter-
natives for expanding orbit-spectrum capacity and the demands
for communications services. Moreover, the demand depends on
the costs of satellite communications services in relation to
the costs of terrestrial communications and the benefits of
additional communications. In addition the balance is sensi-
tive to current R&D decisions to`,develop technology as well
{
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policy decisions to change the allocation or price of
LA
	
orbit-spectrum.
3. NASA's Role
NASA's role in developing new satellite communications
technology is articulated in recent testimony of Associate
Administrator Anthony L. Calio before the House Subcommittee
on Space Science and Applications.) NASA plans to meet the
need for improved effectiveness and efficiency in the use of
the limited resources of the radio spectrum and geosynchron-
ous orbit positions by:
1) new technologies to expend the capacities
of existing bands, and
2) capabilities for functioning in the
unused Ka band.
In the first ,,ategory fall "frequency re-use" methods involv-
ing contourable-beam space antennas, onboard switching, sig-
nal modulation, and polarization techniques. NASA proposes
to take a leadership role 'in developing these technologies
for the Ka band:
We propose to develope an understanding of Ka-band usage
within a multibeam antenna research effort. We believe
that a unified R&D effort built around these new technol-
ogies and techniques will best advance U.S. leadership
in satellite communications and support industry's efforts
to increase the capacity of the two lower-frequency commer-
cial bands (C-band: and Ku-band). Simultaneously, this ac-
tivity will provide ,:Qw information and confidence in
equipment for Ka-band use for private commercial purposes.
We have widespread, enthusiastic acceptance from the
industry on these plans.
A. S. Calio, Testimony of
February 20, 1979,_p. 23
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In addition to its role in R&D, NASA provides technical
advice to the FCC on spectrum allocation and equipment tech-
nical Specifications. This role places NASA in a position
to participate in a wide range of potential policy decisions
on the mechanisms by which frequency usage will be regulated.
Finally, although NASA's role in the regulation of orbit-
spectrum usage is limited to technical advice, it is necessary
for NASA 'to take account of the effect of future regulatory
policy on the need for new capacity and technology. For ex-
ample,, government policy mandating or encouraging frequency
re-use or conservation measures could have a major impact on
the need for NASA's R&D on Ka band technology.
4. A Framework for Analysis
Decisions such as those associated with NASA's role in
satellite coimnunications are very difficult. While consider-
able information on the technology and market is available,
not all of it is relevant or reliable. many technology and
policy alternatives are possible, but it is very difficult
to comprehend the important interactions among the alterna-
tives. And, even iE one could project with certainty the
outcomes of alternatives, there is still the problem of
determining what we want or who is to pay the costs and
share in the benefits.
At the beginning we must recognize that no forecasting
or other analytic 'methodology can eliminate uncertainty, make
t
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decisions or replace the need for difficult value judgments.
Rather, analysis and models are useful in the decision pro-
cess if they facilitate the decision process in structuring
available information and value judgments or preferences in
a way that provides insights into the choices among alter-
natives.
The objective, therefore, is to work towards the level-
i
opment of a process of analysis that is supportive of the
NASA decision processes and makes appropriate use of models
and analysis.
5. Decision Analysis
Many aspects of communication satellite orbit-spectrum
decisions can be captured using readily understood techniques
of decision analysis. 2 In particular, the supply and demand
for satellite communications services are highly uncertain,
as are the technical outcomes of R&D. Early resolution of
technical uncertainty through R&D can have an immediate bene-
ficial effect on the market by facilitating good decisions on
the design and development of new satellites and the use of the
orbit-spectrum resource. The techniques of decision analysis
provide away to put a dollar value on the benefits of resolv-
ing uncertainty through R&D, thus allowing the costs of R&D
to be rationally compared with the benefits.
Decision analysis is more than an analytical technique
for characterizing uncertainty in a decision problem. It is
also a process of analysis for bringing policy and technology
6
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decisions into a logical relation with the available infor-
mation, alternatives and preferences.
Typically a decision analysis.is
 carried out with the
close involvement of many technical specialists and the
responsible executive .iffivIals. Through an iterative pro-
cess of information structuring and alternative generation,
a sequence of analyses is performed. The end product is not
the analysis but is the insight and communication that is
achieved by the participants in the analyses. This process
has been successfully demonstrated in many public and private
decision settings involving R&D, public regulatory policy,
corporate new product decisions, environmental planning and
facility capacity expansion.
As a first step towards such an application of decision
analysis to communications satellite R&D and policy decisions
of interest to NASA, we have developed the illustrative
example in Section II of this paper.
6. Structural Modeling
One of the aspects of the decision analysis approach that
deserves special attention in the case of satellite communica-
tions planning is the complexity of the interactions among the
competing satellite and terrestrial communications systems
and the demands for communications services. For example, as
the cost of communisations is reduced by technological advances,
new demands for communications services appear. These demands
cause the capacity of existing systems to be gully utilized
I
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and create a need for new systems that compete for scarce
spectrum and orbital positions with existing systems.
Attempts to use simpli ;Eied models of the communica-
tions market are generally not very satisfying. A typical
approach is to forecast the magnitude of future communica-
tions demand categorized by type of communication, video,
data, voice. But in a world where the distinctions between
different communication techniques are becoming iuzzy and where
the costs of communication, ' including travel and mail, are
changing rapidly, forecasts that extrapolate from past demand
data are not very accurate or useful.
A modeling approach that has been applied successfully
in many industries is a structural modeling approach. In
this approach, the demands for communications are characterized
in terms of basic end-use services such as person-to-person
and broadcast communications and in terms of the time urgency
and content of information to be . communicated. Specific end
use market segments,such as residential, large business, and
small business might be distinguished.
The alternative communications modes,such as voice,
video, data, mail, and travel,available to each end-use would
be identified and the demands for each derived from the basic
end-use data and the prices charged for each service. These
prices would be computed with bases of information character-
ized in the supply side of the model.
8
r
Y1tr^
Communications services can be provided by a large
number of alternative technologies. Each of these technol-
ogies has its own unique resource requirements in terms of
spectrum resources, capital resources, reliability, and
types of communications that can be carried out. The prices
of these services are generally determined in part by eco-
nomic forces and in part by a regulatory policy that allo-
cates scarce public resources and controls prices of some
services. These prices and the regulatory policies deter-
mine which technologies are developed and utilized to meet
demand. The prices charged for the communications services
in turn influence demand as described earlier.
In a structural model of the communications market, each
generic communications technology would be identified, and
the direct capital operating and other costs associated with
each unit deployed would be characterized as inputs to the
model and would be adjusted within the model to account for
inflation and technological learning effects. In addition,
the technical information required to compute the amount of
spectrum and orbit resources required for a given mix of
communications services would be provided.
The model would utilize this and other information to
simulate the expansion and operation of an entire communica-
tions system including all major forms of communications over
t=	 a period of twenty or more years. The model calculations
a
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would be carried out iteratively because of the simultaneous
nature of the interaction between supply,demand and prices.
A structural model of this type would allow investiga-
tion of.the penetration of different technologies under a
variety of assumptions regarding the outcomes of R&D and
public communications regulatory policy. Such a model would
also be a useful tool for investigating alternative communi-
cations satellite regulatory policies.
In this paper we have not attempted any significant
structural modeling of the communications market and have
instead relied on existing forecasts as a basis for the
illustrative decision analysis. This lack of emphasis on a
structural model of the communications market should not,
however, be taken as an indication of the lack of a need for
such modeling. The illustrative example as developed in this
paper makes clear the need for better models of the communi-
cations market as an aid to communications satellite R&D
planning.
f
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Section II
THE ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
This section of the paper describes an illustrative
application of decision analysis to technology decisions
affecting domestic communications satellites. First we
examine the likelihood of satellite services demand exceed-
ing the system capacity in the future. Having shown the
uncertain need for additional capacity, two options for
increasing orbit-spectrum capacity are discussed and com-
pared the development of conservation and re-use technol-
ogies for the frequency bands currently in use, and the
introduction of service at a higher frequency band (the Ka
or 20 to 30 gigahertz band).
Background information for the analysis is provided by
four contractor reports, supplied by NASA. The contractors
are WesternUnion and ITT, whose studies concentrate on the
demand for Ka band satellite services, and Hughes and Ford
Aerospace, who provided "systems studies" of the technical
and cost details of alternative Ka systems.
The first part of the analysis develops a simplified
demand model, based largely on the ITT analysis. ITT`s
forecasts are presented and discussed. Then a probabilistic
version of the ITT forecast is developed, based on a set of
illustrative estimates by the authors. The next section of
11
the paper examines system capacity. Again the determi-
nistic data from the ITT analysis are used as a base on
which to build a probabilistic forecast. The probabilis-
tic forecasts for demand and capacity allow us to examine
the question of system saturation in a decision analysis
framework.
The next section of the paper considers system expan-
sion through the use of a ' Ka band service or frequency re-
use. A series of scenarios demonstrate how the technologies
might be used to meet demand. The comparison of technologi-
cal alternatives through the use of cost information is dis-
cussed and an illustrative cost comparison of Ka service to
re-use is presented.
2. Demand
A forecast of the future demand for satellite services
is essential to any evaluation of alternative satellite
systems. Ideally, the demand model would build a forecast
by aggregating over the various types of service. In keeping
with a decision analysis approach, the explicit consideration
of uncertainty would be desirable.
Below we develop a simple model of demand. We first
develop a framework for a general satellite demand model.
The model is derived largely from the ITT analysis. ITT's
data and .results are briefly discussed. In the latter part
I
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tof the section we develop a probabilistic forecast, using
a set of illustrative probability distributions.
The data developed in the Western Union report is in
a different form from that used by ITT, and is not used
in our demand model. The Western Union data is presented
and compared to the ITT data in Appendix A.
Outline of a General Satellite Demand Model. A frame-
work for a satellite demand model is shown in Figure 1. The
model estimates satellite traffic in equivalent transponders
for a given service (voice, data, or video) in a given year.
We would expect the demand model to be driven by price,
which in turn will depend to some degree on the cost of both
terrestrial and satellite technologies. The model then de-
termines the total annual demand for long-haul telecommunica-
tions traffic. However, of greater interest is the peak level
of telecommunications traffic. This will depend on total
traffic load, and also on peak hour pricing strategies. The
peak demand will determine the capacity requirements.
The next step is to determine the satellite share from
the total peak demand. We can think in terms of a "satellite
capture ratio," or market share, that determines the percent-
age of the total demand that goes to satellites. This ratio
will vary for different types of service. The major factor
in determining this ratio for a given type of service are
the relative costs of terrestrial and satellite technologies
for a transmission of a given distance. Finally, the average
13
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tcapacity of transponders in use will determine the
demand for transponders.
A More Limited Demand Model. The ITT analysis does
not explicitly consider price as a factor in demand. Pre-
sumably the assumption is that demand is simply not price
sensitive, or that price can be determined directly from
satellite systems cost estimates and from projections of
terrestrial tariffs. This leads us to a simpler demand
model, which is shown within the dotted lines in Figure 1.
Price and cost characteristics of terrestrial and satellite
technologies are considered implicit to the resulting model.
Below we discuss the components of the modified model,
and present the relevant data from the ITT report_.
a) Yearly Long-Haul Demand. ITT's forecast of yearly
demand for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 is shown
in Table 1. It is broken down into three services
types: voice, data, and video. dote a common unit,
terabits per year, is used for each type of service.
The share of the traffic attributed to each type of
service is also shown for each year.
b) Peak Demand. Peak demand determines the overall
capacity required. Peak demand will depend on the
overall traffic level, patterns of usage, and peak
period pricing policies.
Table 2 shows ITT's forecast for peak demand, in
millions of bits per second. The available
t
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Table 1: ITT - Forecast of Yearly Demand, in Terabits/yr.
1980 1990 2000
Voice 559,000 (74%) 10402,000 (76%) 21891,000 (77%)
Data 1120000 (15%) 281,000 (15%) 437,000 (12%)
Video 82,500 (11%) 170,700 (9%) 417,300 (11%)
Total 753,500 (100%) 11853,700 (100%) 30745,300 (100)
Table 2: ITT Forecast of Peak Hour Demand (millions of
bits per second)
1980 1990 2000
Voice 43,800 (65%) 108,100 (63%) 204,700 (64%)
Data 20,667 (31%) 50,869 (30%) 78,853 (25	 )
Video 2,891 (0) 13,252 (7%) 37 980 (11%)
Total 67,358 (100%) 172,221 (100%) 321,533 (100%)
Table 3:	 ITT - Ratio of Peak Hour to Average Demand (Derived)
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2.5 2.4 2.2
Data 5.8 5.7 5.7
Video 1.1 2.4 2.9
I
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tinformation gives no indication of the methodology
used to determine peak traffic. For information
purposes, the ratio of peak demand to average
demand for each of the services is shown in Table 3.
c) Satellite Capture Ratio. The satellite capture ratio
refers to the percentage of long-haul traffic (defined
by ITT as traffic transmitted more than 200 miles)
that is handled by satellite. This will be different
for different types of service.
ITT's capture ratio, are presented in Table 4. The
report does not state how the ratios were determined.
one way of determining capture ratios is presented in
the Western Union report. They consider the relative
costs of satellite and terrestrial service to split
the demand up. They develop a set of terrestrial/
satellite crossover curves that determine the relative
costs for various distances of transmission.. However,
the approach may still be simplistic. The ratio can
also be different between sets of city pairs the same
distance apart, depending on factors including traffic
density, geography, etc.
d) Satellite Traffic. Satellite traffic is an intermed-
iate result. It is computed as the product of peak
demand and the satellite capture ratio for each type
of service.
W
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Table 4:	 ITT - Satellite Capture Ratio, in percent
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2 15 25
Data 1 50 60
Video 50 60 60
Table 5: ITT - Unit Transponder Capacity, in MBPS
Year	 Capacity
1980	 42
1990	 72
2000	 108
Table 6: ITT - Demand
1980
Voice	 21
Data	 5
Video	 35
for Transponders (in 36
trans
1990
	
(34%)	 225 (33%)
	
(80)	 335 (51%)
	
(580)	 11.0 (16%)
MHz equivalent
ponders)
2000
474 (42%)
436 (39 0)
211 (19%)
fe) Unit Transponder Capacity without Re-use Technologies.
ITT estimates that transponder capacity (in terms of
bits received per time period) will increase as time
goes on, as shown in Fable S. Because re-use technolo-
gies are not explicitly considered in the ITT analysis,
we have assumed the capacity increases stem from factors
other than the re-use technologies considered later in
this report. Thus the data given in Table 5 are taken
as base capacities, which can be increased by various
re-use technologies.
f) Transponders Required. The resulting number of trans-
ponders required can be calculated as the quotient of
satellite traffic and transponder capacity. ITT's
forecast is shown in Table 6.
Probabilistic Analysis. Below we use the simple model
outlined in Figure 1 and a set of iilu trative probability
distributions on the model components to demonstrate the con-
struction of a probabilistic forecast. The output will be a
probability distribution on total transponder demand for a
given year.
The equation below determines the demand for a given type
of service in a given year;
19
DTij 
pTC .	 SCRi,	 (1)
3
r
where:	 i
J
DT
PKD
TC
SCR
type of service:. voice, data, or video
year
number of transponders required
peak long-haul demand, in MBPS
unit transponder capacity, in MBPS
satellite capture ratio
j Below we will drop the subscript j	 Just one year, 1990,
will be considered.
The procedure to be used here will be to assign a
P probability distribution to each of the state variables.
These can be transformed, through the use of equation (1)
into a distribution on the number of transponders required
for each type of service for 1990. This can further be con-
verted into a distribution on the total number of trans-
ponders required.
Probability Distributions on Model Parameters. In general,
a continuous or a discrete probability distribution can be
assessed by one or more "experts" for each of the state vari-
ables. Techniques for the elicitation of distributions are
well-established. 3 The distributions we have used here'are
purely illustrative. In each case a discrete distribution
with three branches is used. The value from the ITT report is
20   
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used as the "nominal" case and is assigned a probability of
.5	 "Low" and "high" values, each with a probability of
.25 are also assigned. The values assigned are shown in
Table 7.
It can be expected that there is probabilistic depen-
dence between certain sets of variables. In the first part
of the analysis, where we produce distributions on demand
for each of the three types of service, we assume there is
no dependence between the peak demand P'Di , the capture
radio SCRi
 , and the transponder capacity TC - It would
in general be possible to include the dependencies by
assessing conditional distributions, or by restructuring
the model to include additional variables that explicitly
deal with the dependencies, allowing unconditional assess-
ments to be made.
Distribution on Transponders Required for Each Service
Type. A probability tree,- such as the one shown in Figure 2
for voice, can be constructed for each service. From the
tree we can generate a probability distribution on the number
of transponders required. The distribution has 27 branches.
Because the distributions for voice, data and video traffic
are intermediate results in terms of this analysis, they
are not presented here; they are show y. in Appendix B.
Distribution on Total Number of Transponders Required.
It is also possible to use the assigned distributions to
produce a distribution on total demand. This requires
21
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Table 7:	 Probability Distributions for Demand Model
a
3
for 1990
Low Nominal High	 l
(prob =	 .25) (prate	 .50) (prob = .25)
PKD	 (Peak Demand)
- Voice	 (mbps) 86,480 108,100 140,530
— Data	 (mbps) 25,434 50,869 76,303	 n
- Video	 (mbps) 6,626 13,252 33,130
A
SCR	 (Capture Ratio)
- Voice .10 .15 .25
- Data .4 .50 .65
- Video .45 .60 .7
TC	 (Transponder Capacity)	 54 72 108
(mbps)
Fig. 2s Probability Tree for Voice Demand
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t
PKD	 SCR TC DT
satellite derived
peak	 capture
(demand)
(transponder) demand in
ratio capacity transponders
54 160
.10
or pr7=
120
pr =	 .25 p108T 80
1 54 240
480 72 180
Pr =	 .25	 pr	 =	 •5 108 120
54 400
.25 72 300
pr = 108 200
54 200
.10 z 72 150
08 100
54 300
108,100	 .15 72 225
pr	 =	 . 50 108 150
54 500
.25 72 375
1.08 250
260
.10 72 195
108 130
1.15
54 390
140,530 72 293
pr	 =	 . 25 108 195
54 651
.25 7 2 488
108 325
further consideration of the dependencies between the
types of service. Two possible approaches for the purposes
of the demonstration are. 1) to assume independence between
the peak demand for each service and between the capture
ratio for each service; or, 2) assume complete dependence
between the three peak demand variables, and complete depen-
dence between the three capture ratio variables. The latter
approach is used here. This means that if the voice peak
demand variable takes on its low value, the data peak demand
variable and the video peak demand variable also take on
their low values. The same applies to the capture ratio
variables. The assumption of complete dependence can be
partially justified as follows. There are several common
underlying factors that will influence peak demand for all
the types of service. These factors include new developments
in satellite technology, and general satellite service pricing
policies. With respect to capture ratios, the most important
underlying factor is the relative costs of satellite and ter-
restrial technologies; this should affect each of the three
service types in a similar way. The fact that these underly-
ing factors will influence the variables in a similar way for
' each type of service indicates that some dependence between
demand for the three service types does exist.
The probability tree is shown in generic form in Figure
3, and the resulting cumulative distribution on total demand
is shown in Figure 4. The point estimates from the ITT and
WU reports are also shown.
I
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,f
PKD SCR
peak;
(demand)
(satellite)
capture
ratio
Voice = 86460) Voice = .10!
1l Data	 = 25434 Data	 =	 .4
,Video =	 66261 (Video = .451
.25 .25
{ Void = 1081001 4 Voice _ .1.5 ^
1, Data
	 =	 50869 (
'Video
)t Data	 _ .50
=	 13252) 'Video = .601
.50 .50
TC
transponder
capacity
54
DT j
derived a
demand in
transponders
'Voice = 1405301 Voice = .251
Data
	
76303 Data	 .65,
Slideo =	 33130 video =	 .7	 103
.25 .25	 .25
Fig. 3; Probability Tree for Total Demand
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3. System Capacity Without Re-Use
In this section we determine the capacity of the
domestic orbital arc, in terms of the number of domestic
satellites and the resulting number of transponders that
can be placed in orbit. The ability of each of the three
frequency bands to handle communications traffic is
limited by three factors:
— the intersatellite distance required 'to keep
interference to acceptable limits--this determines
the number of satellites that can be used;
— the number of transponders per satellite; and
— the fraction of the domes=tic orbital arc designated
for use by the U.S.
The ITT report provides data on the first factor, and
presents an estimate of available capacity. We first sum-
marize that data. We then proceed in a manner analogous to
that used in the demand section. We present a simple model
that determines capacity from information on the three
limiting factors listed above. We use the ITT data as a base
from which to generate illustrative probability distributions
on each of the factors. From these distributions we derive
a probability distribution on capacity.
ITT Data
ITT presents three orbital spacing scenarios for the
C and Ku bands.. They are shown in Table 8. Although it is not
explicitly stated, they appear to take 3 0
 as the most likely
Ka band spacing,
27
jTable 8: ITT - Satellite Spacing Scenarios
Scenario	 C band	 Ku band
Minimum Capacity	 4.50	 4.50
Most Probable	 40	 30
Maximum Capacity	 30	 30
Table 9: ITT - Resulting System Capacities (in Transponders)
	
C band	 C and Ku bands
Scenario	 only	 combined
Minimum Capacity 	 216
	
432
Most Probable	 264	 648
Maximum Capacity	 384	 768
rThe ITT estimates of C. and Ku band capacities (in
transponders) are shown in Table 9. They present 3 esti-
mates, corresponding to the three spacing scenarios. The
method by which the estimates we--e derived is not currently
available. In comparison with our estimates of capacity
presented below, the results seem rather high.
Probabilistic Analysis. The following equations can
be used to determine maximum capacity, in terms of trans-
ponders:
a) combined capacity of C and Ku band:
7'lCAP 	 -	 S	 tc 7 2	 p+ Sk	 tk )
b) combined capacity of C	 ,	 Ku and	 Ka	 band:
CAP	 CAP
-	
ck
	 + 72	 to pa
where:
Sc =	 satellite spacing in	 C	 band, in degrees
S  =	 satellite spacing in	 Ku band, in degrees
S  satellite spacing in	 Ka band, in degrees
to _	 average number of transponders per satellite, C	 band
t  =	 average number of transponders per satellite, Ku band
to =	 average number of transponders per satellite, Ka band
72 =	 the size of the domestic orbital arc, in degrees
p =	 fraction of the 72 0 designated for use by the U.S.
;1,
A probability distribution on capacity can be
produced by assigning probability distributions to the
variables in the above model. Again we have assigned
illustrative distributions, which are shown in Table 10.
The data on spacing is based on the scenarios in the ITT
report. It will be assumed there is complete probabilistic
dependence between Sc , Sk , and Sa . That is, if Sc
takes on its low value, Sk and Sa
 do also. The three
variables relating to satellite transponder capacity, tc
tk
 , and to
 , have been taken as certain for this analysis.
From these distributions, cumulative distributions on
capacity without and with the Ka band were derived; the
results are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Again, it is pointed
out these results assume no re-use technologies are applied.
The impact of re-use on capacity will be examined in
later sections.
4. The Probability! of Saturation
In this section we determine the likelihood of system
saturation by 1990 if re-use technologies are not employed.
To do this, we compare our probability distribution on total
demand, from Figure 4, to the distributions on capacity with-
out and with the Ka band, shown in Figures 5 and 6 respec-
tively. We assume probabilistic independence between the
sets of variables making up the demand and the capacity
models.
30
P
tTable 10: Probability Distribution for the Capacity Model
low value nomimal value high value
Variable (2rob.	 =	 .25) (Prob.	 =	 .5) ( r^ ob. =	 .25)
S 4.50 40 30
c
S 4.50 30 30
S 4.50 30 20
a
t - 24 -
c
tk
- 12 -
t - 24 -
a
p .33 .50 .75
k
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We first examine the "most likely" values of the
distributions. The median value of demand is 690 trans-
ponders; the median capacity without Ka is 360 trans-
ponders, and with Ka is 648 transponders. Using the most
likely demand and capacity values, we can calculate that
without Ka the system can meet only 52% of demand in 1990,
p while with the Ka band the system can meet 94% of the demand.
Moving away from the "most .likely" case, we can use the
complete distributions to calculate the overall probability
of saturation; i.e., the probability that demand exceeds
capacity. The equation used is:
Probability of Saturation =
a
	
E Prob IDT > q I CAP ql
	
Prob (CAP = 
qJ
where Q is the set of all values in the capacity distribu-
tion, and DT is the demand for transponders. We have assumed
probabilistic independence between demand and capacity.
Therefore:
Probably of Saturation =
qeQ Prob (DT > q)	 Prob (CAP = q)
The result of these calculations are:
— without Ka band: .86 probability of saturation
— with Ka band: .54 probability of saturation
i
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Thus without the Ka band and without re-use it is very
likely that saturation will occur. Even with the Ka band, the
probability of saturation is still greater than .5. This
suggests re-use technologies will probably be needed if demand
is to be met. In the next section we examine alternative ways
of expanding system capacity.
5. Capacity Expansion Alternatives
If demand in 1990 exceeds the capacity of the C and Ku
bands (as it appears likely it will), capacity expansion will be
required. In this section we discuss how re-use and/or Ka band
service might be used to provide additional capacity.
We will avoid consideration of the details of the techno-
logical alternatives employed. For example, there are many
possible re-use technologies that are or will be available;
some of these are coding and modulation techniques, dual polar-
ization, antenna sidelobe suppression, satellite-to-satellite
links, and the multiple beam antenna with on-board switching.
in the remainder of the paper we assume that one aggregate re-
use technology is available. The aggregate technology could
include one or more of the above technologies. Presumably the
technologies with the lowest marginal costs of use would be
selected for use first. The exact configurations of a system
would be determined by systems engineering studies. For Ka
band service, we ignore attenuation and reliability problems,
and assume the service provided is indistinguishable from C
and Ku band service.
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Analysis of Some Expansion Scenarios. The degree to
which expansion will be required depends on the demand level
in 1990. From the probability distribution on demand from
figure 5 we select three demand scenarios:
— "low"
	 : demand is 415 transponders
— "nominal":	 "	 690	 of
.- "high"	 "	 1100	 it
In order to keep the analysis simple, we will not use
the probability distributions on capacity from Figures 5
and 6. Instead we will take capacit y to be certain, and
assign the "most likely" values:
C band: capacity is 216 transponders
Ku band:	 to	 144	 of
Ka band:
	 "	 288
Finally, we will consider three technological alterna-
tives, and compare them in terms of their ability to meet
demand. They are:
A. Neither Ka band or re-use are available.
B. Ka band is available; re-use is not.
C. Ka band is not available; both the C and Ku
bands can be re-used several (3 to 20)
times, using an aggregate "package" of technologies.
The alternatives presented are just examples; the list is in
no way comprehensive.
The alternatives and the demand scenarios are laid out in
tree form in Figure 7. On the right side of the tree the
ability of the alternatives to meet each of the three demand
levels is described.
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I
A
I
Alternative Demand Level
low
A nominal.
(no Ka
or
re-use) hi h
low
B nominal
(Ka, no
re-use)
high
low
C nominal
(re-use
no Ka)
high
Outcome 1
Saturation - 87% of demand met
t
Saturation - 52% of demand met
Saturation - great undercapacity -
only 33% of demand met
Capacity exceeds demand -
only 19% of Ka band needed
Capacity slightly short of demand -
94% of demand met
Saturation - onl y 59% of demand met
Only 15% of C and Ku bands need to
be re-used
Re-use 920 of C and Ku bands - need to
approximately double capacit}
A large level of re-use is necessary -
about 3 times the C and Ku
capacity without re-use is
required.
r
Fig. 7• Scenarios
F
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in Section 4, comparing the full distribution on total
demand to the distribution on total capacity led to the conclu-
sion that there is a probability of .86 that demand will exceed
capacity if neither re-use or Ka band are available. In the
cruder analysis here, we see that in no case can demand be met
by just the C and Ku bands without re-use. At the "low"
demand level, either a small amount of re-use or a small
portion of the Ka band are required to meet demand.
At the nominal demand level, the Ka band on its own
falls just short of meeting demand. Under Alternative C,
it is necessary to re-use the C and Ku bands so that capacity
is approximately doubled. It appears that given a moderate
level of success in developing either technology, this level
of demand can be met. If a large number of re-use technolo-
gies were to become available between now and 1990, there is
the potential for a large amount of overcapacity.
At the high demand level, the addition of the Ka band
alone does not come close to meeting demand. Under Alterna-
tive C, the C and Ku bands must each be expanded to triple
their base capacity in order to meet demand. Therefore
unless Ka band and/or re-use are successfully developed by
1990, a large gap between dernand and supply could result if
the demand level is high.
tCombining Ka Band and Re-use Technologies. in general,
there are many combinations of C band re-use, Ku band re-use,
and Ka service that can be used to meet demand. Examples of
combinations that could be used to meet the nominal demand
level of 690 transponders are shown in Figure 8. The graph
on the left of Figure 8 shows possible combinations if the
Ka band is not available; the graph on the right assumes Ka
band is available (but cannot be re-used). A vertical line
drawn at any point on a graph shows how demand is met: the
amount that C band is expanded over its capacity without re-
use, the amount that Ku band is expanded over its capacity,
and whether or not the Ka band is used.
If the demand for satellite services is taken as insen-
sitive to price, then the optimal choice of satellite tech-
nologies corresponds to the problem of finding the system
configuration that meets demand at least cost. In the next
section we introduce cost data into the analysis.
6. Analysis of the Comparative Costs of Alternatives
By quantifying the uncertainties relating to cost, we
can expand the decision analysis framework of the earlier
sections of the paper. Unfortunately, the cost data avail-
able so far, from the contractor reports and from other
sources, is sketchy. Below we present a general outline of
how the analysis should proceed. We then present an example
of a cost comparison between competing technologies, using
illustrative cost data.
t
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fThe General Framework. Figure 9 shows a decision tree,
in generic form, that determines the expected cost of meeting
demand for a given technological alternative. For example,
an alternative might be the use of the Ka band, or the intro-
11	 duction of some combination of re-use technologies. There
are four state variables represented in the tree. The first
two variables are total demand, and system capacity without
re-use for each band. Comparison of the values taken on by
these variables determines to what extent frequency expansion
is needed. The last two variables are the technical perfor-
mance of the alternative at the level of service required to
meet demand (e.g., amount of re-use attainable), and the
resulting cost. In some cases the value of one or both of
these variables may be relatively certain. The last two
variables provide a general representation; they would appear
in different forms for specific analyses. The values at the
right side of the tree determine the cost of meeting the
resulting demand level. In some cases it may not be possible
to meet some high levels of demand with the given technologi-
cal alternative. "Rolling back" the tree determines the
expected cost of using the alternatives.
The cost of terrestrial technologies in direct competi-
tion with satellites will also determine the desirability of
using the various satellite technologies. The effect of com-
petition from terrestrial service will show up in the satel-
lite capture ratio in the demand model. Since we have even
less data on projected terrestrial costs than on satellite
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costs, we will assume the contractors' estimates of satellite
capture ratios included the possibility of new or improved
terrestrial technologies. As noted in Section I, it would be
desirable in the future to formulate a structural model that
approached the question of terrestrial /satellite tradeoffs
in a more comprehensive manner. Pricing policies should
certainly be included, as should latent demand--demand not
currently observable, but which might appear if the costs
were reduced substantially.
An Illustrative Cost Com2arison of Ka Service to C Band
Re-use in 1990. The following analysis uses illustrative
cost data. Its purpose is to show how uncertainty about cost
enters into the analysis. A full description of an expanded
form of the example appears in Appendix C.
We compre two technological alternatives. The alterna-
tives are simply examples; many other possibilities exist.
The alternatives are:
1. C-band re-use. The C band spectrum is re-used
through a variety of technologies. The Ku band is
used before re-use is employed on the C band. The
Ka band cannot be used. For the sake of computa
tational ease, we assume no re-use technologies are
used for the Ku band.4
2. Ka band. The Ka band can be used. No re-use is
possible For the C band or the Ku band. In perform-
ing the analysis it was found that the capacity
I
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available from the use of all three bands often
fell short of meeting demand.. Therefore re-use
of the Ka band only is allowed, say through the
use of spot beams with on-board switching.5
The decision tree for the analysis is shown in Figure
10. There are four state variables: total demand, system
capacity, cost of C-band re-use, and Ka system cost.
The total demand distribution from Figure 4 was approxi-
mated by a three-branch distribution. In order to reduce the
amount of analytic effort required, we again use determinis -
tic values for system capacity. The values used are:
C band: CAP = 216c
Ku band: CAPk
 = 144
Ka band: CAP = 288
a
c
i
►^ x
Uncertainty on system capacity could be added to the analysis
with no change in the methodology used.
The basic unit of cost used is dollars per transponder.
We are interested only in relative costs. it is assumed the
costs for the C and Ku bands are certain, while Ka band cost
is uncertain. The following data are used:
Qc = cost/transponder in C-band = $1
Qk = cost/transponder in Ku-band = $1.50
Qa 	cost/transponder in Ka-band is described
by the distribution:
Prob ( Qa = $1. 50 } _ , 5
Prob ( Qa = $ 5.0 0 / _ . 5
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A simple model of re-use cost is employed for C band
re-use (and for Ka band re-use when required). It is assumed
re-use technolog.es are added one at a time until demand is
met. Each technology allows the entire spectrum capacity to
be re-used; i.e., it doubles capacity. Cost increases for
each re-use, as follows:
CRU(n)
	
= 4mn	 (2)
where:
CRU (n)
ponder
nth ti
Q=
m =
n =
= marginal cost per equivalent trans-
when the spectrum is being used for the
me
cost per transponder without re-use
a multiplier (m > 1)
number of times the spectrum is
being re-used
This model is used for illustrative purposes. Its form
does seem plausible. The acquisition of data on re-use costs
would allow this and alternative model forms to be tested with
data and compared in terms of suitability.
For Alternative 1, C-band re-use, the multiplier is me
and is uncertain:
Prob C me =	 1.2 }	 .5
Prob me
 =	 2	 _ -5
x.
For cases where re-use is required for the Ka band, the
multiplier ma is taken to have the value of 1.2.
46
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Figure 11 shows the full decision tree, with the
deterministic capacity variable removed. At the right
side of each final node in the tree is the resulting
minimum cost for meeting demand. The cost calculations
are described in Appendix C.
The tree can be rolled back to =.eld an expected cost
of meeting demand for each alternative. The results are:
Alternative 1, (C-band re-use):
Expected cost $1621
Alternative 2, (Ka band):
Expected cost	 $1802
Because the data used here is illustrative, no defini-
tive statements can be made from the results. However, we
can see how the data could be used for decision-making pur-
poses. If Research Programs 1 and 2 were available that led
respectively to Alternatives 1 and 2 being available in 1990,
then it appears that Program 1 leads to a savings of $181
compared to Program 2. The steps involved in extending the
analysis to give explicit consideration to R&D alternatives
are discussed in the next section.
il
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Fig. 11: Decision Tree for Cost Comparison
ISection III
APPLICATION OF THE APPROA'^"U TO COM4UNICATIONS
SATELLITE R&D DECISIONS
NASA faces a range of decisions in the area of
communications satellite policy. The analysis presented
here is focused primarily on the choice between Ka band
technologies and re-use and conservation alternatives.
The discussion here illustrated how a decision analysis
approach can be used to address that question.
The analysis, however, intentionally leaves out many
issues in order to illustrate analytical techniques. The
full approach as outlined in Section I requires considera-
tion of many other issues and much more attention to data,
involvement of knowledgeable experts and decision makers,
and structural modeling of satellite supply and demand.
In addition, to be useful to NASA R&D planning, the focus
of an analysis would have to be on the R&D allocation
decisions that precede the technology deployment decisions.
Figure 12 illustrates the structure of an R&D
decision analysis. This figure shows a two-stage decision
tree for the R&D decision problem. In the first stage, R&D
allocation decisions and R&D outcomes are represented. In
the second stage the deployment decisions and outcomes are
represented. The analysis of the second deployment stage
would be similar to the analysis presented in the preceding
section.
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The analysis of the R&D stage would use the same
decision analysis techniques as illustrated in the preced-
ing section. The additional information requirements would
include information on the cost of each R&D alternative and
the probabilitites of various outcomes of the R&D.
Within this structure alternative NASA R&D programs
can be represented as alternatives. Thd value of an R&D
program would be characterized in terms of the change in
information produoed by the program including delineation
of new technical alternatives. Numerical values for this
information could be imputed from the resulting changes
in deployment decisions and reduced costs or increased
level of communications services.
We have not carried out the detailed R&D analysis in
this paper. Such an analysis should properly be carried out
with the close involvement of the relevant technical special-
ists and NASA officials. This two-stage R&D decision analysis
structure when combined with appropriate structural models of
communications markets would provide significant insights to
NASA R&D planning and could serve as a basis for a rational
allocation of NASA communications satellite R&D funds.
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Notes
1. Calio, Anthony J. Statement before the Subcommittee
on Space Sciences and Applications, Committee on
	 i
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,
Feb. 20, 1979.
2. For a general introduction to decision analysis, see:
	
a
Howard, R. A., "Decision Analysis: Applied Decision
Theory,"
North, D. W., "A Tutorial Introduction to Decision
Analysis,"
Howard, R.A., "The Foundations of Decision Analysis,"
all reprinted in Readings in Decision Analysis,
SRI International, 2nd ed., 1977.
3. See: Spetzler, C. S., and C. S. Stael von Holstein,
"Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis," reprinted
in Readings in Decision Analysis, SRI International,
2nd ed., 1977.
4. it may in fact be easier to re-use Ku band than C band,
suggesting the alternative of re-using Ku but not C
might be more realistic than the one presented here..
5. Re-use of the Ka band will likely use Ku band re-use
technology, and therefore should be feasible.
I
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APPENDIX A. Western Union Demand Data and
Comparison to the ITT Data
Below we summarize the demand data from the Western
Union (WU) report and, where possible, compare it to the
ITT data. Western Union's demand model appears to be com-
prehensive, and fairly complex. It builds up a forecast
by aggregating data on a large number of telecommunications
services.
Table A-1 shows Western Union's forecast of net long
haul traffice for voice, data and video services for 1930,
1,.990, and 2000. A terrestrial/satellite cost model is then
used to split out satellite traffic from the total long haul
traffic. The estimate of satellite traffic appears in
Table A-2.
The data for the three types of services in the above
tables are each stated in different units. This makes com-
parisons between service types and with the ITT data difficult.
The data is eventually all converted into a common unit, equiv-
alent transponders. The process used to make the conversions
a
is not known at this point. There is some indication it is
a relatively complex process, and includes consideration of
peak hour demand, among other factors.
Western Union's resulting estimates of total long haul
traffic and satellite traffic in transponders are shown in
M
Tables A-3 and A-4. In each case we have shown the demand
I	 rt is split between the three types of service.- From these data,
i	 53
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Table A-1; WU Forecast of Annual Long Haul Traffic
1980	 1990	 2000
Voice (1/2 circuits)	 2,100,000	 5,300,000	 13,700,000
Data (terabits/year)	 i,100
	
7,000	 27e600
Video (widebond channels) 	 170	 290	 450
Table A-2: WU - Forecast of Satellite Demand
1980	 1990
Voice (1/2 circuits) 	 345,000	 892,000
Data (terabits/year)	 464	 3,215
Video (wideband channels)	 79	 187
2000
2,905,000
14,533
340
Table A-3: WU - Total Long Haul Traffic in Transponders
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2100 (92%) 3407 (91%) 8828 (93%)
Data 13 (1%) 75 (2%) 320 (3%)
Video 176 (7%) 253 (7%) 357 (4%)
Total. 2289 (1000 3735 (1000 9505 (100%)
Table A-4: WU - Satellite Demand in Transponders
1980 1990 2000
Voice 346 (80%) 360 (76%) 1862 (80%)
Data 61 (1%) 42 (5%) 201 M)
Video 80 (19%) 157 (19%) 258 (11%)
Total. 432 (1000 829 (100%) 2321 (100%)
Table A-5: WU - Satellite Capture Ratio (derived) in percent
1980 1990 2000
Voice	 16 18 21
Data	 46 56 63
Video	 45 62 72
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we are able to derive a satellite capture ratio, which is
shown in Table A-5.
It is interesting to compare data from the latter
three tables to the ITT data presented in Section 2. In
order to facilitate comparison, the relevant pieces of data
will be reproduced side-by-side.
Table A-6 compares the contractors' estimates of the
way total long haul traffic is split between the three types
of service. There is a major discrepancy over the importance
of data traffic. Although the difference could be attribut-
able to differing perceptions of what is going to happen
with respect to the various technologies, it is also possible
the discrepancy stems from the use of different accounting
conventions. The fact that the results are so different for
1980, essentially the present, supports the latter view. The
discrepancy will hopefully be resolved when the full reports
become available.
In Table A-7 the estimates of satellite capture ratio
are presented. The results are again very different in 1980,
but concur to a large degree in 1990 and 2000.
The estimates of satellite demand in transponders is
presented in Table A-8. The forecasts presented in Table A-8
are the product of the full analysis of each of the contractors,
and are therefore the most interesting data for comparison_
As can be observed, the forecasts are so different that one
questions whether they are based on the same set of basic
Table A-6:
	 ITT and WU - Comparison of Split of Total
Long Haul Traffic Between Service Types - in percent
Format: (ITT data, T9U data)
1980 1990 2000
Voice (740	 92) (76,	 91) (770	 93)
Data (15,
	 1) (15,	 2) (120	 3)
Video (11,	 7) (9,	 7) (11,	 4)
f
Table A-7: ITT and WU - Satellite Ca
Format: (ITT data, WU data)
	
1980
	 1990
Voice	 (2, 16)
	 (15, 13)
Data	 (1, 46)	 (50, 56)
Video	 (50, 45)	 (60, 62)
pture Ratio - in percent
2000
(25, 21)
(60, 63)
(60,72)
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tassumptions and definitions. Although it is a major task
to critique either of the analyses and to improve them, one
apparent assumption of the WU analysis is that transponder
capacity remains constant at 50 MSPS. If the WU results
are recalculated with the increasing transponder capacities
used by ITT, the forecast for th,? total number of transponders,
as shown in Table A-9 1 is much closer to ITT's. This does
not mean one analysis is correct and the other is not, but at
least it offers one explanation for the discrepancies. We
note that there is still a major divergence in terms of the
split between voice, data and video traffic.
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Table A-8:	 ITT and WU - Demand for Transponders
Format: (ITT data, WU data)
1980 1990 2000
Voice (21, 346) (225, 630) (474,	 1862)
Data (50, 6) (345, 42) (436,	 201)
Video (35, 80) (110, 157) (211,	 258)
Total (61, 432) (690, 829) (1121,	 2321)
Table A-3: WU Demand for Transponders, modified to include
increasing transponder capacity (in 36 MHz
equivalent transponders)
1980	 1990 2000
Voice 412	 438 862
Data 7	 29 93
Video 95	 109 119
Total 514	 576 1074
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tAPPENDIX B. The Probability Distributions for Demand
for Void, Data, and Video Services
a
The distributions are shown on the next three pages.
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APPENDIX C. Expanded Version of the Illustrative
Cost Comparison
In Section b we presented an illustrative analysis
of the costs of Ka band service and C band re-use. This
appendix is an expanded version of that analysis: a third
technological alternative has been added. A full descrip-
tion of the cost calculations is also presented.
We compare three technological alternatives.
1. C-band re-use. The C band spectrum is re-used
through a variety of technologies. The Ku band
is used before re-use is employed on the C band.
No re-use technologies are available for Ku band.
The Ka band cannot be used.
2. Ka band. The Ka band can be used. No re-use is
possible for the C band or the Ku band. In per-
forming the analysis it was found that the
capacity available from the use of all three
bands often fell short of meeting demand. There-
fore re-use of the Ka band only is allowed, say
through the use of spot beams with on-board
switching.
3. Combination. Both of the above are available. The
minimum cost combination for each demand level
will be used.
The decision tree for the analysis is shown in Figure
C-1. There are four state variables: total demand, system
capacity, cost of C-band re-use,, and Ka system cost.
The total demand distribution from Figure 4 was approxi-
mated by three-branch distribution. In order to reduce the
amount of analytic effort required, we again use determinis-
tic values for system capacity. The values used are:
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C	 band: CAP 
	 = 2.16
Ku band: CAP  = 144
Ka band: CAP = 288
a
Uncertainty on system capacity could be added to the analysis
with no change in the methodology used.
The basic unit of cost used is dollars per transponder.
We are interested only in relative costs. It is assumed the
costs for the C and Ku bands are certain, while Ka band cost
is uncertain. The following data is used:
QC = cost/transponder in C-band = $1
Qk = cost/transponder in Ku-band = $1.50
Oa = cost/transponder in Ka-band is describedby the distribution:
Prob C Q 	 = $1.50 l = . 5
Prob ( Qa = $5.00 / _ . 5
A simple model of re-use cost is employed for C band re-use
(and-for Ka band re-use when required). It is assumed re-use
technologies are added one at a time until demand is met.
Each technology allows the entire spectrum capacity to be
re-used; i.e.	 it doubles capacity. Cost increases for
each re-use, as follows:
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CRU(n) = Qmn	(2)
where:
CRU(n)	 marginal cost per equivalent trans-
ponder when the spectrum is being used for the
nth time
Q = cost per transponder without re-use
m = a multiplier (m > 1)
n = number of times the spectrum is being
re-used
For Alternative 1, C-band re-use, the multiplier is
me , and is uncertain:
Prob t me = 1.2 } _ .5
Prob ` me =	 2 / _ •5
For cases'where re-use is required for the Ka band, the
multiplier ma
 is taken to have the value 1.2 .
Figure C-2 shows the full decision tree, with the
deterministic capacity variable removed. At the right side
of each final node in the tree is a resulting minimum
cost for meeting demand. The cost calculations are out-
lined below.
Cost Calculations - Alternative 1
Demand is met by first using C band, then. the Ku band,
and then by re-using the C-band as many times (or fraction
of a time) as required. For the range of demand values
encountered here, the following equation can be used.
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a
e'
M e	 Qa
C-band resulting node
re-use	 Ka cost of number
total cost	 band(cost) meeting (for use indemand \parameter demand Table C-v
Alternative
me =	 1.2
--..._
498 1
----4L;7r^
P r m	 2c _ 540 2
1.2 856 3
Alternative 1 690
C band 2 1322 4
re-use
Lpr=
_
	— — — — 1568 5
0
 1/3 2	 _ 4942 6
Qa	 1.5 514 7
415
-----	 Q	 =	 5 706 8
942 9
Alternative 2 690
Ka band 5 2131 10
1.5 1737 11
1100
-------	 5 4782 12
1.5 498 13,
1.2
5 498 14
415
1.5 514 15
5 540 16
1.5 856 17
1.2
5 856 18	 !
Alt rnative 3 690
Combin ation 1.5 942 19
2	 f
5 1322 20
1.5 1469 21
1.2
5 1568 22
1100
k 1.5 1710 23
2
5 3288 24
Fig. C-2: Full Decision Tree
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Let:	 DT-CAP
R = CAP k , where DT is demandc
INT = largest integer less than R
f = R - INT
Then the total cost is ,given by:
INT= 1
COST = Qc	 CAP 	 m^ + fm^rlT + Qk CAP 
o
The amount of re- -use required to meet demand for
each demand level is described in Table C -1. The resulting
costs are shown on the right side of the tree in Figure C-2. 	
f
Cost Calculation - Alternative 2
Demand is met by first using the C , then the Ku, and
then the Ka band, and then by re-using the Ka band if
necessary. For the range of demand values encountered here,
we use the following to calculate cost.
F
Let:
	
R = DT-CAP c-CAPk	
where DT is demand
CAP
a
INT = largest integer less than R
f = R - INT
Total cost is:
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Table C-1: How Demand is Met
t
t
E
Node Number
Alternative from Figure 11 Technologies Used*
1 1 Use 19% of Ka band
2 Use 19% of Ka band
3 Use Ka band,then re-use 15% of it
4 Use Ka band,then re-use 15% of it
5 Use Ka band,then re-use it once,
then re-use 57% of it
6 Use Ka band,then re-use it once,
then re-use 57% of it
2 7 Re-use 25% of C band
8 Re-use 25% of C band
9 Re-use C band,then re-use 53% of it
10 Re=use C band,then re=use 53 10L of it
11 Re-use C band three times,then re-use
43% of it
12 Re-use C band three t?mes,then re-use
43% pf it
3 13 Re-use 25% of C band
14 Re-use 25% of C band
15 Use 19% of Ka band
16 Re-use 25% of C band
17 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
18 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
19 Use Ka band, then re-use 15% of it
20 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
21 Re-use C band twice, then use Ka,
then re-use 9 % of C
22 Re-use C three times, then re-use
43% of it
23 Use Ka, re-use Ka, re-use 76% of
C band
24 Re-use C twice, use Ka, re-use 7% of
V
	 Ka
*C band and Ku band are always used once before C band re-use
or Ka band use.
70
COST CAP 
	 T-
INT-1 m  + fmint + Qc 
. 
CAPc + C	 CAPkIi = o
The amount of Ka band use required to meet demand for
each demand level is shown in Table C-1. The resulting
cost values appear in Figure C-2.
Cost Calculations Alternative 3
7
I
Under Alternative 3, it is assumed demand is first met
Fh
	
	 by using the C and Ku bands once. Additional capacity
is added through re-use of the C-band and/or through the use
,i
1 and subsequent re-use of the Ka band. Capacity is added
in increasing order of its marginal cost. This generates
a supply curve for capacity. Table C-2a shows the increase
in marginal cost as the C band is re-used, and as the Ka
3
3
{
band is used and subsequently re-used. When the appropriate
cost parameters are "plugged in," the supply curve is derived
N
	
	 by combining the lists for the two technologies and selecting
alternatives in order of increasing marginal cost. Since
there are two possible values of Ka system cost and two
r
	
	possible values of C band re-use cost, a total of 4 supply
curves were needed in order to calculate the costs at the
end of the tree. The development of the supply curve forl
one set of parameters is shown in Table C-2b the resulting
supply curve appears in Figure C-3. For a given demand
value, total cost is the area under the supply curve out to
71
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Table C-2a. Marginal Cost of Increased Capacity
C Band Re-use:
Increased Capacity
	 Marginal Cost
in Transponders
	 per Transponder
first 216
	 me Qc
next 216	 mc2 QC
next 216	 mc3 Qc
next 216	
m c 
4 QC
Ka Band Introduction and Subsequent Re-use:
Increased Capacity Marginal Cost
in Transponders per Transponder.
first 288 (introduction) Qa
next	 288 (first re-use) ma Qa
next	 288 ma Qa
next	 288 ma2Qa
next 288 ma3Qa
f
1..
Table C-2b: Development of the Supply Curve for
One Set of Cost Parameters
Parameters: inc = 1.2 , Qa = 1.5 , ma = 1.2
C Band:
Increased Capacity	 Marginal Cost
in Transponders	 per Transponder
first 216	 1.20
next 216	 1.44
next 216	 1.73
next 216	 2.07
Ka Band:
Increased Capacity 	 Marginal Cost
in Transponders	 per Transponder
first 288	 1.50
next 288	 1.80
next 288	 2.16
next 288	 2.59
Resulting Supply Curve:
t
f
t
Increased Capacity Cumulative Marginal Cost
in Transponders Capacity Increase Per Transponder
first 216 216 1.20
next	 217 432 1.44
next	 288 720 1.50
next	 216 936 1.73
next	 288 1224 1.80
next	 216 1440 2.07
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the demand value. Table C-1 shows how demand was met for
each of the branches of the decision tree pertaining to
Alternative 3.
Results
Because the data used here is illustrative, no defini-
tive statements can be made from the results. However, it
is interesting to analyze the tree in Figure C-2 both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
The tree can be rolled back to yield an expected cost
of meeting demand for each alternative. The results are:
Alternative 1, (C-band re-use): Expected cost = $1621
Alternative 2, (Ka band): Expected Cost = $1802,
Alternative 3, (Combination): Expected Cost = $1171
If Research Programs 1, 2, and 3 were available that
led respectively to Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 being available
in 1990, then it appears that Program 3 leads to a savings
of $450 compared to Program 1, and a savings of $631 compared
to Pro3ram 2. If the costs of the research program were
available, the net savings generated could be compared.
In SectionII, comparing the full distribution on
total demand to the distribution on total capacity led to
the conclusion that there is a probability of .86 that
demand will exceed capacity if neither re-use or Ka band
are available. In the cruder analysis here, we see from
75
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r f
i	 R
i K
	
	 Table C-1 that in no case can demand be met by just the C
and Ku bands without re-use. In the case of the lowest
demand value, 415 transponders, demand is met either by
using 19% of the Ka band or by re-using 25% of the C band.
For the higher demand levels of 690 and 1100 transponders,
the introduction of the Ka band without re-use is not
sufficient to meet demand. It appears likely that re-use
will be required by 1990. At the highest demand level,
extensive re-use is necessary. We also note that the
lowest cost "solutions" involve mixing re-use of the C and
Ka bands.
.o
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Abstract
t
This paper addresses problems associated with the allocation of
a scarce resource--the radio frequency spectrum. It is observed that
the current method of allocation very likely does not allocate the
resource to those most valuing its use. Because users of the spectrum
are not required to pay the "opportunity cost" of their spectrum use
(defined as the benefits foregone by not employing the resource in its.
best alternative use) they are, in effect, being subsidized. Further-
more, there is little or no incentive for them to improve and conserve
their use of the resource. If anything, incentives run counter to
this goal.
A number of schemes to encourage more economically efficient use
of the resource have been proposed. These range from institution of a
free market in radio frequency rights to implementation of federally
administered usage fees. The first part of the paper sets out economic	 j
criteria by which the effectiveness of resource allocation schemes can
i
be judged, and offers some thoughts on traditional objections to
implementation of market characteristics into frequency allocation.
1 The second part of the paper discusses the problem of dividing
s
orbit and spectrum between two satellite services sharing the same band,
but having significantly different system characteristics. The problem
is compounded by the likelihood that one service will commence operation
much sooner than the other. Some alternative schemes are offered that,
within proper international constraints, could achieve a desired flexi-
bility in the division of orbit and frequency between the two services
domestically over the next several years. 	 a
lli
I.	 WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
t	 a. Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about how the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC) allocate a scarce resource - the radio
frequency spectrum. The interest in this subject stems from the
fact that radio spectrum [1] is allocated in a manner so radically
different from that for most other.resources in our economy. From
the standpoint of economic efficiency, this method of allocation is
considered by many to be highly questionable.
The present method of radio spectrum allocation [2] has its roots
in the Radio Act of 1927 (Public Law 69-63z), the purpose of which was
stated in the preamble as follows [3].
".. . this Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate
and foreign radio transmissions and communications within the
United States, its territories and possessions; to maintain the
control of the United States over all the channels of interstate
and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of
such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals,
firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions,
and periods of the license."
Most of the provisions of this act were later incorporated into
the Communications Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-416), the basis of the FCC's
current authority. In effect, the federal government nationalized
the radio spectrum, apparently out of the fear that continued unregu-
lated use would result in levels of radio interference rendering the
resource entirely useless [4].
1
As "trustee" of the resource, the federal government is charged
with the following significant responsibilities:
Sec. 1, ". . . to make available, so far as possible, to all
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges.
Sec. 303(c), "Assign bands of frequencies to the various
classes of stations, and assign frequencies for each individ-
ual station and determine the power which each station shall
use and the time during which it may operate"
u .	 Sec. 303(f), "Make such regulations not inconsistent with law
as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between sta-
tions and to carry out the provisions of this Act: Provided,
however, that changes in the frequencies, authorized power,
or in the times of operation o f
 any station, shall not be
made without the consent of the station licensee unless,
after a public hearing, the Commission shall determine that
such changes will promote public convenience or interest or
will serve public necessity, or the provisions of this Act
will be more fully complied with"
Sec. 303(g), "Study new uses for radio, provide for experi-
mental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest
These provisions underlie the present "modus operandi" of the
Federal Communications Commission. As it is now, the FCC must decide
how, and by whom, radio frequencies will be used [5].
Aside from the issue of the political implications ofcentralized
control of an information medium (certainly not to be ignored in this
case), the FCC faces the problem that plagues any central allocatory
authority: insufficient genuine information to make intelligent judg-
ments on how to distribute the resource under its purview. This is
not to say that applicants and licensees are not eager to supply
plenty of information, but it is information inevitably colored to
reflect the vested interest of its supplier [6]. Sorting the
2
tgenuinely relevant information out of reams of data is an
unenviable task often far beyond the capability of an agency
with the FCC's resources.
One place market allocation appears to be generally superior
I
to administrative control is in the economy of information required
to guide resources to their highest valued use [7). No single en-
tity needs to know who has the greatest need or who will make best
r
use of a resource. All relevant information about the marginal value
of a resource to those actively competing for its use is contained in
one number--the market place. In aggregate, the amount of information
in the economy can remain immense, but the decentralization of
decision-making eliminates the transaction cost associated with
transferring large amounts of information to a centralized authority,
and tends to ensure that decisions are based only on relevant
information [8].
Owen set out three serious flaws in present methods of radio
frequency allocation and assignment as follows [9]:
1) There is no formal mechanism for trading spectrum
rights 'among users;
2) no price is paid for use ofthe resource;
3) the criteria by which users are chosen are vague and,
from the standpoint of both quality and economic
efficiency, often counter-productive.
Both the first and second flaws have significant impacts upon
innovation and the developiiient of rew services that often follow it.
Spokesmen for the development of new communications services often.
find themselves i,n conflict with the FCC over whether or not frequencies
i	 3
y _	 _
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will be allocated to potential new, but as yet non-existent,
services. They correctly perceive that failure to secure frequency
allocations now for future services may preclude those services
from coming into being. Without some assurance that these alloca-
tions can be obtained, people hesitate to invest in development
and construction of equipment that would be rendered useless by
shortages of usable frequencies.
One cause of this dilemma is the effective nontransferability
of either present or future radiation rights [101. Under the present
system, there is often no incentive for old users to yield to new,
even when the new user would be willing to pay the older user much
more than the value that the old user would assign to his unit of
spectrum. If old users perceived spectrum use as having a price,
either because they paid a fee, or because they could have all or
part of their radiation rights bought out by new users, then there
would indeed be an incentive for old services to yield use of the
spectrum to more valuable new services. In such a world, providers
of new services would know that, when the time came, they would be
able to obtain frequencies. The only uncertainty would be over what
the price would be (even this uncertainty could be reduced by an
appropriate futures contract with a present user). From the stand-
point of risk, this would be preferable to the current system,
where the new service has no assurance that spectrum with the de-
sired characteristics can be obtained in the desired amounts, re-
gardless of its willingness to pay the price.
4
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tCertain implications of nontransferability of any rights can
t	
be gleaned from the following proposition, derived from welfare
economics:
If any number of parties enter into a transaction of their
own volition, and if the transaction has only nonnegative
impacts on nonparticipating parties, then social welfare
is unambiguously increased by the transaction.
If there is a nonparticipating party on which there is an adverse
(negative) impact, it may still be possible to expand the definition
of the transaction to include compensation to this party and satisfy
the above criterion. If parts of such expanded transactions are allowed
to be only potential (that is, transactions that could take place but
won't necessarily) then the above becomes the familiar "Kalaor Criteri,)n"
[111.
If transactions of the type above are blocked, as present communi-
cations law dictates that they are, then society has foregone an in-
crease in its welfare. This is the primary reason for the economist's
interest in the shortcomings-of current radio frequency allocation
methods.
In a world of perfect markets, all transactions would be of the
type described above (to be perfect, impacts upon nonparticipants
should be strictly zero). Furthermore, when certain familiar assump-
tions are made about the preferences of the participants in this
market (nonsaturation, etc.) and transactions costs (they are zero or
sufficiently negligible) then the resources allocated by the market
will be allocated in an economically efficient manner. This
5
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teconomically efficient allocation of resources is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for maximization of social welfare
(however, within reason, it may be defined. Arriving at this
definition is the essence of the political problem.).
The stated proposition can be applied even when markets are
imperfect, though greater scrutiny of a transaction's effects upon
the welfare of third parties is generally required. The presence
of monopolies may tend to create more equity and externality prob-
lems, but it is still possible, within these constraints, to define
certain resource allocations as being "better" or "worse" than
others.
Besides inhibiting transfer of rights, "zero price" spectrum
use reduces incentive to economize on its use. Thus, spectrum (and
orbit too) is always perceived as being in short supply. NASA, for
example, sets out the coming saturation of limited spectrum and
geostationary orbit resources as the motivation for initiating a
research and development program to open the 734';/30 GHz band to use
by communications satellites. Technologies that make use of the
resource more extensive (for example, higher powe r traveling wave
tubes making higher frequencies usable) and more intensive (multi-
beam antennas, digital compression, etc.) are seen as a way to
increase the resource supply, and thus close the gap between supply
and demand.' Others, however, have noted a tendency of technology
based efforts to increase supply to also increase demand, by making
new services possible [121. Thus, the technologist becomes much
like the dog chasing its tail--running faster and faster but never
quite catching up.
6
This perceived shortage is a consequence of the fact that
no price is paid for use of the resource. In a properly function-
ing market, no shortage would exist. In such a world, NASA would
see its objective not as closing the gap between supply and demand,
but as lowering the resource cost to the user (or, alternatively,
expanding the number of services that can be offered on a profit-
able basis). Also, there would be greater incentive for private
sector users to develop ways to use the resource more intensively,
since this would directly benefit them financially. NASA's emphasis
would probably.shift towards (higher risk) extensive development.
Finally, conventional cost-benefit analysis will tend to mis-
estimate the return on com unications R&D. iany of the "benefits"
measured by such analyses are, in part, measures of the cost of
miscallocating a resource. Many of the services now excluded (or
limited) by the present spectrum allocation and assignment process
may have greater value than some of those included (a frequently
cited example of what appears to be such a case is land mobile
radio vs. UHF television frequency allocations). Likewise, costs
associated with some high value services now operating will be
overestimated due to their being required to use a suboptimal mix
of inputs. If the resource were allocated in a manner that was
"economically efficient," then one could be sure that it was only
marginal services whose costs and benefits were being compared, and
that X11 cost estimates were being based on optimal input mixes.
As it is now, most studies of this sort are largely "stabs in the
dark."
I
7
F
tb. Economically Efficient Spectrum Use
The word "efficiency" is generally used in several different
contexts, often leading to confusion. For example, some engineers
characterize efficient spectrum use as accomplishment of a given
task by use of technology that minimizes required bandwidth, power,
and area of unwanted spillover. Under this definition, efficient
use of the resource is identified with minimum possible use, even
though such minimal use would require state-of-the-art (expensive)
technology across the board.
Another (and I would argue more reasonable) approach to judg-
ing efficiency of spectrum use invokes economic efficiency as the
chief criterion. Economic efficiency is characterized by optimum
use of all resources required for production of a given output.
Here, "optimum" means minimization of the total opportunity cost
of all inputs used to produce a given output. Opportunity cost is
defined as the value of benefits foregone by not employing a given
input (i.e., spectrum) in its best alternative use. As an aside,
it can be noted that, in a perfect market economy, aggregate oppor-
tunity cost minimization corresponds to aggregate profit maximiza-
tion [13). If the total opportunity cost of all inputs used in a
production process exceeds the value of output, then the activity
in question is unprofitable relative to other possible activities;
thus, one expects resources to flow to the other (more profitable)
activities.
Economic efficiency criteria treat spectrum as just one of
many inputs into a given output. Furthermore, inputs can be
r
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substituted for each other. For example, one can use less spectrum
by using more sophisticated technology, and vice versa. In deciding
how much of each to use, the producr, ,.
 (here a common carrier or	 r
broadcaster) compares the relative cost.of each, and then alters
the mix of inputs so as to minimize total cost.
Under the present allocation methods, the cost of spectrum use
to the user (zero, assuming one can get the assignment) does not
reflect the opportunity cost (which is greater than zero, since use
of a given frequency necessarily excludes certain other potentially
worthwhile uses of the same frequency in the same area). The result
of this is that common carriers, broadcasters and other users of the
spectrum are motivated to substitute greater spectrum use, which
they perceive . as cost-free, for use of more expensive technologies
that reduce or eliminate spectrum use. At the same time, potential
spectrum users who cannot get an assignment from the Federal Communi-
satins Commission (FCC) are forced to substitute alternative resources
in the production of the goods or services.they wish to provide, or
forego production altogether. Under the FCC's current allocation
and assignment scheme, there is nothing to ensure that spectrum is
allocated among potential users in such a way as to maximize its con-
tribution to society's aggregate economic product, and good reason
to believe that it is not.
The solution to this problem is not, as is often proposed, to
accommodate all possible users of the spectrum by use of technology
sophisticated enough to allow everyone who wishes to use the spectrum
to do so. This kind of approach seeks to reduce the opportunity cost
of spectrum use to zero by substitution of other resources (such
as more sophisticated Lequipment), but fails to recognize that this
requires an increase in the opportunity cost of the other resources
used in the production of a specified level of output. The total
opportunity cost of all inputs is unlikely to be minimized by such
an approach.
The best (in the sense of economically efficient) solution to
the spectrum allocation problem can only be achieved if the cost
of spectrum use to the user can be made to reflect its opportunity
cost. If this could be achieved, competitive economic forces would
then tend to push spectrum assignments into the hands of those
groups or individuals making the most economically productive use of
the resource.
If the cost of the spectrum use truly reflected opportunity
cost, spectrum use by new industries (such as a Land Mobile or
Broadcast Satellite Service) that proved to be more profitable than
existing uses would drive up the cost of spectrum use to the point
where the existing users would be forced to reduce or eliminate
their use. Thus, new communications services would not face uncer-
tainty about whether or not spectrum assignments could be acquired
that might otherwise stifle their growth.
There are a number of ways in which the cost of spectrum use
could conceivably be made to reflect opportunity costa Among these
are institution of a free market for spectrum where assignments can
be bought and sold, institution of a spectrum use fee by a centralized
regulatory authority, or some mix of markets and regulation. The
10
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	 market's approach alleged drawback resides in the difficulty of
defining and enforcing spectrum property rights (although it can
be effectively argued that this same problem plagues the current
system). The drawback to centralized allocation with usage fees
is that an overwhelming amount of information is required in order
to accurately calculate fees that reflect opportunity cost (the
shadow pricing prob.:m).
Nevertheless, definite improvement in the current FCC alloca-
tion and assignment process can very likely be achieved, even
though a "best of all possible worlds" solution may be impossible.
Allowing parties now holding licenses to openly buy and sell all
or part of their, frequency assignments would institute market char-
acteristics tending to lead to more efficient spectrum utilization.
In spite of the evident merit of applying such market mechanisms
to the allocation of spectrum, however, there remain some tradi-
tional objections that must be addressed [14].
c. The Property Rights Problem
It is generally agreed that market mechanisms cannot be
successfully introduced into spectrum allocation without first
arriving at a workable definition of spectrum property rights. It
has been argued that transferable rights for a resource as ethereal
as the radio spectrum could become very complicated indeed. For
example, determination of who is liable for interference expevi-
enced by certain party would not be trivial in the case where the
W	
interference is caused by intermodulation (although, again, this is
11
no different from the current situation. However, it would be
i
premature to conclude, based on this alone, that enforcement costs
[151 for transferable spectrum property rights need be prohibitively
high.:
The relat aively low cost of enforcing property rights in more
"concrete" resources, such as land, does not result from the defi-
nition of these property rights being any simpler than those proposed
for spectrum. A small amount of reflection on the nature of land
property rights reveals that they are, in fact, a very complicated
set of rights, none of which are absolute in nature. For e)-ample,
landowners may keep trespassers out, but not kill them; grow corn,
but not marijuana; make noise, but not so much that their neighbors
can never sleep. Zoning laws make these rights even more restric-
tive. Land property rights are never exclusive in the sense of
society abdicating all control over land use.
It is not so much the level of complexity in a right's defini-
tion that determines enforcement costs, but cdrtainly what the right
entails. If A uses B's land without B's authorization, there is
little doubt that a court will find A liable for damages to B. Cer-
tainly about what the outcome of an adjudication will be tends to
deter events of this kind from occurring. The disputes most likely
to end up in court are those associated with fuzzy delineation of a
right. For example, the level of noise A is allowed to make on his/her
property is generally not well defined. If A's turbine test facility
is sufficiently close to neighbor B's recording studio, one expects
there is a good chance the two will end up in court. Sufficient
12
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precision in the definition of property rights would go far
towards keeping spectrum users out of court.
The other component significantly affecting enforcement cost
j	 is the cost of detection. In the land rights example, it was
reasonable to assume that B would detect A's violation of B's
property right with high probability at very little cost. However,
if the probability of detecting A's violation (and identifying A
as the offender) is sufficiently low, and the penalty incurred by A
upon being detected is sufficiently lore, one might expect A to vio-
late B's right even when it is certain that A would lose to B in an
adjudication.
This last problem can be formally illustrated in the following
manner:
a = state of the world in which A's violation
goes undetected;
b = state of the world in which no violation
takes place;
c = state of the world in which A is caught
and punished,
p = the probability A assesses of being caught;
u(x) = utility of state of the world x.
Making the assumption that U(a)>U(b)>U(c), construct the func-
tion (1-p)U(a) +p1J(c). This is A's expected utility of violating
B's right, and is a strictly decreasing function of p. Furthermore,
there exists a p between 0 and 1 such that U(b)>(1-p)U(a)+pU(c) for
all probabilities greater than p. That is, above some minimum proba-
bility of detection, A will not wish to violate B's right. If one
accepts the notion that the perceived probability of detection tends
i I	 t*:___
to be positively c9rrelated with society's actual expenditure on
detection, then one can conclude that an increase in this expendi-
ture will tend to decrease the number of people violating other
i	
people's rights. Whether the expenditure that maximizes the net
social dividend (defined as the value of the provisions prevented
minus the cost of detection) will be within reasonable limits is
^`.	 an as yet unresolved question for spectrum rights.
Also, observe that an increase in the penalty for a violation
would decrease U(c) and, therefore, the minimum detection probabil-
ity above which A would not violate B's rights. Thus, under both
the current and market techniques for spectrum allocation, there is
some flexibility in that higher penalties can be, to some extent,
substituted for detection capability, thereby lowering enforcement
costs [161.
DeVany et al. [171 have proposed definition of spectrum property
rights in terms of hours of transmission, in and out of band limits
on radiated power outside a specified geographical area, and band-
width. The notion is that property rights defined in these "output"
terms would be much easier to transfer in whole or part than rights
specified in terms of inputs, such a, s transmitter power or antenna
height. In the case of satellites, system performance requirements
are already defined in terms of limits on power —flux-density (PFD)
over specified geographical areas. This closely approximates the
Time-Area-Spectrum (TAS) property right advocated by DeVany et al.,
though additional complications are introduced by the possibility
of interference on earth to space transmissions, especially when the
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power levels of these uplinks differ significantly. These
additional complications manifest themselves in the form of
the resource called "orbit." Segments of the geostationary arc
in space are the counterpart of areas of geographical coverage
on earth. Any discussion of satellite systems must account for
both.
d. Spectrum Monopoly
Besides enforcement costs, concern has been voiced over the
strong possibility that markets in radio frequencies would be
largely monopolized by the national broadcasting networks in some
bands, and by AT&T in others, in an attempt to squeeze out competi-
tion. This tendency could be especially severe in the case of AT&T
where regulated rate of return monopoly services could be used to
r	 cross-subsidize services offered in competitive markets. In princi-
ple, AT&T might attempt to squeeze out competitors by buying up
spectrum, thereby raising its price to competitors and reducing the
volume of services they are able to offer. The standard response
to this concern--that antitrust laws can respond to such efforts in
the usual manner--is not entirely satisfactory in a time when many
large corporations have already demonstrated the capability to drag
such proceedings out for years. It would be far preferable to avoid
this situation if at all possible.
On the other hand, there are numerous ways in which the tele-
phone company can cross-subsidize services without resorting to
spectrum hoarding at all. Spectrum hoarding would succeed as a
squeeze out technique either by completely excluding competitors
from use of the spectrum or by forcing them to charge higher prices,
allowing the monopoly to undercut them. Total exclusion would seem
to make what is occurring too obvious. Hoarding just enough to
drive up the competition's prices to where they can be undercut
would seem to be a roundabout tray of achieving something that could
be more easily achieved without hoarding spectrum (i.e. instead of
buying up spectrum to hold idle, why not just directly undercut the
competition's price?).
Finally, it is not clear that a spectrum market heavily domi-
nated by a regulated monopoly would be worse than the current situ-
ation, nor is it clear that the AT&T monopoly is any more constrained
by the current FCC from undesirable market practices than they would
be if spectrum were allocated by the market place. There is no
reason to believe that monopoly or oligopoly could not be just as
effectively regulated within the context of a market system as with-
out. This particular objection is largely beside the point.
e. Equipment Lifetimes
An oft-cited argument for maintaining the status quo is that the
rigidity of present spectrum allocation methods is necessary to pro-
tect the integrity of investment in long-lived radio equipment. The
fallacy of this argument lies in the failure to distinguish between
the "technical" and "economic" lifetime of equipment. Technical
lifetimes may be very long indeed, but it is the economic lifetime
that is relevant in economic decisions. Tax and depreciation policies
16
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tin the United States, coupled with the rate of innovation and
resulting shifts in demands, tend to make the economic lifetimes
of most technologies significantly shorter than their technical
lifetimes. Innovation in the computer industry, for example, has
been so rapid that most machines are scrapped and replaced long
before there is any danger of their wearing oat.
Economic decisions always involve the comparison of present
and expected future alternatives in the present moment. One does
not continue to fly Ford tri-motors simply because the equipment
has not worn out if conditions of demand are such that the profita-
bility of flying jet aircraft is greater. In fact, one of the
strongest arguments against the rigidity of the present system may
be that it stifles innovation in comunications by favoring existing
users at the expense of innovative new users. Airlines wishing to
fly new aircraft have little difficulty obtaining pilots or fuel
used by airlines operating older aircraft when conditions of demand
warrant it, but anybody wishing to offer a new radio service may
have great difficulty obtaining spectrum from existing users,
even when the demand for the new service is high.
f. Indirect Prices for Resource Use
A not uncommonly heard objection to pricing spectrum use per
se is that users already pay an indirect price through their invest-
ment in radio equipment and operating expenses However, attempting
to apply this argument to other analogous situations in the economy
reveals its weakness. Cars and gasoline, for example, like radio
I
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Iequipment and radio spectrum, are both complements anJ su'ostitutes
(i.e., more fuel efficient cars can be substituted '°o,^ greater
gasoline consumption, yet the two are always used together). One
would be on very weak ground indeed if one attempted to argue that,
because people must buy cars to use gasoline, charging a price of
zero for gasoline would not lead to inefficient use of the resource.
Based on this premise, one could make a strong case that the govern-
ment should completely subsidize gasoline use for reasons of equity.
If any conclusion can be reached from the ongoing debate over
the viability of spectrum markets, it is that further theorizing is
unlikely to resolve the question. The economic case has been made.
Just as the theoretical physicist must at some point take predic-
tions to the laboratory before further theoretical progress can be
made, so it is that economists, both pro and con, must attempt an
"experiment" on the viability of spectrum markets before confidence
can be placed in their conclusions. Such an experiment for land
mobile radio services has already been proposed by Dunn and Owen
[181. Along these lines some thoughts on how market techniques
could be applied to the assignment of orbit-spectrum to satellites
are presented in the next section of this paper.
II. MARKET ALLOCATION OF ORBIT-SPECTRUM FOR SATELLITE SERVICES
At the time the first man-made earth-orbiting satellites were
launched, few expected or believed possible the explosion in the use
D
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Iof communication satellites that has occurred, Yet, problems
resulting from this rapid growth illustrate the drawbacks in the
current method of frequency allocation and assignment. There are
few places where the need for administrative flexibility is more
apparent than in the allocation and assignment of frequencies to
services undergoing rapid technologically induced changes.
From the standpoint of system performance, optimum frequencies
for satellites lie between about 1 and 10 gigahertz=-the so-called
"space window." Because this part of the spectrum was already
heavily occupied by the time communication satellites went into
service, only one of the three bands currently allocated to communi-
cation satellites falls within this region (4/6 gigahertz band).
The other two bands (12/14 gigahertz and 20/30 gigahertz) require
substantially higher transmission porters to overcome effects of
atmospheric attenuation. Of these, the 12/14 gigahertz band is only
now corning into use while the technology to make the 20/30 band use-
able remains in the future. It is highly doubtful that the present
approach to frequency allocation has minimized the aggregate cost of
providing all services, both space and terrestrial, using frequen-
cies above one gigahertz.
Before proceeding with the discussion of orbit and frequency
allocation for satellite services, it is necessary to consider the
international context of the orbit-frequency allocation and assigned
problem.
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocates fre-
quencies to services on a worldwide basis. This is achieved through
19
administrative radio conferences in which ITU member nations attempt
to arrive at a consensus as to how radio frequencies will be used.
Because its success is based on consensus politics, the ITU
must attempt to minimize the international constraints on domestic
decisions about frequency use within a particular country. The
United States, for one, has traditionally argued for the maximum
flexibility in determination of how a nation will use frequencies
i`	 within its borders. Services offered in one part of the world fre-
quently will not even exist in another part. Consequently, strict
worldwide allocation of frequencies would lead to tremendous waste
in resource use.
The U.S. is fortunate in the respect that, within its region
of,the world, only a handful of nations are in potential conflict
over use of orbit and spectrum. This contrasts with the European
situation where many developed nations are concentrated within a
relatively small geographical region. Thus, it was tentatively con-
cluded by a 1974 Rand Corporation report that, except for Canada,
the probably demand for satellite systems of other countries in the
western hemisphere (ITU Region 2) can be net without special coordi-
nation with U.S. systems [197. In fact, most of the orbital arc best
suited for use by South American nations does not coincide with seg-
ments best suited for U.S. and Canadian systems.
If this conclusion is indeed true, then reliance on market tech-
niques for domestic satellite orbit-spectrum assignment becomes a
much simpler political problem internationally than if domestic and
international assignments cannot be decoupled. More is said about
this shortly.
20
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While people tend to describe satellite systems in terms of
the services they provide, it is often useful to think of them
purely in terms of their system characteristics. High-powered
satellites, such as those being considered for space broadcasting,
offer the possibility of small diameter (less sensitive) earth
station antennas, thus allowing for systems employing many rela-
tively cheap earth stations. Systems in the fixed sa-Lellite.ser-
vice generally employ relatively few earth stations using large
diameter (more sensitive) antennas and low powered satellites.
Interference between the two types of systems tends to be more
severe than interference between systems of the same type. Two
reasons for this are, 1) even though larger antennas have vela-
tively high gains, they also have sidelobes that can be illuminated
by interfering satellites and, 2) when the interfering satellite is
transmitting a higher power density than the satellite transmitting
the desired signal, then illumination of the sidelobe results in
relatively more interference noise in the receiver.
Approaches to sharing between services using the two system
types described have been studied relatively extensively and are
fairly well understood [201. The unsolved problem lies not in how
to share between the two services but in how to determine, on the
basis of future utility, how much orbit-spectrum must be received
for each. If the future demand and course of technological develop-
ment for each service could be predicted with certainty, there would
be no problem in deciding how much orbit-spectrum to allocate to
each service at any given time. The difficulty arises both from the
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likelihood that one service--the fixed satellite service, will grow
more rapidly within the next few eyars than the other--the broadcast
satellite service, and from uncertainty about what technologies will
become available to alleviate sharing problems between the two.
One question one might ask is: Should spectrum be held idle
for the future use of a service that might possibly come into
existence but is not certain to do so? Holding spectrum idle neces-
sarily excludes its use by currently viable services. The opportun-
ity costs incurred may very well outweigh the discounted future
benefits of the service for which the spectrum is being reserved.
It is unlikely that a satellite service expected to come into exis-
tence many years down the road could be justified if this were to
require that a significant amount of usable spectrum be held idle
for this entire period.
At least one person, Dr. Charles Jackson, has proposed a world-
wide orbit-spectrum market for satellites [21]. Under the Jackson
proposal, orbit-spectrum rights are preallotted to each ITU nation.
Nations may then lease their rights (which specify a band of frequen-
cies and a certain number of degrees of the geostationary arc loca-
tionally unspecified) to the highest bidder through a market run by
j	 an international body (the IFRQ). The rent from the lease of an
orbit-spectrum right goes to its "oviner." Once a system operator
has acquired enough rights to protect himself from interference, he
registers his satellite system with the IFRa, just as at present.
Jackson's premise is that this approach would defuse much of
the growing political opposition that developing nations have to use
f
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of the orbit and spectrum by the developed nations without
requiring that economic efficiency be sacrificed. Jackson states
that, "the arguments for the necessity and possibilityy of a
spectrum market for international satellites are even stronger
than the arguments for the use of market allocation for many domes-
tic spectrum uses. Sloth equity and efficiency considerations are
involved in the allocation of the orbital-frequency resource. A
well designed market system should be able to separate these two
problems" [221.
Unfortunately, there is reason to question the last statment.
Much of what occurs in the international forum is heavily colored
by ideology that may not even accept the principles outlined t.
Jackson and the first part of this paper. even if orbital slots;
that could be sold or leased were preallocated to every nation in a
manner deemed equitable (a proposal counter to traditional U.S.
positions), several political problems would still remain. Some
nations, initially finding relatively fete buyers for their orbital
rights (and all buyers being from developed nations), might see them-
selves as victims of the monopsony power of the developed nations.
Coalitions of nations might decide that the political advantages
gained in other areas by using+ their allotted orbit-, spectrLIM rights
for leverage would outweigh the relatively small revenues they might
receive from leasing them to users.
Problems of both sorts above have stalled the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea for a number of years on the question
of deep seabed resource development. One can make a reasonable case
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that leasing of deep seabed tracts by an internatioial authority
to high technology companies for a limited term of years at a
price roughly approximating the economic rent of the activity is
an equitable way to proceed with the development of deep seabed
resources, especially when the proceeds from the lease are redis-
tributed to lesser developed nations. However, it is only recently,
after several years of negotiation, that some of the lesser developed
nations have begun to acknowledge that only the economic rent, and
not the entire revenue, from these activities should be subject to
redistribution. Maoy nations, seeing that they have little to gain
at best from deep seabed resource developM ent, have sought to use
the issue for political leverage. There is reason to believe that
much of the same kind of thing would make implementation of the
Jackson proposal on a worldwide scale difficult, regardless of merit.
However, it might be possible, as will be discussed, to employ a
regional or even domestic variation of the Jackson plan.
At present, three approaches to allocation of the 11.7 to 12.7
GHz (downlink) band appear to have reasonable probabilities for
adoption in ITU Region 2::
1. Rigid Allotment Plan with EIRP's, orbital spacing,
frequency assignments specified; slots, channels
assigned to nations.
2. Continuation of first-come, first-served principle;
fixed and broadcasting satellites sharing the band,
broadcasting satellites constrained to orbital arc
segments from 75 0 - 95° W (Month America) and 1400
- 174` W.
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3. Continuation of first-come, first-served ,
principle, separation of services by frequency.
The third approach listed characterizes the expected U.S.
position at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference. How-
ever, there are two ways to divide fixed and broadcast satellite
services by frequency, only one of which is acceptable to U.S.
interests. For example, the FCC's Tenth Notice of Inquiry (Docket
20271) recommended that the broadcasting satellite service be given
a primary allocation in the 12.2 to 12.75 gigahertz band (shared
with terrestrial fixed and broadcasting services), and that the
fixed satellite service be given a primary allocation in the 11.7
to 12.2 gigahertz band. This arrangement would require either a
power-flux-density limit on broadcasting satellites or a detailed
frequency coordination plan between broadcasting satellites and
terrestrial services, and would cause decreased geographical flexi-
bility. Too stringent power-flux-density limits mioht preclude the
use of earth terminals small enough for low-cast direct satellite-
to-home broadcasting.
While some (mostly kegion :. countries interested in satellites
primarily for broadcasting) deem this last aspect to be bad, the econ-
omist would note that if the value of the additional fixed satellite
services that can be offered because of power-flux-density limitations
outweighs the additional value of direct broadcasting from satellite
to home (as opposed, for example, to broadcast from satellite to
community area TV reception stations) then this would be the economi-
t
	
cally efficient solution. High powered broadcast satellites required
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for direct broadcast may require the use of more orbit and spectrum
than is justified by the additional aggregate economic value.
Lower powered broadcast satellites broadcasting to community area
TV reception stations would generally allow more fixed satellite
services to be offered in the same segment of orbit.
Although this latter solution very likely is the one that maxi-
mizes the aggregate economic value of the services using the band,
most of the benefits from this approach accrue to nations not wish-
ing to use broadcast satellites (mostly developed nations). Even
though aggregate economic value is maximized, all parties may not
be better off than under alternative schemes. Unless some way is
found to redistribute benefits among nations (Jackson's satellite
market being one possibility) under the plan proposed by the U.S.,
stiff opposition can be expected.
An alternative suggested allocation includes both broadcasting
and fixed satellites in the 11.7 to 12.75 gigahertz band, with
higher powered satellites (i.e., broadcasting) initially assigned
to the 11.7 and 12.2 band and lower powered satellites (in the fixed
satellite service) initially assigned to the 12.2 to 12.75 gigahertz
band. It has been argued that this proposal makes (technically)
efficient use of the orbit and spectrum by grouping satellites of
similar characteristics and initially constraining higher powered
satellites to those frequencies shared with few terrestrial services
(making sharing with terrestrial services easier). One objection to
this flexible assignment scheme is that accommodations for broadcast-
ing satellites could disappear if faster-groaning fixed satellite
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'	 services end up requiring the lower part of the band as weld.
Allowing the fixed satellite service to use the lonerR art of the
band at all may incur international opposition from other Region 2
countries wishing to use this part of the bhhd only for broadcasting
y^
satellites. On the other hand, insistance by these countries that the
11.7 to 12.2 gigahertz band be held idle indefinitely, even in the
G
face of expanding demand for fixed satellite services, might be
unacceptable to the U.S., and very likely economically inefficient.
If frequency division of the sort proposed by the U.S. is not
t	 adopted at WARC 79 (and this is considered by many to be unlikely),
E	 then the U.S. will be faced with the likelihood of an orbit segmen-
tation plan (approach#2 above) or an even less desirable allotment
plan (approach #1). One conclusion from the preceding discussion
is that, however undesirable the approach ultimately adopted is, the
r	 U.S. would be much better off if the orbit-spectrum rights adoptedt
are marketable (transferable) than if they are not. Then, at least,
the R.C.C. could go into the world market to buy them or lease them
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I :	 from other nations, if the domestic demand for satellite services
warranted their doing so. If the adoption of a rigid plan appears
imminent, it might be in the best interest of the U.S. ( and other
nations with similar concerns) to push for a regional market
approach.
Even if such an approach proves to be infeasible throughout
Region 2, it might still befeasible for a limited number of nations
(i.e., Canada, the U.S., Mexico, Brazil) to collude and pool their
allotments in orderto achieve the maximum economic value from their
r
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allotments (the market- scheme would have to, of course, distri-
bute rents so that each participating party is better off than
they would be without such an agreement, but this is one thing
the market is well suited for). Mexico, for example, could lease
their slots to a foreign party until they were ready to use it
themselves (thus, making both better off). Even if no other
nations wished to participate in such a scheme, the U.S. could
still employ the market approach in domestic distribution of its
allotment. Three appraoches that could be employed domestically
or regionally are described in the following pages:
Policy Option 1 - A Domestic or Regional Market for Orbital Slots
Orbit-spectrum slots are auctioned to the highest bidder. These
assignments may then be bought and sold between services if no affected
parties are bypassed. The rights auctioned could be defined in a man-
ner similar to the Time-Area-Spectrum right proposed by DeVany et al.,
but would have both earth to space and space to earth components. On
the space to earth component, both in band and out of band maximum
permissible power-flux-densities could be stated for areas outside the
designated geographical area of coverage (with the out of band limit
applying within this area as well). The earth to space component
would have analogous limits (not necessarily the same) on in band
power levels outside the designated portion of the geostationary arc
and out of band power levels generally.
Rights bought by the highest bidder would be perpetual, but
transferable. A1; long as nobody else's rights are affected, parties
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could even agree to alter power-flux-density limits as well as the
amount of the earth's surface and geostationary arc designated by
the right [23). Furthermore, the relatively small number of systems
would make enforcement of these rights fairly easy. Thus, the fixed
satellite services, which would presumably be the initial rights
holder, could at a later date, within the limits of their ability to.
share their assignment with a broadcasting party, sell all or part
."r
of their rights to a broadcasting party for a sum of money. The
broadcasting party would presumably buy up additional orbit-spectrum
rights from fixed service parties as long as their marginal revenue
product from use of the resource exceeded that for the fixed satellite
service.
Policy Option 2 - Administered Total Services Discounted Cost Minimi-
zation
The idea in this proposal is that both satellite services share
frequency allocations and any time a new system, whether broadcasting
or fixed, is proposed, the F.C.C. (or the relevant multinational
regulatory authority) must include this additional system in the avail-
able orbit-spectrum at the lowest aggregate cost over all users. This
approach might reg0 re the new system to employ more expensive (spectrum
conserving) technology than had been anticipated. It could also require
previous systems using equipment requiring much orbit-spectrum to change
equipment. Which systems must change equipment depends on what combi-
nation of changes admits the new system at the lowest aggregate cost..
This policy option is essentially the approach proposed by Lusignan
and Russell, in which the party that saves the most gigahertz-degrees
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Fper dollar expended is the party required to conserve spectrum.
It differs from coordination (the current procedure for transfer
of orbit-spectrum rights) in the respect that no transfer payments
between parties need take place for the efficiency of use to be
improved. Thus, earlier users need not receive scarcity rents at
the expense of later users, as is now the case. Unfortunately, in
order for the Lusignan-Russell scheme to work, regulatory authori-
ties must have all the information about technological options and
costs available for each satellite system. It is questionable
whether this is even remotely possible, and it is the author's
opinion that the information problems associated with administra-
tive remedies in general probably mane the tusignan=Russell proposal
less attractive than the other more market-oriented policy options
presented in this paper.
Policy Option 3 - Leased Rights Distributed by Auction
This proposal is similar to Option 1, except that rights are
leased by the central authority rather than sold outright. In fact,
the two could be mixed in a hybrid "bonus bid/royalty" scheme if
this were deemed desirable.
The least rate would be a floating rate adjusting continuously
to the market value of assignments in the relevant part of the spec-
trum. This, unlike the outright market sale, would ensure that the
governing authcrity accrues all "windfalls" (which, however, could
be negative should the market price decline).
One argument favoring this approach over the outright market
sale is that bureaucratic organizations would be much more prone to
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1reexamine their resource needs if they leased rather than bought
T
spectrum. On the other hand, leasing at a floating rate would
burden the user with uncertainty over future prices that would not
be faced in an outright sale. Businesses will generally pay a pre-
mium to reduce uncertainty about the environment in which they
expect to be operating, especially when they are contemplating
longer-term investments. Furthermore, prices would have to increase
dramatically for a true windfall to occur in an outright sale of
spectrum assignments. Nevertheless, this option offers an alterna-
tive for those who feel that any kind of windfall accruing to a pri-
vate party under any conditions is unacceptable.
In fact, the choice of lease or sell could conceivably be based
fi on the particular nature of the parties involved. Alternatively,
leasing together with encouragement of options or futures contracts
could be employed. Under either system, coalitions of parties offer-
ing different services that could share an assignment would be capa-
ble of offering higher bids than a single service that excluded the
use of all other services from that part of the orbit spectrum. Both
would tend to lead to more efficient use of the resource.
Several observations can be made about the three policy options
described above. First, economic efficiency need not be coupled to
l distributional equity. In fact, because economically efficient use
maximizes the aggregate economic value derived, it is possible that
nations participating in an economically efficient allocation scheme
I
could all be better off than they would be under an inefficient
alternative (such as nontransferable nation by nation assignment
of channels and orbital slots). This last observation suggests
the possibility of multilateral collusion to adopt market or quasi-
market techniques in ITU Region 2 for assignment of orbit-spectrum.
Such a scheme could even be embedded by agreeing nations within
the rigid plan being advocated by some nations`''o provided transfera-
bility of allotted orbital slots or frequencies is maintained. Such
an approach should be examined as a possible fallback, should U.S.
positions at WARC 79, or at the proposed 1983 Region 2 conference
be rejected.
A more important observation is that all three schemes give
the designers/operators of satellite systems the incentives to
make correct trade-offs between technology and orbit-spectrum re-
source use--incentives that are either absent or distorted in the
present (zero -price rationing) administrative approach. Instilling
the correct incentives will be especially important if the number of
satellite orbital slots available to the U.S. is severely limited
by international orbit -wide planning. In fact, it is possible that
the same mechanisms that instill these incentives (payment of scar=
city rent by users) could play a role in reducing the attractiveness
of such worldwide planning even to those nations most enamoured with
it. Once the appearance of users getting something for nothing is
eliminated, the international political interest in orbit-spectrum
assignment might disappear.
0
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III. EPILOGUE
Orbit-Spectrum is the only commercially useful space resource
developed by mankind so far, but, hopefully, not the last. For
I	
those who believe other space resources will indeed be developed,
orbit-spectrum serves as a useful prototype highlighting some of
the problems development of other space resources can expect to
encounter.
Fifty years ago, orbit-spectrum was a worthless resource.
Today, this is far from being the case, as the continuing political
conflict between nations over its allocation so vividly illustrates.
Many of the lesser-developed nations have demanded that they be
apportioned their fair share of the efv ource, even though they have
no real intention of using it themselves. But, what made this once
worthless resource so valuable?
The answer to this last question is, of course, technology--
specifically, technology developed by a handful of industralized
nations. One might argue that, since orbit-spectrum is a nondeplet-
able; ^vsource made useful only by the investment of these nations,.
it is only fair that they use it as they see fit. According to this
view, leasing of orbital slots through an international authority
would lead to accrual of economic rents by lesser developed countries
(LDC's) not truly earned--thus, a leasing arrangement would be really
quite generous to the LDC's.
Unfortunately, the LDC's don't see it this way. Some believe,
rightly or wrongly, that the wealth of the industrialized nations was
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accumulated by exploitation of what are now lesser developed
nations during the colonial period. They view orbit-spectrum as
one of many "common heritage" resources (i.e., not by their loca-
tion naturally belonging to any one nation) that should be evenly
distributed among the nations of the earth, but are likely to be
appropriated by the (first-come) industrial nations. That the
resource is now rationed free of charge strongly reinforces the
plausibility of the view that a "common heritage" resource is being
unjustly appropriated by the industrialized nations.
An international leasing market would result in income redistri-
bution that might defuse the militance characterizing some LRC's
recently but not destroy the incentives of the industralized nations
to continue technological development improving resource utilization.
It would be naive to believe, given what has transpired in the
case of the first renewable space resource, that the U.S. would not
receive a great deal of political heat for exploiting nonrenewable
space resources, such as space minerals. Any future "space policy"
must be prepared to address this problem on at least the rhetorical
level, though it's not so far-fetched to imagine world politics
leading to the creation of an international authority to lease space
mineral rights [26].
The other question of interest only briefly discussed in the
body of the paper concerns how the channeling of research and devel-
opment funds is affected by the assessment of a resource's value.
Because there are not market prices for "orbit-spectrum," there is
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a tendency to improperly compare different parts of the same
resource. For example, the 30/20 gigahertz band is not as
easily usable (henry valuable) as the 6/4 band. Yet, the two
are described as almost perfect substitutes in R&D discussions.
Proper valuation would give a better measure of the return on
both extensive and intensive development, and thereby a better
idea of where to spend public R&D moneys.
It
fNotes
1. Rather arbitrarily defined as frequencies between 0 and 300
gigahertz 4GHz). 1 gigahertz = 1 billion cycles per second.
2. The word "allocation" has two meanings in this paper. The
usual meaning refers to the distribution of economic resources
1	 in general. The specific meaning refers to the process by
which classes of services are allotted a region within the
spectrum. It is hoped that which meaning is intended will be
clear from the context.
3. Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 contains essen-
tially the same language.
4. Ronald Coase argues that the Congress overreacted by passing
the Radio Act of 1927, adopting a solution far more encom-
passing than avoidance of destructive interference required.
He argues that the courts would have, in time, arrived at a
workable definition of radiation rights optimizing the level
0 destructive interference even with no legislation at all.
Coase, Ronald H., "The Federal Communications Commission,"
Journal of Law and Economics, II (Oct., 1959). Charles
Jackson counters that the importance of interference-free
radio communications to the safety of maritime operations (the
primary user of radio spectrum in the early part of the century)
and the then relative simplicity of an administrative solution
(prior to an era when billions of dollars could hinge on the
outcome of a decision, or for that matter, when spectrum was
even noticeably scarce) makes the "press for government monopoly
more understandable." Jackson, Charles L., "Technology for
Spectrum Markets," PH.D. Dissertation, MIT, 1976.
5. Descriptions of the allocation and assignment process appear in
Coase, op. cit., and Robinson, John 0., "An Investigation of
Economic Factors in F.C.C. Spectrum Management," F.C.C. Report
No. SAS 76-01.
6. A discussion of this information overload problem appears in
Robinson, Glen 0., "F.C.C.: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, 1976.
7. There are, of course, a number of nontrivial assumptions being
made here about what constitutes "highest value" in a social sense.
However, even when social value is somehow determined to differ
from market price, there are still ways to employ market mecha-
nisms, and their attendant information economies, to the distribu-
tion of resources. For a discussion of this problem see Schultz,
Charles, The Public Use of Private Interest, Brookings Institu-
tion, Aug., 1977.
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8. In fact, many view price systems as nothing more than a
highly efficient information system serving to promote
mutually beneficial transactions between parties.
9. Owen, Bruce M. "Spectrum Allocation: A Survey of Alterna-
tive Methodologies," Office;of Telecommunications Policy
Staff Paper, April, 1972.
10. Coase, in a footnote on page 27 of his article (op. cit.
note 4), remarks that his most fundamental com plaint is
that certain desirable market transactions are impossible
under current law.
11. Henderson and Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed., p. 279,
McGraw Hill, 1911.
12. Robinson, John 0. "Introduction to Economic Factors into
Spectrum Management," Masters Thesis, p. 28, Annenberg
School of Communications, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1974.
13. dote that opportunity cost minimization is not the same as
accounting cost minimization. The latter is minimized by
zero output whereas the former is not--idle resources have
a positive opportunity cost.
14. Not that I am the first to address them--indeed, many have.
However, no matter how many times they are addressed they
crop up again and again.
15. As used here, "enforcement" includes both detection of a
violation of somebody's rights, and adjudication for purp-
poses of resolving disputes over rights or punishing
offenders.
16. This crude model is designed only to illustrate a point.
Note that it is not capable of handling the more likely situ-
ation where A's violation of B's right is unintentional. The
simple model could be extended by allowing A either to expend
an amount a to be assured he is violating nobody's rights, or
expend nothing and face probability q that he is violating
somebody's rights. Letting b* be the state of the world in
which A has expended a to be sure that no violations have
occurred, the decision criterion becomes:
U(b*)>(1-q)U(b)+q[(i-p)U(a)+pU(c)1
If a depends on q in an appropriate way (i.e., q>O then a>O
and h*>b) and U"a)>U(b)>U(c), then there will always be a p
between O and l such that for all probabilities greater than
this p, A will expend e to guarantee that he is violating no-
body's rights. If feelings of guilt accompany a violation
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16. (continued)
of somebody else's rights then it may be that U(b)>U(a).
If this were true for everybody in society, then, according
to the simple model, no violations would occur, even if
society spent nothing on detection (p=o). Thus, the social
purpose of guilt may be largely that of keeping enforcement
I	
costs down.
As for the trade-off between detection probability and
punishment, Gary Becker has noted that "a common generali-
zation by persons with judicial experience is that a change
in the probability has a greater effect on the number of
offenses than a change in the punishment. . .," Becker,
Gary S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy, pp. 169-217, March4pril, 1968.
17. DeVany, Arthur S., Eckert, Ross D., Meyers, Charles J.,
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XXI, pp. 1499-1561, June, 1969.
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Radio Spectrum Management, Report to the F.C.C., Sept., 1978.
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cations to 12 GHz Domestic Systems," NASA Report R-1463, p. 189,
May, 1974.
20. For example, Reinhart's report, previously noted.
21. Jackson, Charles L. "Technology for Spectrum Markets," Ph.D.
Thesis, p. 71 ff., MIT, 1976.
22. Ibid 21.
23. How negotiations of this kind might be effected is extensively
described in the article by DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, and
Scott, referred to in note 17.
24. Russell, S. P., & Lusignan, B. B. "A Techno-Economic Approach
to U.S. Domestic Satellite Orbit-Spectrum Regulation," IEEE
Compatibility, Vol. EMC-19, No. 3, p. 351, Aug., 1977.
25. This approach is discussed in detail by Jackson in "Technology
for Spectrum Markets," op. cit. note 21.
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26. For those to whom this seems too "far out," I would,
only point out that the same could have been said 100
years ago about the idea that apportionment of deep
seabed resources would someday become the politically
heated issue it has in fact become in recent delibera-
tions at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
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IAbstract
The purpose of this paper is to describe the
boundaries of market areas which favor various means
for distributing communications satellite traffic.
The distribution methods considered are: control
earth station with cable access, rooftop earth sta-
tions, earth station with radio access, and various
combinations of these methods.
The method of comparison is to determine the
least cost system for a hypothetical region described
by number of users and the average cable access mile-
age. The region is also characterized by a function
'	 which expresses the distribution of users.
The results indicate that the least cost distribu-
tion is central earth station with cable access for
Y	 medium to high density areas of a region, combined with
rooftop earth stations or (for higher volumes) radio
access for remote users.
J
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Introduction
Technological improvements increasing satellite capacity
and lowering costs are likely to continue, implying that the
long haul portion of telecommunications costs will steadily
f	 assume less importance. This paper focuses on least cost con-
figurations for local distribution of satellite traffic, which
is likely to account for an ever increasing portion of tele-
communications cost.
The local distribution problem is non-trivial because of
the different approaches and technical alternatives for meeting
demand that are available. In general, existing common carriers
favor use of large earth stations and local distribution provided
by existing facilities. Current plans call for only five
Western Union earth stations and only seven joint AT&T/GTE earth
stations. New entrants, on the other hand, prefer to avoid
distribution over existing facilities, instead relying on smaller
units which can be placed on customer premises. The latter
approach is exemplified by the Satellite Business Systems (SBS)
proposal for small rooftop earth stations. In the SBS case,
the local distribution cost is insensitive to distance. An
alternative approach, the Xerox Telecommunications Network (XTEN),
employs an MDS (radio) system for local. distribution. The XTEN
system's distribution cost is basically independent of distance,
although reception is Limited to points within about forty
miles of the transmitter.
1
Noww_	 _
* Teleconferencing:
Systems for Continua
The presence of the three technical alternatives poses
` questions about how local distribution should be accomplished.
Demographic characteristics of the region served will usually
determine which system has the least cost. However, the best
means of local distribution could be a combination of the com-
peting technical arrangements.
Cost Characteristics for an Example Service
For the purposes of this discussion, an example service
is taken from a teleconferencing study. The service provides
four channels for one-way video and two-way audio communications.
The study, which reached the n(:qi familiar conclusion that satel-
lite systems are often the most cost-effective way to provide
long distance communications, provides cost estimates for earth
stations, cable distribution, and an MDS-type system. Cost
equations extracted from this report are used (with simplifi-
cation) in this paper to provide order of magnitude estimates.
The cost structure for a region with n users is:
earth station with cable access (C)
c c  + c2rn
:i rooftop earth. stations (ES)
1	 c = c3n
earth station with MDS system (MDS)
c =c1+c4+c5n
Cost Optimization for Satellite and Ground
Professional Education and Medical Services,
E. Parker, Stanford University, May 1972.
2
where:
C  cost of earth station equipped for redistribution (11,500)
c2
 cost per mile per user for cable distribution (6,000)
c 3
 = rooftop earth station cost (9,200)
c4
 = cost of MDS transmitter (86,000)
c5 = cost of user MDS receiver (8,600)
r = average mileage for cable distribution per user.
Figures in parentheses are approximate dollar costs for installed
equipment and maintenance. Note that different types of
systems may have different space segment designs for minimum
cost operation.
C ys ES vs MDS
The minimum cost arrangements for regions described by the
variables r and n are now examined. If only one technical
arrangement can be used for a region, the transitions occur at:
ES-MDS tradeoff
cl + c4
n =
C3 - c5
C-MDS tradeoff
= 162.5 (receivers)
r	 C55 + C4 n - 1.43 + 14.3 (miles)
Z	 2
C-ES tradeoff
r c3 - cl n = 1.53 - l.nl6 (miles)
2	 2
The boundaries of these areas are plotted in Exhibits 1-A, B, C.
Exhibit 1-D'displays the composite of these boundaries. The
C-MDS, C-ES, and ES-MDS boundaries intersect at a common point.
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Using the above cost estimates, this intersection point is at
r = 1.522 and n = 162.5.
The conclusion in this case is fairly straightforward. if
the demand is highly concentrated, a central earth station ac-
cessed by cable is the lowest cost alternative, regardless of
the number of users in the region. Lf the demand is low density
(geographically dispersed), then either an MDS system or rooftop
t	 earth stations dominate in terms of cost. The choice between
these latter two depends only on the number of users, provided
users are not so widely dispersed as to be outside the range of
the MDS transmitter. Higher demand favors the MDS system, since
the incremental cost of an MDS receiver is slightly less than
the cost of an individual earth station (an MDS distribution
system has a fixed cost as well). However, if earth station
costs become low enough, the MDS system will not be a least
cost alternative in any region.
C vs C and ES
It is sometimes possible, when the space segment allows
compatible designs of two local distribution technologies, to
R
assume that more than one technology will be used in the same
system. For example, consider the joint use of cable and roof-
top earth stati.!
 ^.`. Given the cost characteristics of these
systems, it seems that distribution cost would be minimized
by employing cable for the nearby users and rooftop earth
stations for the more remote users.
Unfortunately, the boundary separating near and remote areas
is not well defined by r and n alone. More information about
5
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ithe demography of the region is required. Specifically, we need
to kn;w the number of users n within a given radius r of the
cable relay station. This information, which can be represented
by a function of radius n(r), is sufficient for us to obtain a
second function, r(n), which tells how average cable mileage
changes as additional users are served.
For regions of interest, we will assume that all users can
be ordered so.that s(n), the increment in cable-miles required
to serve the n th user, is non-decreasing. This is a useful concept
since it enables an evaluation of the incremental cost of serving
the n th user by alternative arrangements. If served by cable,
the incremental cost is cls(n). If served by rooftop earth
station, the incremental cost is c C This allows a division of
users by the distribution technique serving them:
Let n = max {n { s (n) < c3/c2}
then use:
C for users	 1, 2, ....n
ES for users
	
n + 1, n + 2, ...._n
Note that if s(n) is not non-decreasing, a more complicated analysis
is required. Furthermore, this analysis could indicate that a
second central earth station accessed by cable is required to
minimize distribution cost--a result that is precluded when s(n)
is non-decreasing.
It can be shown that s(n) and r(n) are related:
s(n) = r(n) + nr I
 (n)*
The total number of cable-miles is nr(n), the number of users
multiplied by their average distance from the transmitter. The
'
	
	
increment in cable-miles s(n) is just the rate of change with
respect to n of total cable-miles--the derivative of s(n) with
respect to n. 5
t
7This relation can be used to plot an appropriate boundary for
"'C only" and "C and MDS" in our r - n space diagrams for various
assumed "demographies" s(n). For example, suppose that regions of
interest have users distributed such that s(n) is linear:
s(n) = an
	 for some constant a,
so that r (n) = 2an  and s (n)- 2r (n) .
s(n) reaches the criterion c3/c2 at r	 c3 and n = c3 .
	
2c2 	act
Note that for this special, case, r does not depend on n. This
example is depicted in Exhibit 2-A. As shown, for a.Z linear
demography, there is a threshold value above which both cable
and rooftop earth stations are used jointly. This threshold
is one-half the value of the threshold (in the limit) in Exhibit
1-C.
To show that the boundary is not always flat, consider a
logarithmic demography defined by:
s(n)	 all + log n) for some constant a
so that r(n)	 a log n.
s(n) reaches the criterion c3/c2 at n = e 1 + ac and r -- -a.
	
2	 2
rc 2	
The resulting boundary is log n = c _rc or n = exp[cc3-rc
3 2 	 2
This example is depicted in Exhibit 2-B.
it is important in the examples above to note that the
boundary of the areas " C only" and "C and ES" is not invariant to
Ia	 the demographic "class" of the region. Even in the limit for a
A.
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large number of users, the threshold for introduction of user
earth stations depends on the type of demography assumed. For
most regions of interest, the boundary is expected to be fairly
flat as shown in the examples.
C vs C and MDS
Now consider the joint use of cable and an MDS system. This
x	 _
analysis proceeds parallel to the above analysis, except that it
is slightly complicated by the presence of a fixed cost for the
MDS transmitter. Otherwise, the MDS system has cost characteris-
tics similar to rooftop earth stations. In the previous case, the
behavior of s(n) after it reaches the cost criterion was irrelevant
as long as it was non-decreasing; in this case, it matters.
If the systems are used jointly, cable access will be em-
ployed for nearby users and MDS receivers for remote users. The
i
users may be divided by the criterion:
let n* = max {n(s (n)
	
c5/c2}
then use
C for users	 1, 2,	 .n*
MDS for users
	 n* + 1, n* + 2, ..n .
The system will be used jointly only if:
Cost (C only) > Cost (C and MDS)
or
cl + c 2rn > c  + c 2r(n*)n* + c 4 + c5(n-n*)
or
n > c4 + (c 2r(n*) - c5)n*
c 2 r - c5
R
1
Consider again the linear demography s(n) = an and r(n) = :!^n- .
*	 nc 	 c5
	
2
Transition occurs at n	 r*	 The condition on n2rc 2 	 2'
requires:
	
c + c rn > c + c C5 n 
c 5	 nc 5+ c + (n- —1	 2	 1	 2 2c 2 ^r c 2	 4	
c 5	 Tr c 2
or
c4
> Z 2 r	 c 5
(r	 5 ) 2 
[for r >	
2 1
2C 2
Exhibit 3-A displays the boundary for the linear demography.
Note that this curve is always below the curve in Exhibit 1-B,
which assumed that the systems could not be used jointly.
C vs C and ES vs C and MDS
Now let's consider the case where cable is used and either
MDS or user earth stations can be used in addition. The linear
demography s(n) = an, r(n) = 2an is assum::.d again. To determine
the boundary, note that:
Cost (C and ES)	 > Cost (C and MDS)
cl + C 2 r(n)n + c 3 (n-n) > c I + c 2 r(n*)n* + c4 + c 5 (n-n*)
	
c 3 nc 3	 ncC	
c nc 
5	
nc 
5
	
^—	 n-= > c + c -5 "2 rc 2 re 2 
+ c 3( 2rc 2	 4	 2 2c 2 2rc 2	 5	 2rc2
4rc 2 c 4
> n >	 - 2	 2 + 4rc2(,c3-c5)
	
c5 	 c 3
In the limit on r,
	 n = c 4	 143
c3-c5
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Note that the fixed cost for a central earth station does not
enter in the boundary relation since both systems require it.
This result is depicted in Exhibit 3-B, and represents the
composite boundaries for the linear demography. Compare this
figure to Exhibit 1-D, where it was assumed that only one system
could be used in a region.
Remarks
In this paper, a technique has been described that can be
used to determine the demographic characteristics of regions which
favor different technical arrangements for local distribution of
satellite traffic. The example used finds the least cost arrange=
ment to be a central earth station with cable access for medium to
high density areas of a region, combined with rooftop earth
stations or MDS for more remote users in the region. The rooftop
earth station--DlDS tradeoff is decided principally by volume,
with the latter arrangement preferred for high volumes. More
analysis is required to support this finding for more general
demographies.
4
12
THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR NATIONAL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
by
Donald A. Dunn
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Contract NASW 3204
October 1979
Report No. 23
PROGRAM IN INFORMATION POLICY
Engineering-Economic Systems Department
Stanford University	 Stanford, California 94305
^K
'r
tl
I	 "
Abstract
This paper is concerned with national policy issues that arise
with respect to science and technology. The creation, dissemination,
and use of science and technology in society can be viewed as an
information activity. The management of this activity is the subject
of science and technology policy. Two categories of policy instruments
are discussed: (1) market-oriented approaches; and (2) direct public
action. This paper is primarily concerned with pointing out possibil-
ities for increased use of market-oriented approaches that can provide
benefits to society in the form of an increased rate of innovation and
of more "appropriate" technology, better suited to the needs of users.
t
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t1.0 INTRODUCTION
t
	
	 National science and technology policy is-concerned with societal
choices with respect to technological change and the adoption and use
of new technology in society. The creation of new technology can be
viewed as the creation of new knowledge or information through research
and invention. Invention and research, in turn, draw on previous work,
and a society's policies with respect to the storage, retrieval, and
dissemination of scientific and technical information are important
K
	
	 elements of national science and technology policy. The adoption and
use of new technology in society can be influenced in many ways by
government policies and actions. Many policies that affect the use of
a
new technology involve questions of access to or the provision of infor-
mation concerning the new technology to users. This paper is concerned
with all threa stages of the information production-consumption process
r	 in the science and technology field: creation, dissemination, and use.
While it may seem restrictive to focus on the information-related aspects
	
1
r
of science and technology policy, a policy such as a ban on the sale of
a particular product is usually based on information concerning the use
of the product and also is ordinarily adopted because the existing system
of information dissemination to users is deemed inadequate. Thus, in
most situations, an information focus captures the essential features
of policy decisions.
^+	 9
A government agency, such as NASA, is involved with all three stages
of the information production and consumption process in its own field
f	 of space science and technology. It creates new information through its
i
research and development programs. It disseminates this information and
r	 1
C
r	
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t
	 assists nonaerospace firms and various government agencies in making
use of this information through its technology transfer program. And
NASA is also, of course, a user of both NASA-created and other Infor-
mation in its own research and development programs. A private sector
firm is also typically involved in all stages of this process in its
own field of activity.
The objectives of national science and technology policy have
traditionally been thought of in terms of increasing economic effi-
ciency, productivity, and GNP. These overall national economic objec-
tives can each be affected by changes in policy with respect to crea-
tion, dissemination, and use of scientific and technological informa-
tion, and a number of these connections will be discussed here.
Efficiency, productivity, and GNP are all quantities that are
independent of what is being produced. By focusing on these economic
measures it is implicitly assumed that the national output is produced
in properly functioning markets, in which the goods and services that
are preferred by consumers are being provided. Of course, only a por-
tion of the national output is produced in properly functioning markets
in the U.S. or any other country. If only a small fraction of the GNP
is produced outside of properly functioning markets, the effects of
ignoring the nonmarket sectors in developing science and technology
policy may not be serious. However, the U.S. economy has become a non-
market economy in many of its major sectors, and it is doubtful if these
sectors can be ignored in future planning. Several types of deviations
from a market economy exist, and some of their implications for science
and technology policy will be discussed. Some of these deviations are
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often referred to as market failures. Those of special interest
here are: (1) monopoly; (2,) government regulation; (3) government
provision of services; and (4) the fact that the principal costs of
provision of service are being incurred by users rather than providers.
As a result of these deviations and market failures, the validity of
focusing primarily on productivity and GNP when seeking to formulate
national science and technology policy becomes doubtful. An attempt
is made here to suggest some more relevant measures of economic per-
formance, but these suggestions can only be viewed as preliminary at
this stage.
The growth rate of productivity has been decreasing in the 1970's
in the U.S., while this quantity, along with the real GNP, has contin-
ued to increase in Japan, West Germany, and some other nations [1].
Economic (CNP) growth in the U.S. has been primarily a result of an
increase in productivity and only in small measure a result of capital
investment j21, [3]. The factors that influence productivity are
therefore of considerable interest. The entire subject is confused
by the use of noncomparable measures and by the aggregation of sectors
of the economy, such as manufacturing and services, that may have widely
different rates of change of productivity. However, in the period
1900-1960 steady productivity increases in both manufacturing and agri-
culture occurred. Denison has put forward the hypothesis that, since
schooling increased in the U.S. during these years of productivity
increase, schooling was responsible for the increase [4]. A more per-
suasive argument put forward by Klein is that productivity increased
as a result of innovation in dynamically changing competitive U.S.
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markets (S]. Klein O s argument is that the U.S. market is now less
competitive and that, since firms feel less pressure to innovate,
there is less innovation and consequently a reduced rate of increase
in productivity. Causes of the decline in competitive markets can
be found in the increased roles in the economy of industries subject
to regulation, industries with highly concentrated market structures,
and governmental provision of services.
In addition, it has been widely observed that the U.S. is now
an "information economy," in the sense that more than half of our
paid workers and our economy is now engaged in.the producti gn of
information-related products or services (6), [7], [8]. Information
is not like other economic goods, because new ideas can be copied,
usually at a much lower cost than the cost of creation. Therefore,
the cost of creation of a new idea, through investment in basic
research, for example, may not be appropriable, and potential investors
will tend to underinvest in basic research for this reason. When we
speak of underinvestment in this connection, we mean, relative to the
amount of investment that would be socially optimal. Society receives
benefits that go beyond the benefits received by the consumers of edu-
cation and the firms that do basic research.' It is therefore in
society's interest to intervene in the markets for innovation, informa-
tion creation, and education through government subsidies or by creating
incentives for enhanced investment in these activities in the private
sector. Various governmental actions have been taken to make investment
in innovation more attractive, including patent, copyright, and tax in-
centives. Direct public support of basic research and education is also
4
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a traditional part of national science and technology policy,' It is
not at all clear that reliance on these traditional policies will be
the most effective national policy in the years to come.
Perhaps the most significant deviation from a market economy in
the U.S. is a result of the existence of the "household economy" in
which the final output of the market economy is combined with user
time to produce the .cervices that users ultimately consume (9), [101.
The existence of the household economy is not a form of market failure,
but its existence raises a question, familiar in system analysis, of
possible suboptimization through a focus on the market economy portion
of the total system, rather than on the total system which includes
both the market economy and the household economy. If the household
economy were small in comparison with the market economy, a policy focus
on the market economy might be justified. However, in the U.S., the
household economy is comparable to the size of the market economy [9l.
Therefore, it may turn out tr'J be very important to consider the effects
of science and technology policy on the household economy along with
its effects on the market economy.
2.0 THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFOWCATION
The information production-consumption process can be throught of
as beginning with the creation of new information and proceeding through
a dissemination process to the user who then consumes the information
or uses it, possibly in creating a further innovation. An innovation
that is brought to the market often includes both a new technology and
a new concept of how this new technology can be utilized. Innovations
3
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often create new information that is disseminated and incorporated
in other new products or services, etc.
There are three main policy instruments that have been used to
encourage individuals and firms to create, disseminate, and utilize
new information: (1) patents and copyrights; (2) direct funding of
research, development, and production by the government; and (3)
subsidizing and other facilitating private sector investment in
innovation and related activities. These policy instruments will
be discussed in the following.
2.1 Patents and Copyrights
When we think of the individual inventor or creator of a new
work of art, it is easy to see the economic effects of granting a
patent or copyright to this individual. The patented invention or
copyrighted work is protected against copying for some period of
years and is thus made more valuable and more readily sold, and this
increased value creates an incentive for further investing in innova-
tion and invention.
There is an apparent tension between the policy objectives of
obtaining a high national level of creativity and the policy objective
of obtaining rapid dissemination of the results of the creative pro-
cess: The policy instruments, such as copyright laws, that have been
used to encourage creativity do so by creating barriers to copying
and apparently act as obstacles to rapid dissemination. However, the
tension is primarily a tension between short and long run objectives.
In the short run, an innovation can perhaps be most rapidly dissemi-
nated by allowing free access to it. But in the long run, it is
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necessary to be concerned not only with dissemination of known ideas,
but also with the continued creation of new ideas, so there will be
something to disseminate. Patents and copyrights encourage both
innovation and the disclosure of innovation. The alternative of
allowing free dissemination results in innovations being kept secret
as far as possible, which obviously does not promote dissemination.
Even under a property right system, many innovations, such as computer
software, are not protected, and innovators often go to considerable
lengths to keep their ideas secret [11), [12).
The effects of Patent laws on the operation of a modern, competi-
tive industrial market can be rather different from the effects on
individual inventors. In modern industry, the invention process has
been commercialized. Inventors are hired and organized to create new
ideas that will be most beneficial to the firms that employ them. In
some markets the innovation process has been accelerated to a very
high Pace. The computer industry is an example of an industry with a
rapid development cycle, typically less than 5 years for a major inno-
vation. A rapid obsolescence of products naturally accompanies this
rapid introduction of new products. Five-year old computers may work
very well, but their value is only a small fraction of their purchase
price.
An important distinction needs to be made between the invention
process that may be involved in creating a new product and the innova-
tion process that is concerned with selecting the specific character-
istics and technology of the new product and "cringing it to the market-
place.. Many innovations are not patentable. But innovation is protected
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iby trade secret law and by the time it takes to copy a new product.
In a high technology► field, the time to copy may be over a year,
and a firm that is a year or two behind its competitors may ,find
that its competitors have written off the costs of creation by the
time its product reaches the market, so it does not gain a price
advantage through copying. In such a mackct, copying would not be
a successful strategy. The role of patents in such a market is
unclear. Patents on basic inventions that will be used in several
cycles of innovation have long-term value. Patents on obsolete
products are obviously not of value. The usual argument that firms
will underinvest in innovation does not seem to apply to rapidly
changing, high technology markets. Firms in these markets must
innovate in order to survive. Firms can effectively nullify the
effects of patents by entering into cross-licensing agreements.
Firms, in effect, give up the potential rewards from occasional basic
patents in order to avoid the risk of competitors' inventions blocking
their access to the market. Of course, crass-licensing and patent
pools can violate the antitrust laws [13]. But if all new entrants
to an industry can join the licensing agreements, the effects are not
anticompetitive.
The economics of invention and innovation in markets with rapidly
changing technology appears to be an important field for research [14].
Neither the operation of such markets without government intervention
nor the effects of patents and cross-licensing agreements in such
markets are now well understood.
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2.2 Direct Funding of the Creation of New Information
As an alternative to creating property rights in new information
through patents and copyrights, direct public investment can be made
in the creation of new information. In areas in which the government
has a mission responsibility, as in defense and space, it can be
expected to support the research that it believes will be most bene-
ficial to its missions in the long run. In areas in which the private
sector is responsible for providing products and services to consumers,
there is also a potential role for government supported research,
especially basic research. The economic argument that firms will
underinvest in research that leads to inventions subject to copying
is even more applicable to basic research that is aimed at under-
standing nature, because patents do not cover theories or laws of
nature. Thus, the discoveries that core from basic research will
benefit a firm's competitors as much as the firm itself (except for
public relations benefits), so the amount of basic research done in
the private sector will tend to be less than is socially optimal (151,
[16]. Some form of governmental intervention in the market, in order
to create increased incentives for carrying out basic research, is
therefor appropriate. And direct government funding is a straight-
forward way to support basic research.
Once government funding of research is adopted as a national
policy, a question arises with respect to the ownership of patents
and copyrights on innovations made in this research. Presumably, the
national interest is best served by a government patent policy that
will maximize innovation. Government o^,mersbip of patents results in
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disclosure, but it does not create incentives for Firms to make the
necessary investments to bring these patented innovations to the
market. Granting of exclusive rights to firms that do make such
investments would enhance the incentives to develop these innovations,
much as homestead rights have been used to encourage the development
of government land.
Another important policy issue in this area is that of the
allocation of funds. Mat areas of research should receive funding,
and at what levels? A balance of many diverse interests is somehow
achieved in the present system. However, there may be opportunities
for improving the present system, for example, by creating more inde-
pendent sources of research funding that are likely to support research
leading in new directions. Both industry and mission--oriented agencies
could strengthen their positions in the long term by supporting basic
research projects of special interest to them, rather than relying on
others to provide this support.
2.3 facilitating Private Sector Investment in the Creation
of New Information_	 -
Industrial investment in research can be increased through tax
incentives. However, there is the risk that the amount of new research
may be small in relation to the amount of tax subsidy, because firms
have an incentive to reclassify existing activities to quality for
favorabl y: tax treatment as well as to initiate new research.
Also of importance is the possibility of more industry-sponsored
research, on an industry-wide basis, in universities, industrial
research Jabs, or research in;titutea. 'There are likely to be many
10
i
cases arising in the future in which it is important for an entire
industry to develop a new set of techniques that will be used through-
out the industry. Projects to develop these techniques could appro-
priately be .funded and managed by the concerned industries themselves,
without governmental intervention. Industry cooperation in such
research programs could, however, have antitrust implications, and
it is possible that new legislation would be helpful in encouraging
this type of industry-wide research activity.
The principal limitation on industry-wide research is the compet-
itive nature of industrial firms and the desire by each firm for
secrecy and the exclusive use of new ideas created by an individual
firm. However, there are precedents for this sort of industry coopera-
tion in many industries. The necessary condition for a successful
prograin of this type is a guarantee of access to all outputs of the
program to all :industrial participants in the program. This condition
can best be met by carrying out the research in universities or non-
profit institutions, separate to some extent from the firms. It would
be difficult to create a successful program that would employ scientists
and engineers from the participating firms in the direct conduct of the
cooperative research. On the other hand, from a national, policy stand-
point, a central feature of this approach would be the participation
of scientists and design and development engineers from industry in
project selection and the directions to be taken in the research done
under the program. The incentive for firms to provide this costly
participation in the management of the research program would be
stronger under an industry-financed program than. a tax-supported program.
2.4 Facilitating ►, Private Sector Innovation
The production-use cycle can be entered at the use end rather
than the creation end. Policy instruments can be designed to facili-
tate the use of existing information in the process of bringing a.
t
new product or service to the market, i.e. in the innovation and
product planning process. NASA's technolo gy transfer program is
designed to assist government agencies and industrial firms in the
nonaerospace sectors of the economy in making use of new technology
that has been created in the space program and that has promise for
utilization in other sectors of the economy.
The policy instruments used by NASA include: (1) creating
information "bulletins" or abstracts that describe the new technol-
ogies believed to have significant potential in nonaerospace applica-
tions and making these abstracts readily available to U.S. industry
and government agencies, (2) assisting nonaerospace users in the
product planning process, for example by going beyond an information
abstract to a complete business plan for the adaptation of a NASA
developed technology to a specific commercial application. This
latter form of technology transfer obviously requires careful project
selection, because there may be hundreds of possible products or
services that could be developed from a specific NASA technology.
However, it has the important value that it creates an example that
is specific enough to present potential users with a much more complete
picture of the possibilities than a simple description of the technology
f	 itself. Even if the sample business plan is not adopted, it could stim-
ulate a user, to create a business plan that would be adopted. The
'	
12
technology transfer process is not well understood, but it seems
reasonable that it might be economically efficient to go somewhat
beyond the basic abstract and document dissemination process.
What is unclear is just how far and in what ways it is efficient
for an agency like NASA to enter into the product planning process.
A somewhat different approach to technology transfer is to
provide a subsidy to firms willing to undertake product planning
and development of products that would use certain classes of tech-
nologies or that would provide products or services of certain
desired types. Both Japan and England have experimented with this
approach, using a "national research and development corporation"
as the organizational entity for carrying out this ;idea. Rep.
Fuqua has introduced a bill that would create a U.S. quasi-
governmental corporation to encourage the development of new products,
processes, and industries using the properties of the space environ-
ment [171. The bill provides for the "space industrialization corpor-
ation" to provide funds to industrial ventures under negotiated man-
agement plans, with repayment including a profit being required of
profitable ventures. This provision follows the plan of British and
Japanese corporations that have been organized in the same way with
repayment only required from profitable ventures. It also incorporates
the important concep' of allowing negotiation rather than requiring
competitive bids. n sum of $50 million per year'for two years is
proposed to get the corporation started. Further  funding could be
voted. The Fuqua plan creates a corporation that would initially be
an agency of the federal government, but provides that it can be con-
verted into a publicly owned private corporation.
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A significant advantage of this approach to tectctology transfer
is that it would leave the entire product planning process to industry,
where it can be done best, and it does so in a way that protects the
confidentiality of the ideas submitted in proposals. The research and
development corporation would not be required to use the competitive
bid approach and hence would not have to define the product or other-
wise inject itself into the product planning process. It would only
R
have to select which proposals to support. If it maintained confiden-
tiality of the proposals submitted, it could expect to receive pro-
posals with the best available innovative concepts that industry could
present. The economic justification for this approach in a market
such as the industrialization of space i!; the uncertainty of profits,
combined with very large investment per project required, in a market
that would offer long term benefits to the U.S. by maintaining the
comparative advantage the U.S. has developed in space technology and
applications. There is no reason that this approach could not be used
for "market development" programs in a wide variety of fields.
3.0 IMPROVING THE OPERATION OF MARKETS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE
INNOVATION TfhkT IS RESPONSIVE TO CONSUMER DEMAND
It has become apparent in recent years that industries with a high
degree of concentration, with strong local monopolies, or with high
barriers to entry more often than not achieve their protection from
competition through government action [18]. Industries that consist
of a few large firms seem to have less incentive to innovate, if it is
difficult for small competitors to enter their market with innovative
1
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new products. In industries where small competitors can enter the
market rather easily, as in the computer industry, small firms
provide a very large fraction of the innovation that occurs.
Four major types of policy options are considered here that
are of interest in dealing with industries that have somehow managed
to obtain governmental protection from competition; (1) deregulation
in "regulated industries" such as railroads; (2) deregulation in
'"unregulated" markets; (3) improved consumer information in all markets,
but especially in local service markets; and (4) privatization of
markets dominated by government providers of service.
3.1 Pere u],aton of "regulated industries"
Although government regulation is often adopted as a consumer pro-
tection measure, the eventual effect is usually to limit competition
by creating barriers to entry to the regulated market [19]. The pace of
technological change in regulated markets is slowed for a number of
reasons. Governmental approval may be required to make new investments
of certain types, and the regulatory process can be used to prevent an
innovative firm in a regulated market from introducing new technology
as fast as it would like. Once new technology is in place, the regu ­
latory process can be used to prevent pricing services that use the
technology in ways that would threaten less innovative service providers.
In addition, regulators and regulated industries may adopt pricing
strategies that minimize present prices but slow the introduction of
new technology that would reduce prices in the future. Only in markets
where competition is restrained by government action can these anti-
innovation policies be pursued and sustained for long periods of time.
I
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A government can, thus, through its own actions, create a competi-
I	 tive disadvantage for its industries in world markets. Of course,
governments do not act to regulate an industry without the consent of
the industry, and usually governments are pushed into regulation by
industry, in order to limit competition [201. However, when new
national policies to encourage innovation are being considered, it is
difficult to think of a more significant policy option than deregula-
tion, in industries presently subject to regulation [211.
This argument does not depend on economic studies of innovation
as a function of firm size or market structure. A number of studies
have been made of the various economic characteristics of firms, in
an attempt to identify market conditions favorable to innovation. It
has been suggested that large firms may be more apt to innovate than
small firms, because they have more flexible resources [22]. Firms in
competitive markets that are not too fragmented have been found to be
more innovative than firms in either highly concentrated markets or
markets with a large number of very small firms [23]. However, the
rate of innovation is also strongly a function of the specific industry
and its stage of evolution [24]. Regulation could be used to influence
firm size or market structure, but its direct effects on innovation are,
in the author's opinion, much stronger than any of the other market
characteristics that have been studied. And the evidence is that regu-
lation is consistently used to slow the pace of innovation. For example,
the rate of innovation in the business telephone terminal market was
extremely slow when this market was protected from competition. The
Carterfone decision in 1963 opened this market to competition, and
16
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there has been a high rate of innovation since that date, both by AT&T
and its new competitors [25), [261. The opportunity exists to increase
innovation through deregulation in many other U.S. industries.
Deregulation would not only tend to benefit consumer q through an
increase in the availability of new products and services, but also
through reduced prices for existing services resulting from process
innovation. Perhaps equally important in the long term would be the
improved position of the U.S. in world markets in the deregulated
industries. In many cases regulated industries in the U.S. are indus-
tries that are completely govermentally managed in other countries,
such as railroads, telephones, and broadcasting. Thus, even though
technological change in these :industries has been limited by regula-
tion in the U.S., it has also been slowed in other countries by even
more constraining governmental action. Therefore, the U.S. is not yet
at a competitive disadvantage in most of these areas. And the oppor-
tunity to take or maintain the lead in these areas is still open.
As these markets are deregulated and start to admit innovation at
an increased rate, foreign equipment suppliers will be attracted to
these markets along with U.S. suppliers. Pressures will then undoubt-
edly develop to protect U.S, equipment suppliers from foreign competi-
tion. Protectionism in these markets will be more easily justified,
if foreign markets of the same types are not open to U.S. industry, as
is almost certainly going to be the case initially. In the long term,
however, international competition may cause deregulation worldwide, if
it is initiated by the U.S. and if deregulation does lead to more rapid
technological change. A more rapid rate of technological change in the
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U.S. and an improvement in the relative position of U.S. firms in
these industries relative to foreign firms may create pressure for
deregulation worldwide as a competitive response.
The trend toward more rapid diffusion of innovation throughout
unregulated world markets has been widely noted. Lower wage costs
in developing countries make them competitive sources of manufactured
goods, thus putting more pressure on the developed countries to
increase the pace of innovation. At the same time, the growing world
markets are making it easier to write off R&D expenses and to finance
innovation. The deregulation of U.S. regulated markets would simply
be another step in this process..
3.2 Deregulation in "unregulated" markets
Many industries that are not regulated in the sense that public
utilities are regulated are nevertheless neither competitive nor inno-
vative. Usually these industries are highly concentrated and the role
of government in these industries is often anticompetitive, even though
less obviously so than in the case of public utilities.
For example, in the drug industry the government plays a complex
role. In connection with prescription drugs, advertising of prices
and the introduction of generic drugs would obviously increase competi-
tion. The high cost of testing new drugs creates a barrier to entry by
new smaller firms. Government policies aimed at increasing competition
could encourage innovation in this industry.
The broadcasting industry plays a key role in the economy. It is
not regulated in the way that public utilities are regulated. A market
18
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in broadcast stations exists; entry is possible through purchase of
an existing station. But gover 'rent plays a central role in limiting
competition and the operation of the market in this industry [201.
For example, pay-by-program television has been technically feasible
since the late 1950's. But the introduction of pay television into
the broadcast market would create economic risks for the existing
networks and stations. Their markets have been protected from pay
television competition up to the present time by restrictive FCC rules
and the administration of those rules, even though it makes no more
economic sense to ban pay television than it would to prevent magazines
from charging consumers for copies and allo w only magazines that relied
exclusively on advertising for their revenues to exist.
There are many opportunities to increase competition and innovation
in unregulated U.S. industries, simply by withdrawing governmental support
for anticompetitive practices in these industreis. Thus, the science
and technology policy option of greatest significance in many industries
today is simply the option of repealing previous legislation. This state-
ment has many detailed implications that differ from industry to industry.
And each industry would require a major study and analysis effort, as
well as a political consensus sufficient to overcome industry opposition
to deregulation, in order to implement a deregulation policy option.
That such an option is worth considering has been demonstrated by airline
deregulation.
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3.3 Consumer Information
A well functioning market requires that consumers have adequate
information about price and quality. Otherwise, competition cannot
exist. Yet, in many consumer markets, the consumer not only has inad-
equate knowledge of product quality, but also has difficulty obtaining
even price information. Most advertising is not intended to provide
this type of information, but rather to inform consumers of the exis-
tence of products, sources of services and products, and to create
favorable impressions of the advertised product or service. U11ile
Consumers Union provides comparative information of the type that con-
sumers need on nationally advertised products, very little information
is available on the local services and products that consume most of
the consumer's income: housing, medical services, auto repair service,
and other local services.
It is not reasonable to expect either government or industry to
provide the type of information that consumers need. The job will
almost certainly have to be done by consumer groups, if it is to be
done at all. Nevertheless, the opportunity exists for government to
facilitate the development of consumer information services. It is
reasonable to expect very substantial. gains in the productivity of
local services, as well as a much more rapid rate of innovation in
qJ	 these industries, as a result of increased competition that would
result from improved consumer information at the local level [271, [281.
3.4 Privatization
In many sectors of the economy the government acts as a monopoly
or near-monopoly provider of services. The postal service, the public
1
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schools, public libraries, defense, and the. exploration of space
are some of the major markets dominated by government or quasi-
government providers. One of the sources of difficulty in thse
markets is the fact that services are provided to users at zero
price. Funds are obtained for the provision of these services
through general taxation, and these funds are allocated to the
service provider by Congress or a state legislature. Such organi-
zations become attuned to the wishes of their legislative constitu-
ents, but their incentives to serve their users are weak and exist
only to the extent that their users make their demands felt by their
representatives in the legislature. In some cases, this system is
quite satisfactory. Mien the users are industrial firms, the like-
lihood is high that the legislature will adequately represent the
interests of the user in dealings with the government service provider.
However, when users are individuals, it is difficult for the users to
arrange for their interests to be adequately represented. A policy
option that is, in principle, easy to adopt is to charge users directly
for the service, rather than to use tax funds to pay for the service.
The principal benefit of this approach is that service providers become
more attentive to their customers. However, this approach does not
benefit users to the full extent possible unless users have an alterna-
tive supplier to turn to. Thus, the postal service feels some pressure
from the threat that users will reduce their purchases of service, but
the pressure is much greater, if users can get their packages or messages
delivered by an alternative service provider such as United Parcel Service.
Thus, the combination of funding through direct user payments with opening
21
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the market to competitors avoids the principal difficulties with
government provision o« service. But there is still one difficulty
with such a market, and that is the fact that both government and
private sector monopoly service providers tend not to price their
services in proportion to cost. In other words, they subsidize one
service from revenues obtained from another service. Such cross-
subsidies are often introduced in response to their legislative con-
stituents [29]. Once in existence, such cross-subsidies are politi-
cally difficult to eliminate, and their existence can block the adop-
tion of open entry polities that threaten to force the market toward
cost-based pricing. An example is the subsidy of rural trail delivery
3
by urban mail. The only satisfactory way of preserving such subsidies,
i
is to make them into direct subsidies. However, direct subsidies are
more difficult to get political support for; their economic and social
effects are often examined more closely than are the effects of indirect
subsidies. For example, should rural mail and telephone subsidies be
extended to both rich and poor rural dwellers, and, if not, hoc.* could
the distinction be made on a practical basis?
If a direct subsid y is acceptable politically, as it might be in
the case of low income users of public schools and libraries, it can
be combined with•a direct user payment system by providing vouchers
to the tow income users [30]. But again, such a system is only fully
-effective if the user can turn to an alternate source of service if
unsatisfied. Once free entry is allowed, along with cost-based
pricing and direct user payment, the need for a government service
provider often disappears altogether. The only residual trace of
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government intervention would then be the provision of vouchers or
scholarships to low income individuals. In such a case, full
"privatization" of the service can be accomplished.
In defense and space, the path to privatization is not as
straightforward as it is in the case of purely domestic services.
Nevertheless, in both defense and space in the U.S., the government
relies on the private sector for its hardware, software, and some
of its operational services, so some elements of privatization are
present in these services. The opportunity for further privatization
may exist in defense and space, and analysis of this possibly appears
to be appropriate. The directions in which innovation in these fields
is moving is now dettirmined by a process in which the individual con-
sumer plays almost no role whatsoever. It is not easy to bring the
consumer into these fields effectively. A token, uninformed consumer
on an advisory board is not an effective mechanism for getting consumer
"input." One possibility that has not been adequately explored is the
idea of improving consumer-oriented information about the operation
and significance of these agencies. Of course, both agencies now
spend substantial sums on providing information to consumers, but
this information is organized and presented in a way that is likely
to strengthen public support for existing programs. The new possibility
is to provide information that will cause consumers to question the
basic premises and orientation of existing programs and to see some of
the opt-..ons for defense and space that are not now given official support.
It is quite possible that a more open, questioning approach to defense
and space policy would result in more innovation and more effective
programs in the long term.
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4.0 IMPROVINO THE DIANAGFUENT Or COVERNMENT SPONSORED
RESEARCH AND DEVE1.01IMNT
The market concepts discussed in previous sections have some
bearing on the questions 
of 
the appropriateness of government
sponsorship of WO and of how project selection in government spon-
sored R&D should be carriod out.
Starting with basic research, there seems to be little contro-
versy over the appropriateness of some form of governmental stimulus
to this act(vity, whother through direct support, pnLent and copyright
proteetion, or L.Ax inoontives. The project solacLion mochanism is
now (airly divorce, and there are many roa gons for favoring a diversity-0
0 ►• 1,011ted tippro '.1011 to rt ►nding and project soloction- The econo-mic con-
cept that is relevant here is Oat the custo riers or users of basis
researt-h should be involved in projeot selection and fLaiding, by analogy
to the role of the consumer: in markets. This concept is only occasion-
ally operative today. A possibIc example of the application of this
princtiple would btu to briiig produeL development etigineers into the pro-
ject seloction process in the support of research projects in their
field at an agency like NSF. This group now influenc(-.s, to some extent,
the patbt., of basic research within their- own companies. It ► ight be
feasible to increaso their influenco. in governmont sponsored programs,
as well., on the basis that they are the most direct consumers of b' ►sie
reseatob. The ordinary individual is the ultim a te consumer of basic
research, and again the only rezalistic opportLinity for increasing
coll 'oZimer participation appoars to bo throw-1 1fli improved consumer informa-
Lion on the basic research establishment and its operatioa.
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Considering next the role of government in relation to applied
research and development, the appropriate role is fairly clear in
areas in which the government has a mission responsibility and
monopoly, such as defense and space. In these areas the government
is responsible for funding, project selection, and overall management.
The possibility of increasing the degree of privatization and through
this, competition and innovation, was discussed above. In civilian
markets, there may also be a role for government sponsored applied
research and development, but the case is less clear. If there is an
appropriate role for government sponsored R&D in civilian markets, it
Is probably primarily In applied research, because product development
is closely tied to the.  market and is best (lone by firms that are
familiar with the market ['311.
Applied research is research that: is oriented toward specific
applications in spocifte markets. It is often clear that a specific
type of device or technique is of key importance in the evolution of
a particular Hold, and it is ClOar. that the bo-, t way to promote pro-
gress in LIUS field is through the development of specific devices or
examples of the critical technique. In such cases this development
is not coupled directly to the market, but rather represents learning
work that goes beyond basic research and prepares the way for market-
oriented development to follow. An example might be a key component
in a large system, such as a new type 
of 
communication satellite that
would make possible yin improved communication system. In such cases,
there may well be. a case for government sponsorship of R&D 
on the
economic: grounds that the private sector tends to underinvest in this
25
AW'
type of work, because it is unable to appropriate the results. A
	
r	
firm is likely to underinvest in applied research that could benefit
its competitors as much as itself; it will prefer to wait until
there is a specific market opportunity to focus its work on. Thus,
	
I	
if the government can find these critical areas of applied research,
it can probably make an important contribution to the national com-
petitive position in whatever industries it chooses to support.
The process by which areas of government applied research are
chosen is thus an important element of the R&D program. It may be
that there are opportunities for organizational improvments in the
project selection process. At the present time, U.S, government
agencies have advisory panels that help them to keep in touch with
the industry and its views. A possible opportunity for improvement
might lie in the way industry representatives are chosen for these
panels or in the ways that panel members are able to express their
views. In some cases an industry panelist may know of an area that
would be productive for government R&D, but may be reluctant to share
his ideas with his competitors. There may be an organizational alter-
native that would allow secrecy to be maintained. For example, if
the R&D is government sponsored but done in industry, a negotiated
contract rather than a competitive procurement could prote ,^± the ideas
of the industry R&D group. Of course, this approach would violate
many of the existing constraints on government contracting. An alter-
native to this approach is the creation of tax incentives for firms to
	
I
	 do R&D that allow firms to make project selections completely on their
ratan [31]. The weakness of this approach is that it results in the
1
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support of a great deal of work that industry defines as R&D for tax
purposes, but that may be nothing more than restyling, as in the
automobile industry.
One way of looking at government R&D in civilian markets is that
the government is acting as an industry-wide cooperative R&D agency.
A portion of the industry's corporate income tax can be thought of as
being allocated to this purpose, and it is therefore reasonable to
expect R&D project selection to be made by industry. In order to avoid
the weaknesses of both government sponsored R&D and the tax incentive
approach, it might be possible to encourage the development of industry-
wide R&D activities outside of government, as discussed , in Section 2.3.
The "national research and development. corporation" concept discussed
in Section 2.4 is another option that allows greater confidentiality
than a government sponsored program with consequent increased flexibility
and potential for innovation.
5.0 INCREASING "APPROPRIATE" INNOVATION IN
LARGE--SCALE SYSTEMS
Starting with Jacques Ellul [32], there has been a steady flow of
literature concerned with the uncontrolled, apparently autonomous evolu-
tion of technology in directions that are "inappropriate" because they
are not directions that benefit consumers [33], [34]. The principal
contribution of economic theory to this question is to suggest that thew_
"inappropriate" evolutionary trends in technology are most likely to
occur in sectors of the economy in which market forces are ineffective,
often as a result of governmental action. For example, the choice of new
technology in U.S. hospitals is not limited by considerations of economic
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iefficiency, becuase insurance payment systems cover all costs and there
is no effective competition in this market. The result has been an
extraordinary rise in hospital costs [35].
System analysis can contribute to an understanding of these trends
by pointing to examples of inappropriate technology in areas in which
large-scale societal systems are being built with inadequate coordination
and planning, such that "suboptimization" is taking place. The subsystems
of these inappropriate systems are being optimized, but no one is looking
after the overall system optimization. For example, in attempts to
increase productivity in post-secondary education, televised classes have
been used to Increase the number of students per teacher. Television and
other educational technologies such as audio cassettes used in combina-
tion with ~ gill visuals have been found to have no significant difference
from each ether and from live classes. When optimization of the school's
operation L11rough minimization of waching costs is done, television
appears to be the preferred technology. However, if optimization of the
entire learning operation, including the cost of student time, is done,
technologies such as andi:o cassettes (videorecording technology is still
too expensive for most students) that offer students the chance to lis-
ten to lectures when they wish and to review them as often as they
wish, result in lower total costs. The optimization of the school's
productivity is a suboptimization, because it fails to include the entire
system and the costs of student time that would be included in an overall
system optimization. The system boundary in such a case has been
incorrectly drawn, from the standpoint of society, even though correctly
drawn from thu standpoint of the schoui.
A similar suboptimization is taking place in some areas of national
2$
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science and technology policy. Present policy 4ocuses on productivity
in the market economy and on GNP, the output of the market rronomy
rather than on the output of the total economy.. The total economy
includes both the market economy and the household economy. in the U.S.,
the household economy is comparable to the size of the market economy,
because for most services that consumers receive, the cost of consumer
time is several times as large as the price that users pay into the
market economy for goods and services [9], [10j. As in the case of
educational, technology, there is a danger that firms will choose the
best technology from their standpoint and end up with the wrong technology
from society's standpoint. Wrong choices by fir:-
-s will be corrected in
markets whero users have a chance to obtain services from more than one
provider. However, in fields such as education, medical care, defense,
and space, %,!here Oere are local or national monopolies, wrong choices
are not automatically corrected.
One approach to science and technology policy that would improve
technological choices in large-scale systems is, of course, to improve
the operation of markOLS by increasing competition anti. consumer choice,
as discussed in Section 3. When deregulation and competition are not
feasible, it still, may be possible to refocus technological choice toward
options that till m.iaimire total cast rather than provider cost and that
will optimize total system operation rather than the subsystem under the
control of the provider. Any new non-market a pproach to science and
technology policy that seeks to induce overall system optimization. will
probably have to do so by facilitating large-scale system planning that
does in :Fact take users into account in the organizational design.
For example, there are many opportunities for innovation in such areas
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Ias city design, in the organizational sense rather than the physical
sense.. In principle, such local service markets as housing, transporta-
tion, education, and police services could be highly innovative. Their
organizational design is presently highly constrained by regulation and
most are monopolistic. Both market incentive approaches, such as dereg-
ulation and privatization, and new organizational designs that encourage
overall system optimization could usefully be the subject of analysis and
R&D.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS
Science and technology policy is concerned with the rate and direc-
tions of technological change in society. Two broad categories of policy
instruments are available: (1) market--oriented approaches, such as the
modification of property sights in newly created information through
patent law, that seek to increase the incentives for the private sector
to invest in R&D; (2) direct public action, such as government sponsor-
ship of R&D, that seeks to substitute government action for the operation
of the market. Much existing policy makes use of the direct action
approach. This paper has been primarily concerned with pointing out
possibilities for the use of market-oriented approaches and some of the
advantages of such approaches that can be seen from basic economic
,j	 principles.
The fundamental economic justification for government action to
increase innovation in markets is that the private sector will tend to
underinvest in R&D because it is not able to fully appropriate the bene-
fits of such investments. The reason for this inappropriability is that
the information that results from R&D can be copied by competitors and
30
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the originating firm may, therefore, not be able to recover its costs of
creation. In markets that are competitive and in which the industry is
at a stage where technology is changing rapidly, investing in R&D is a
necessary element for the survival of a producing `irm. Innovations in
such markets are protected by the Fact that it takes a substantial time
and effort for competitors to make copies. It is unlikely that firms
underinvest in R&D in these markets, and further stimulus to innovation
through governmental action is not needed.
In regulated markets and other markets in which barriers to entry
are created by governmental action, there is often a variety of adminis-
trative obstacles to the introduction of innovation. Deregulation is the
most effective mechanism for the stimulation of innovation in these
industries.
Tile objectives of technological innovation for a nation are twofold:
(1) to maintain or acquire a competitive position in the world market;
(2) to provide better products and services to the citizens of the nation.
Much of national science and technology policy can be justified by its
effectiveness in contributing to the first objective. For example, the
use of tax funds in support of education, basic research, and libraries
contributes to the development of a national information infrastructure.
This infrastructure creates the basis for comparative advantage in inter
national trade in the information-based economies of the modern world.
The mechanisms for government action in support of education, basic
research, and libraries involve subsidies of these activities. The
quality of these activities could probably be improved by giving more
control over the character of the services offered to the users rather
than the providers of these services. The organizational approach to
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rproviding government support for industrial R&D could Also probably be
Improved. Industry-wide R&D organizations within the government, in
government corporations, and in private firms could provide similar
services but with different degrees of industry control and confidential-
ity for innovative ideas.
In many large-scale systems, the evolution of technology has taken
^'
	 place in ways that have been characterized as "autonomous" and ""inappro-
priate," because the technologies seem to ha ve evolved in directions of
their own, without regard for human needs. ;luck of the difficulty can
be traced to the fact that these systems are monopolistic; users in these
systems do not have an adequate choice. Market-incentive approaches such
as deregulation and privatization, offer the most reliable path to the
restoration of appropriate innovation. However, in certain areas, such
as defense and space, a new approach to science and technology policy
that seeks to achieve a mare comprehensive approach to system planning
may bring innovation that is more appropriate to human needs.
A general conclusion is that there seem to be a number of opportune-
ties for increasing the rate of innovation and for bringing the directions
of innovation more closely into line with the needs of users. Most of
these opportunities can best be realized by improving the operation of
markets by such techniques as deregulation, improving the quality of
consumer information, and privatization. A second conclusion is that
these improvements could benefit the consumer, both as a member of a
nation with a stron ger position in the world market and as a consumer of
`	 more ""appropriate" technology. To obtain these benefits, various forms
32
of organizational innovation appear to be needed. Studies of new organi-
zational options for the implementation of national science and technology
policy would be an essential first step in this innovation process.
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Most empirical studies in economics focus on the trading
of goods and services, and hence neglect to consider the
value of goods and services produced by individuals for
themselves and their families. This paper presents an em-
pirical examination of this "household economy".
The principle result of the study is a comparison of the
value of the time which people devote to each activity of
their lives with the money they spend on the-activity. Al-
ter-tax wage rates are used to value an individual's time.
The enormous size of the household economy, and the fact
that for most activities the value of the consumer's time
devoted to an activity exceeds the money expenditures on the
activity, suggest that there are many opportunities for
productivity improvements in the household economy which
have been overlooked in most traditional thinking on prod-
uctivity.
1.	 LNTRO.DUCTION
Production by consumers has been largely overlooked by
economists, yet there is little doubt of its imp-o-rtance.
All products and services are purchased by consumers in an
unfinished state. The consumer must then do further proc-
essing to produce the good or service desired. Lancaster'
and Becker 2 have constructedtheoretical outlines of this
process, yet empirical work has been lacking.
Each household may be viewed as a little corporation,
purchasing a variety of inputs and producing a variety of
goods and services for its members. These little corpora-
tions may be thought of in the aggregate as 'the household
economy.' Many outputs of t.h-e household economy, for exam-
ple food preparation or clothes cleaning, differ little from
the outputs of some conventional corporations. Yet the
economy, as it has been traditionally defined, usually in-
cludes only those goods or services produced in return for
money payment. Lt will be referred to here as "the market
f
economy" to emphasize this dichotomy.
(Kelvin J. Lancaster, 'A New Approach to Consumer Theory',
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.74 (April, 1966), pp.
132-157.
=Gary S. Becker, 'A Theory of the Allocation of Time', The
Economic Jour a	 September, 1965, p. 493.
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The arbitraryness of the distinction between, the two
economies is painfully evident. If I pay you to clean my
house, and you pay me to clean your house, then both trans-
actions are in the market economy. If we each clean our own
houses, or even clean each other's house as a favor, then
the activities must be regarded as part of the household
economy, as they certainly are not part of the market econ-
omy. The constant shifting of activities across the bound-
ary between the two economies may result in misleading in-
ferences. For example, if increasing numbers of women take
jobs in the market economy and spend part of their income
purchasing services, such as day care, which they used to
produce for themselves in the household economy, then the
usual measures of the economy, such as Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP), will indicate a larger increase in production
than has actually been the case.
However, this problem of activites shifting across the
boundary between the two economies is only one symptom of
the fact that a major portion of the economy is simply left
out of most conventional economic analysis. This neglect of
the household economy is reflected in government policies.
In particular, the household economy is neglected in most
present thinking on productivity. While much discussion,
and some action, is devoted to improving productivity in the
market economy, little attention is given to improving prod-
i
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uctivity in the household economy. Yet it may be argued
that improving the productivity of any activity in the hou-
sehold economy would have the same effects on welfare as im-
proving the productivity of an industry of similar size in
the market economy.
There arc two reasons why the household economy has
tended to be neglected by economists. The first has been a
definitional problem. Although it is arbitrary, defining
the economy to include only those goods or services produced
in return for a money payment does create a sharp distinc-
tion between activities which are and are not part of the
economy. Most alternative definitions require many judge-
mental distinctions before they can be applied in practice.
The only solution would seem to be to regard every activity
in which people engage as part of the economy. One may view
every activity in which people engage as a service, even if
only to the person who produces it.
The second problem is one of data. Data on money trans-
actions are widely collected and distributed. Data an other
	
1 1
types of activities are not so readily available. This
study is an attempt to pull together available data on the
various activities in the household economy, and express
this data in money terms. Lt will be shown that many of the
tl w,
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enormous proportions. For most activities, the value of the
time which people devote to the activity exceeds the money
the people spend on the activity.. Hence, the opportunities
for productivity improvement in the household economy are
great. Using this data, one may identify specific opportu -
nities which merit futher study.
2. THE THEORY
Unfortunatel„ since household outputs are not sold, it
is difficult to place a monetary value on them, so as to
compare their value with those of outputs in the market
economy. There is, however, one household output which is
sold in the market economy--labor. According to economic
theory, rational producers will allocate their scarce re-
sources in such a way that the value of the marginal product
of the resource is equal in each use. Applying this logic
to the allocation of time in the household, it may be argued
that time contributed by members of the household should be
valued at the wage rate of each individual. Since personal
time is really the only scarce resource contributed by the
household, it seems reasonable to assume that the value
added by the household inproducing each good or service is
equal to the value of time spent producing the good or serv -
ice. The total value of each good or service produced by
the household is equal to the value of time plus the value
4
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of any inputs purchased in the market economy ('market
expenditures') which were used in the activity.
There are at least two objections which may be made to
this procedure. The first is that the time which is sold as
labor may also produce a service (or disservice) to the in-
dividual involved, since people may derive pleasure (or dis-
pleasure) from their own la 7ior. The wage rate will not re-
flect the value of this additional service (or disservice),
and hence not be an accurate representation of the true
value of peoples' time. Second, people may not be free to
adjust their work hours so as to equate the value of the
marginal product of time off the job to the wage rate. Un-
fortunately, there is, as yet, no way to correct for these
problems in an empirical study.
Another troublesome problem with valueing peoples' time
at the wage rate is that it works only for people who have
wages. Perhaps the most notable class of people who would
be left out under this scheme are housekeepers. Housekeep-
ers are the professionals of the household economy, and
should not,be overlooked. As will be discussed below, data
are available on time allocations by housewives, who com-
prise the overwhelming majority of housekeepers. It will be
assumed that housewives have an opportuntity cost of time
(i.e. the wage rate they could make if they were employed in
5
0the market economy) equal to the after-tax wage rate of the
average female year-round full-time employee. People who
will have to be left out of this analysis due to lack of
both time allocation data and the difficulty in estimating
wage rates include children, retired people, and the unem-
ployed.
Two major types-of data were required by this project.
The first type were data on individual time allocations.
This data was taken from a 1965 study done by the Survey Re-
search Center at the University of Michigan. For that
study, about 2000 non-farm urban-dwellers between the ages
of 18 and 65 kept diaries of how they spent a single day.
Times reported were coded into one of 96 activity categor-
ies. Complete tables were then compiled of time alloca-
tions, in average number of minutes per day, for employed
men, employed women, and housewives. Tables with less de-
tailed 37 activity categories were also published for spe-
cific socio-economic groups, including six household income
f
levels.
The second type of data were on market expenditures.
These were taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics'
Consumer Expenditure Survey, which gives data on consumer
expenditures broken down into several hundred categories.
The survey was conducted in 1961-62 and again in 1972-73.
6
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This study will use data from the 1972 -73 survey, which al-
though a bit more separated in time from the 1965 time allo-
cation data, is more complete and up to date than the
1961-62 survey.
Reconciling the data on time allocations with the data on
consumer expenditures poses several problems. First, it is
necessary to reconcile the classifications of time alloca-
tions with the classifications of market expenditures. Ev-
ery effort was made to develop as detailed a classification
of household activities as the data would allow. A 38 ac-
tivity classification was ultimately developed. The first
17 activites are uhat will be called "tradable" activities,
since they are direct competitors with services which may be
purchased in the market economy. The last 20 activites are
called "non-tradable", since the services which result may
b y consumed only by the person who produces them. Appendix
A describes the activity classification and the assumptions
behind it in more detail.
t
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The second data reconciliation problem was to find a way
to compare data on individual allocations of time with hou _
sehold market expenditures. The solution is to word{ at the
aggregate level. Thus, the sum total value of time devoted
to a particular activity by all individuals may be compared
to the sum total market expenditures by all households.
7
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Breaking out the data by household income levels is diffi-
cult, as the necessary data on individual wage rates by hou-
P
sehold income class have not been published. These wage
rates may be estimated, however. Appendix B explains the
methodology which was used to accomplish this.
1
Calculation of aggregate market expenditures for each ac-
tivity by income class began by multiplying per household
expenditures on each activity for the income class by the
number of households in the income class. This did not end
r	 the process, however, since there were also some households
who did not ,report their income. Aggregate market expendi-
tures by these families could, however, be calculated by
multiplying their expenditures on each activity by the num-
ber of households not reporting their income. This amount
was then distributed among income classes in proportion to
expenditures by families reporting their income in each in-
come class.
3. THE RESULTS
The empirical results of this study are shown in Appendix
C. The first three columns for each income class show the
average number of minutes per day devoted to each activity,
while the fourth column shows the average market expendi-
tures per household per year. Columns five through seven
8
4{	 give the aggregate value of time devoted to the activity by
all employed men, employed women, and housewives in the in-
come class, respectively. These figures were obtained by
multiplying columns one through three by the corresponding
population and wage rate. Cclumn eight is simply the sum of
columns five through seven. Column nine gives aggregate
market expenditures by all household-t in the income class on
the activity. Column 10 gives aggregate annual person-hours
devoted to each activity, obtained by multiplying the fig-
ures in columns one through three by the corresponding popu-
r
	 lation size, summing, and making necessary unit changes.
Continuing to the second page for each income class, col-
umn one gives the sum of columns eight and nine on the pre-
vious page--the total expenditures of time and money on each
activity. Column two ranks the activities by total expendi-
tures. Column three gives the market expenditures per per-
son-hour spent on each activity. Hence, it represents the
entries in column nine divided by the corresponding entries
in column 10 on the previous page. Column four ranks the
market expenditures per person-hour,. Column five gives the
ratio of value of time to total market expenditures. Hence,
it represents the entries in column %ight divided by the
corresponding entries in column nine on the previous page..
Column six ranks these ratios.
t
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1The third page for each income class shows the assumed
population sizes and wage rates for the income class. The
total number of employed males and females are based on 1973
averages as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.3
1:
	 These populations were distributed among income classes in
pruportion to the aggregate number of person-hours worked,
as estimated and Appendix B and shown in Table 9. The total
number of housewives is based on the average number of women
in 1973 not in the labor force due to the fact that they
were "keeping house," as reported by the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics.'' This total was distributed among income
classes in proportion to the number of households in each
income class, as shown in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
The total number of households is from the consumer Expendi-
ture Survey, with households not reporting their income be-
ing distributed among income classes in proportion to the
number of households reporting an income in the class. Wage
rates are as estimated in Appendix B.
f
3 U.5. Bureau of Labor Statistics, En, plovment and Earnings,
U.S. Government Printing office, January, 1974, p. 145.
"Ibid, p. 141
4. CONCLUSIONS
The household economy far exceeds the market economy in
size. If one were to redefine personal consumption expendi-
tures (PCE) to include the value of time expended in the
household, the 1973 Gross National Product (GNP) would have
been around $4700 billion, rather than $1307 billion. s Many
of the "industries" of the household economy are gigantic
compared to most conventional industries. The value of time
and money which are devoted to watching television, for ex-
ample, far exceeds the market expenditures on either housing
or food
In virtually every activity, the value of time which peo-
ple devote to the activity exceeds the value of market ex-
penditures on the activity. This suggests a substantial
willingness of people to pay for innovations which would re-
duce the time spent on activities which are displeasureable
or neutral. Although this statement may not sound very
original, this willingness to pay for time savings may be
f	 SThis number was obtained by adding my total expense for all
families (value of time and market expenditures) of $4197
billio!j to the 1973 total of $497 billion for gross private
domes','c investment, net exports, and government purchases;.
The number is approximate, since my definition of market
expenditures does not exactly match the standard definition
of PCE.
Source:U.S. Bureau of tine Census, Statistical Abstract oaf
the United States _ 1978, p. 440.
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amuch greater than is comwonly perceived.
	 For example, most
of us are accustomed to thinking of eating out as an "expen-
sive" activity.	 Yet ► 	 the data in Appendix C indicate that
the value of a restaurant customer's time is an average of
1.9 times more valuable than the cost of the meal purchased.
The success of the fast-food
	 restaurant industry in recent
years may be attributable more to the time savings these es-
tablishments offer than to their low prices,	 If	 this hy-
pothesis	 is correct,
	 there is every reason to expect that
many people would prefer higher quality food than most
fast-food
	 restaurants	 offer,	 and	 be willing	 to pay for	 it,
if only they could get	 it quickly.	 Hence,	 there is
	
probably
a substantial untapped market
	
for high-quality fast-food
restaurants.
In general, one might assume that the higher the ratio of
time value to -market expenditures, the more willing people
would be to make a given percentage increase in their ex-
penditures so as to obtain a . given percentage decrease in
time spent on an activity. House cleaning, with its 19.3
ratio, and personal care at home with a 25.7 ratio would
seem ripe for innovation. So would education (2.3 ratio),
f reading (28.3), and hobbies and crafts (18.8). Although it
would require a substantial technological breakthrough, any
innovation which could safely and comfortably enable people
to reduce the time they spend sleeping would have an enor-
12
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mous impact. People currently spend time with a value
roughly equal to the GNP sleeping.
For a few activities, expecially medical care and hous-
ing, the very low ratios of time value to market expenditure
suggest that innovations which allow people to reduce market
expenditures by devoting a bit more of their own time to the
activity would have an impact. Do-it-yourself solar water
heating systems might be one example of such an innovation.
Various types of medical monitoring equipment for use in the
home might be another.
interestingly, the ratio of time value to market expendi-
tures are remarkably stable across income classes. There
are distinctly higher ratios for food and clothing in lower
income classes, indicating a "do-it-yourself" tendency among
lot-ter income households. However, the opposite would appear
to be true of housing. Perhaps this is because lower income
households generally have more modest housing, requiring
less care and maintenance than higher income households. As
might be expected, market expenditures per hour devoted to
an activity rise with income for all activities. In gen-
eral, one might infer than all income classes would be re-
ceptive to innovations which improve household productivity.
t
Ir
f
There is n need for regular monitoring of the houshold
economy through some indicators similar to those presently
used to monitor the market economy. These indicators would
not necessarily require the type of detailed time allocation
data used in this study, although they could be improved if
this type of data were available on a regular basis. Useful
indicators of total household production could be developed
from existing data on wage rates, employment, and the size
of various socio-economic groups. These indicators would
remind everyone of what has been demonstrated in this pa-
per--that what most economic planners think of as 'the econ-
omy' is merely the tip of the economic iceberg. bidden un-
derneath are great opportunities for a better life.
4
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Appendix A
DEVELOPING AN ACTIVITY CLASSIFICATION
f
t
Eycry effort was mxcde to develop as detailed a classifi-
cation of household activites as the data would allow. A
38-activity classification was ultimately developed. These
axe listed in Table 1, along with the time allocation study6
activity classifications assigned to each one.
The 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey, from which data
on market expenditures were obtained, had two components.
In the first, a sample of about 20,000 nouseholds 7 were
asked to keep diaries of all their expenditures over a two
week period. In the second, about 20,000 households were
asked once each quarter for a year to report expenditures
for "big ticket" items. The results of both survey compo-
6John P. Robinson, Now Americans Use Time; A Social-PsYclho
logical Analysis of Everyday Behavior, Praeger Publishers,
New York, 1977;
and
John P. Robin4F;n, Now Americans Used Time in ,1965, Insti-
tute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Ar-
bor, 1977: Available from University Microfilms, Ann Ar-
bor, MI.
? A household is a group of persons, usually living together,
who pool income and expenses, or a financially independent
person.
!i
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TABLE 1
Assignmenl, of	 Time Allocation Study Activities
	 to Household
Economy Study Activities
Household Economy Time Allocation
Study Activity Study Activity
Tradable Activities -
1
1.	 Job 00 Normal Occupational fork
Outside Home
01 Normal Occupational Work
at Home
02 Overtire
} 03 Travel	 During Word:
04 Waiting Time or	 Inter-
ruption
	 During WoCk
05 Second Joh
07 At	 Work,	 Other
08 Work Breaks
i
2.	 Travel	 to Job 09 Travel	 to Job
3.	 Food	 Preparation 10 Food	 Preparation
11 steal	 Cleanup
30 Shopping
	 for Everyday
Goods	 (57%)
36 Waiting	 for Purchase of	 Goods
and Services
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping
	
(25%)
49 Travel	 Associated with
Personal	 Needs	 (25%)
4.	 Cleaning 12 Cleaning	 House
13 Outdoor Chores
30 Shopping
	
for Everyday
Goods	 (3%)
39 Travel	 Associated With
Shopping
	
(2%)
49 Travel	 Associated With
Personal	 Needs	 (2%)
5.	 Gardening and	 Gown Care 17 Gardening,	 Annimal
16
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Care	 (607.)
30 Shopping	 for Everyday
Goods	 (1.)
39 Travel	 Associated With
Shopping
	 (1.)
49 Travel	 Associated With
Personal Needs(1.)
6.	 Pet Care 17 Gardening,
	 Animal
Care	 (40.)
30 Shopping for Everyday
Goods	 (1%)
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping
	 (1.)
49 Travel	 Associated with
Personal
	 Heeds	 (1::)
R
7.	 Clothing	 and	 Linens 14 Laundry,	 Ironing
15 Clothes Upkeep
30 Shopping
	
for Everyday
Goods	 (13.)
35 Repair and
	 CLenning
Services	 (60.)
39 Travel Associated with
t Shopping	 (14.)
49 Travel
	 Associated with
k
Personal	 Heeds	 (14%)
S.	 House 16 Other Home Repairs
18 Upkeep of	 Heat and
j Mater Supplies
31 Shopping	 for Durable Goods	 (90%)
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping	 (20.)
49 Travel	 Associated with
Personal
	
Needs
	
(207.)	 ,
9.	 Medical
	 Care Given 41
I
Personal Medical
	 Care
at Home at	 Home (50.)
30 Shopping	 for Everyday
Goods	 ( 1*,'*)
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping	 (1.)
49 Travel	 Associated with	 b
Personal
	
Needs	 (1.)
10.	 Child	 Care 20 Baby Care
21 Child	 Care	 j
22 Helping	 Child	 with
Homework
27 Care of Other	 People's
Children
11.	 Financial	 Management 19 Household	 Paperwork
17
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34 Government Services
37 Other Professional
Services
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping
	
(207)
49 Travel	 Associated with
Personal deeds	 (20%)
12. Travel Associated with 39 Travel Associated with
Professional Medical Shopping Me)
Care 49 Travel Associated with
Personal	 Needs	 (2%)
13. Travel Associated with 59 Travel Associated with
Education Education
14. Travel Associated with 69 Travel Associated with
Organizations and Organizations and
Relgion Religion
15. Travel	 Associated with 79 Travel	 Associated with
Social	 Life and Social	 Life and
Entertainment Entertainment
16. Travel	 Associated with 89 Travel	 Associated with
Leisure Activities Leisure Activities
17. Shopping	 Associated with 10 Shopping	 for Everyday
Non-Tradable Activities Goods	 (257)
31 Shopping	 for Durable
Goods
	
(10%)
35 Repair and Cleaning
Services	 (407)
39 Travel	 Associated with
Shopping	 (14%)
0 9 Travel	 Associated with
Personal	 Needs	 (14%)
Non-Tradable Activities-
18. Personal Care at Nome
19. Personal Care Services
20. Medical Care Received
at Nome
21. Professional Medical
Care
22. Eating at Hosne
40 Personal Hygiene
48 Other Private Activity
32 Personal Care Outside
Horne
41 Personal Medical Care
at Nome (50%)
33 Medical Care Outside
Home
43 Eating at Nome
18
323. Eating Out
24. Sleep and Rest
25. Vacation
26. Education
T
27. Religion
FS'
28. Other Organizations
t
29. Television
F
	 30. Reading
44 Meals Outside Home
or Workplace
06 Meals at Work
44 Essential Sleep
46 Incidental Sleep
47 Resting, Routine Haps
98 Relaxing
See Text
50 Attending Classes as Full-
Time Student
51 Attending Classes as Part -
Time Student
52 Attending Lectures or
Special Talks
53 Political Programs or.
Union Training Class
54 Homework or Research
55 Reading Technical
Journals or Books
56 Other Education
64. Participating in
Religious Organizations
65 Religious Services
60 Participating as Member of
Social or Political
Organization or
Labor Union
61 Voluntary Activities as
Elected Official of a
Social or Political
organi2ation or Labor
Union
62 Participating in Meetings
of Organizations
63 Unpaid WorP. for a Civic
Purpose
64 Participating in Factory
Council
67 Participating in Other
organizations
68 Other Organizational
Activity
91 Television
93 Reading Books
94 Reading Magazines
95 Reading Newspapers
99 Reading, Not Specified
19
34. Entertainment
36. Performing
37. Hobbies and Crafts
38. Personal Letters
yPi
r
31. Social Life
t
t
35. Listening to Sounds
24 Indoor Play with Children
42 Care and Help Given to
Other Adults
75 Entertaining or Visiting
Friends
76 Parties or Receptions
77 Going to Bars, Tearooms.
Soda Fountains, etc.
78 Other Social Life
87 Parlor Games
23 Read or Talk with
Children
96 Talking with Adults
25 Walking or Playing
Outdoors -with Children
80 Playing Sports or Physical
Exercises
81 Hunting, Fishing, Camping,
Pleasure Drives,
Sightseeing
82 Talking a Walk or Hike
70 Attending Sports Events
71 Circuses, Fairs.
Nightclubs, Dancing
Parades
72 Attending Movies
73 Attending Theater,
Concerts or Opera
74 Attending Museums,
E::hibitions, or
Galleries
19 Listening to Records
or Tape Recording
22. Listening to Radio
86 Playing a Musical.
Instrument, Singing,
Artistic Dancing
83 Hobbies and Collections
84 Women's Home Crafts
85 Artistic Hobbies
88 Other Leisure
97 Writing Private
Correspondence
t
32. Conversation
f	 33. Outdoors
a:
20
nests have been compiled as an integrated set of tables.'
However, a greater level of commodity detail is provided in
the separate publications on each segment of the survey.9
Both surveys were done over a two-year period, with no ad-
justments made for price changes over that time. Hence, the
expenditures shown may be viewed as averages of expenditures
over this period. The diary survey began six-months later
than the interview survey, with price level adjustments be-
ing made to ensure that the integrated diary and interview
survey data reflected calendar years 1972-73. Data are
presented according to various socio-economic breakdowns,
including 12 household income levels and seven occupational
groups.
Table 2 shows the consumer expenditure classes assigned
to each household activity. Whenever possible, the classes
"-	 come from among those used in the integerated diary and in-
terview survey data.. In some cases, these classes did not
provide sufficient detail for this study. The separate di-
ary and interview survey publications provided a more de-
	
a
--------------------
9 U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey : Intecirated Diary and Inte*view Survey Data, 1972-3,
Bulletin 1992, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 	 j
DC, 1978.
9 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Sur-
ve a Diary Survey, July 1972-June 1974, Bulletin 1959, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1977;
and
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Sur-
v_1: Interview Survey, 1972-73, Bulletin 1997, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1978_
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tailed breakdown of many of these classes, which were used
where necessary. Where data was taken from one of the sepa-
rate survey publications, this is indicated by a footnote in
Table 2.
With three exceptions, expenditure.; reported from the
broad classes shown in the integrated diary and interview
survey publication equaled the sum of the corresponding more
detailed expenditure classes in the interview survey publi-
cation, where the data from the interview survey was used in
this study. Thus, this detailed expenditure data from the
interview survey publication was directly comparable to the
expenditure data reported in the integrated publication, and
could be used without modification. in three exceptional
cases small adjustments were made, as explained in the foot-
notes to 'fable 2, to insure comparability of this data.
Expenditure data for the classes in the integrated publi-
cation never exactly equal the sum of the expenditures shown
for the corresponding more detailed classes in the diary
survey publication, due to price level adjustments made to
this data in the integration process by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. These adjustments were made due to the fact
that the diary survey actually began six months after the
interview survey, as explained above. Where -diary survey
data were used, expenditures shown in the diary survey were
ORIGINAL PAOC 15
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TABLE 2
Assignment of Consumer Expenditure Classan	 to ltoxttehold
Economy Study Activities
Household Economy Consumer Expenditure
Study Activity Survey Class
Tradable Activities-
1. Job
2. Travel to Job Transportation (35.4%)
3. Food Preparation Food at Home (98%)
Refrigerators and
Freezers	 (1)
Cooking	 Ranges	 (1)
Dishwashers and Garbage
< Disposals	 (1)
Toasters,
	
Coffeemakers,
Blenders	 (1)
Flange Hoods and Electric
Kitchen Equipment (1)
Domestic Services-
Domestic and Other
Duties	 (50%)	 (2)
Housewares
Miscellaneous House-
hold	 Products	 (50%)(3)
Service Contracts on
Appliances	 (50%)(4)
Transportation	 (8.7%)
4. Cleaning Cleaning	 Supplies	 (3)
Vaccuums and Other Electric
Floor Equipment	 (1)
Domestic Services-
Domestic and Other
Duties	 (50%)(2)
Transportation	 (.5)
S. Gardening and Lawn Care Gardening and Lawn Care
Services	 (2)
Fertilizers	 and	 Pesticides	 (2)
Lawn and Garden Supplies	 (3)
Lawnmowers	 (4)
Transportation
	
(.3%)
6. Pets and Animals Pe	 ,	 Supplies,et Purchases
and	 Other	 (1)
Pets,
	
Toys,	 and	 Games	 (10%)
Food
	
at Home	 (2%)
23
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Transportation (.
Laundry supplies t3)
Clothing Purchases
Dry CLeaning and Laundry
Washing Machines (1)
Clothes Dryers (1)
Sewing Machines (1)
Household Textiles
Paper Towels, Napkins
and Tissues (66'/.)(3)
Service Contracts on
Ap;:liances (50%)(4)
Transportation ( 6%)
1
7. Clothing and ".,inens
8. House	 Shelter
Other Household Repairs (2)
Reupholstering and
Furniture Repair (2)
Appliance Repair and
Servicing (2)
Moving, Freight, and
Storage Charges (2)
Fuel and Utilities
Furniture
Floor Coverings
Heaters, Fans, Humid-
ifiers, Vaporizers (1)
Miscellaneous Items (2)
Dehumidifiers, Air
Conditioners (1)
Miscellaneous Household
Products (50:)(3)
Lamps, Chandeliers, and
Other Fixtures (4)
Window Shades, Blinds,
and Rods (4)
Clocks, Mirrors and
Decorative Items (4)
Hand and Power Tools (4)
Insurance on Personal
Effects (4)
Other Household Expenses (1)
Transportation (2.5%)
f	
9. Medical Ca-re Given 	 Nonprescription Drugs and
at Home
	
	
Medical Supplies
Domestic Services-
Child Care and Care
for Elderly (50%)(2)
f
	 Transportation (5.4%)
10.. Child Care
	
Toys (1)
Pets, Toys and Games (45%)
24
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13. Travel Associated with
	
Transportation(1%)
Education
14. Travel Associated with Transportation	 (5.3%)
Organizations	 and
Religion
15. Travel Associated with Transportation	 (15.6%)
Social	 Life and
Entertainment
16. Travel	 Associated with Transportation	 (2.7%)
Leisure Activities
17. Shopping Associated with Transportation	 (8.6/)
Non-Tradable Activities
Non-Tradable Activities-
18. Personal Care at Home Personal Care Pr6ducts 	 (5)
}
if
)
)
19. Personal Care Outside
Home
20 Medical Care Received
at Home
21. Professional Medical
Care
22. Eating at Home
Domestic Services-
Child Care and Care
for the Elderly (500(2)
Transportation (5.4%)
Stationary and Greeting
Cards (50%)(3)
Personal Insurance,
Retirement and
Pensions
Miscellaneous
Typewriters and Home Use
Office Equipment
Transportation (5.2%)
Transportation (2/.)
Paper Towels, Napkins,
and Tissues (3)
Personal Care Services (5)
Health Care Expenses Not
Covered by Insurance
Health Insurance
25
11. Financial Management
17 Travel Associated with
Professional Medical
Care
32. Conversation
33. Outdoors
i
23. Eating Out	 Food Away from Home
Meals as Pay
24. Sleep and Rest
25. Vacation
26. Education
27. Religion
28. Other Organizations
29. Television
30. Reading
31. Social Life
34. Entertainment:
35. Listening to Sounds
Vacation and Pleasure Trips
Owned Vacation Home
Luggage, Footlockers,
and Trunks (4)
Education
Gifts to Religious
Organizations (6)
Gifts to Welfare
Organizations (6)
Gifts to Educational, Political ►
and Other organizations (6)
Television
Television Cable Services (1)
TV, Radio, Musical Instrument,
and Other Repairs and
Rentals (60%)(1)
Re ad,n,g
Pets, Toys, and Games (45'/.)
Gifts to Individuals
Outside Family (6)
Alchoholic Beverages
Tobacco Products and
Smoking Supplies
Telephone
Boats, Aircraft and Wheel
Goods
Club and Membership Dues (1)
Bicycles. Tricycles, and
Powered Carts (1)
Sports Equipment ,(1)
Playground, Camping, and
Other Equipment (1)
Season Tickets, Admissions,
and fees ( 1 )
Radios (1)
Phonographs, Tape Recorders,
and Other (1)
Component Systems, Parts and
Other ( 1 )
26
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Records, Reels, and Cassetts (i)
TV, Radio, Musical Instrument ►
and Other Repairs and
Rentals (40%) (1)
36. Performing
37. Hobbies and Crafts
38. Personal Letters
Musical lnstruments and
Accessories (1)
Lessons (40%)(1)
Photography (1)
Lessons (40%)(1)
Stationary and Greeting
Cards (50%)(3)
(1) Taken from interview survey publication.
(2) The integrated diary and interview survey publication gives one
figure for "Domestic and Other Household Services", which includes
the following classifications from the interview survey
publication:
Domestic Services-Domestic and Other Duties
Domestic Services-Child Care and Care for Elderly
Gardening and Lawn Care Services
Other Household Repairs
Reupholstering and Furniture Repair
Appliance Repair and servicing
Moving, Freight, and Storage Charges
Fertilizers and Pesticides
However, these classifications do not sum to match the total shown
in the integrated publication. The difference is evidently due to
the inclusion of a few miscellaneous items from the diary survey,
including locksmith services, small houseplants, seeds, and bulbs.
This was resolved by using the figures for the above
classifications shown in the interview survey publication, and
creating a new classification "Miscellaneous Items" for the
difference between the total expenditures for the above
classifications and the total expenditures shown in the integrated
publication.
(3) These classifications were lumped together under the bending
of "Housekeeping and Laundry Supplies" in the integrated diary
and interview survey publication. Detailed expenditure data was
taken from the diary survey publication, and scaled to make the
total of all these classifications match the total shown in the
integrated publication.
( 11) The integrated diary and interview survey publication gives one
figure for "Miscellaneous Household Expense", which includes these
classifications from the interview survey publication. However,
expenditures oil 	 classifications do not match the total
shown in the integrated publication. The difference is evidently
due to the inclusion of expenditures oil 	 from the diary
27
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survey. This was resolved by adding the difference between the
total of these classifications shown in the interview survey
publication and the total shown in the integrated publication to
the figure for "Other Household Expenses." Expenditures on other
classifications were taken directly from the interview survey
publication.
(5) These classifications were lumped together under the heading
of "Personal Care" in the integrated diary and interview survey
publication. Detailed expenditure data was taken from the diary
survey publication, and scaled to make the total of all these
classifications match the total shown in the integrated
publication.
(G) The integrated diary and interview survey publication gives
one figure for "Gifts and Contributions", whipli includes these
classifications from the interview survey publication., However,
expenditures on these classifications do not sum to matcli the
total shown in the integrated publication. The difference is
evidently due to the inciusion of some small contributions from
the diary survey. This was resolved by scaling the detailed
expenditure data to make the total of all these classifications
match the total shown in the integrated publication.
'0
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3-11) were included in the times and expenses of these ac-
tivities. "Travel to Job" was felt to be so important that
it was made a separate activity. Since travel was collsid
ered to be a tradable activity, it seemed inappropriate to
include the time and expense of travel associated with non-
tradable activities in the times and expenses allocated to
these activities. Hence, five special tradable activities
were created for them (numbers 12-16).
scaled by the factor necessary to ensure that the expendi-
ture shown for a class in the integrated publication equaled
the sum of the corresponding expenditures in the diary sur-
vey publication.
The most troublesome group of activities to deal with in
developing this classification were Lhose related to travel.
They will be regarded as tradable, since even though it is
not passible to pay someone else to do one's own traveling,
it is generally possible to pay to have whatever one is
traveling Vo brought to one's home. For example, if one
does not wish to travel to school, one could hire a tutor to
give lessons at home. In this sense, travel competes di-
rectly with services offered in the market economy.
With the exception of "Travel to Job", the time and ex-
pense of travel associated with tradable activities (numbers
I	 ^
l
l
f
Travel while on vacation was considered to be different
from other types of travel associated with non--tradable ac-
tivities, since one cannot generally pay to have the vaca=-
tionland brought to one's home. Furthermore, vacation
travel may be an integral, part of- the activity of vacation-
ing, not simply something which must be done in order to
carry out some other activity, as is usually the case for
travel associated with other activities. Hence, the time
and expense of vacation travel was included in the activity
"vacation".
Shopping is similarly a tradable activity, which is asso-
ciated with most activities, both tradable and non-tradable.
The time spent on shopping associated with activities 2-16
were included in the time of these activities, while the
time spent on shopping associated with non-tradable activi-
ties 18-38 were made into a separate activity " Shopping As-
sociated With Non-Tradable Activities."
Unfortunately, the time allocation study does not break
down time spent traveling and shopping into this much de-
tail. While travel activates 13-16 are broken out, as well
as travel to job and travel associated with child care, all
other travel in the time allocation study is lumpted to-
gether under " Travel Associated with Purchasing Goods and
Services" and "Travel Associated with Personal Needs".
30
3
IShopping is broken down into only "Shopping for Everyday
Goods", "Shopping for Durable Goods", and "Waiting for Pur-
chase of Goods and Services." There is very little pub-
lished data which could be used to further breakdown these
classifications. Even if data on time allocations by de-
tailed purpose of trip had been collected, it would be dif-
ficultto analyze, since consumers so frequently do several
types of shopping and errands on a single trip. A Federal
Highway Administration study provides some very limited
guidance. 10
 The sum total of the time allocations for
"Travel Associated with Purchasing Goods and Services" and
"Travel Associated with Personal Needs" were allocated among
activities based on estimates made by the author. Simi-
larly, the time allocations for shopping were allocated
among activities based on estimates made by the author. The
percentage of the total allocated to each activity is indi-
t	 dated in Table 1.
Except for transportation expenditures while on vacation,
the consumer expenditure survey provides no breakdown of -
transportation expenses by purpose of trip. Transportation
expenses were therefore distributed among activities in pro-
IO U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Nationwide Personal
Transnortation Study; _Pe p ort no. 100: Purposes of Automo-
bile Trips and Travel, Washington, DC, tiny, 197 11.	 Addi-
tional data from this study is presented in U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 197 1 1 National Transportation
Renort, Washington, DC, July, 1975, pp. 133-1311.
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portion to a weighted average of the travel times of
employed men, employed women, and housewives allocated to
1
each activity. The percentage of total non- vacation trans-
portation expense allocated to each activity is indicated in
Table 2. '
l"
The time allocation study did not survey peopl who were
on overnight trips, hence most vacation time was excluded.
In order to estimate time spent vacationing, it is necessary
to turn to the Census of Transportation. The average trip
duration is estimated from the following distribution of
trip durations:11
	
Duration	 1967 Total	 Percent
Person-Trips	 Non-Business
(millions)
1 Day	 31.5	 73.6
	
1 Night	 89.7	 84.2
	
2 Nights	 94.1	 88.6
3 to 5 Nights	 75.7	 84.9
6 to 9 Nights	 34.8
	 92.5	 i
10 to 15 Nights	 20.3	 92.2
>16 Nights	 15.1	 89.3
One day trips will be ignored, as presumably they were in-
cluded in the time allocation survey under one of the lei-
sure activities.. It will be assumed that one night trips
lasted an-average of 24 hours; two night trips lasted an av-
erage of 48 hours; three to five night trips lasted an aver-
-
	
s
11 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1967 Census of Transportation;
Volume f. , Eationa Travel Survey, Washington, DC, July,
1970, P. 24.
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0age of 96 hours; six to nine night trips lasted an average
of 180 hours; ten to fifteen night trips lasted an average
of 300 hours; and sixteen nights or more trips lasted an av-
erage of 480 hours. Using the number of non-business trips
as a weighting factor, an average trip d uration of 104 hours
may be obtained.
The Census of Transportation also provides data on the
number of trips by household income level. From this, the
average annual number of non-business overnight trips per
person by income level may be calculated (see Table 3).
Multiplying this average number of trips by average trip du-
ration of 104 hours gives the following annual number of
hours per person spent on overnight vacation trips by income
class:
Household Average Annual Number
Income of	 Hours Spent	 on
Level Overnight Vacation Trips
(1967) Per Person
<$4000 98
34,000-$51999 185
$6,000-7,499 205
$7,500-9,999 168
$10,000-14,999 140
$15,000 131
All 151
f"
Estimated average number of minutes per day spent on the ac-
tivity "vacation" were obtained by simply converting these
figures into units of 'minutes per day. The time spend on
all other activities were scaled down to ensure than the sum
of all daily activities equaled 1440 minutes (24 hours).
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TABLE 3
l	
Calculation of the Annual Number of Non-Business Trips Per
Person
Household 1967 Percent Estimated	 Average
Income Number Non- Popula-	 Annual
Level of Business. tion(2)	 Non-
Trips(1) Business
Trips Per
Person
<$4,000 38.5 91.5 37.4
	
.94
$4,000-5,999 52.4 92.5 27.3	 1.78
$6,000-$7,499 53.5 90.4 24.5	 1.97
$7,500-9,999 70.6 88.0 38.3	 1_.62
$10,000-14,999 73.4 80.7 43.9	 1.35
>$151000 41.3 74.0 24.3	 1.26
Total 329.7 86.0 195.8	 1.45
1)	 The number	 of trips	 for each	 family income level was scaled
to dive a	 total
	
of 329.7	 million trips, the number of trips of
one night or more duration recorded	 above.
2)	 Source:	 U.S.	 Bureau of	 the Census,
	
Current	 Population	 Reports,
f	 Series	 P-60,
	
No. 59,
	
"Money Income	 in	 1967 of	 Families,"	 U.S.
Government
	 Printing Office, Washington, DC,	 April,	 1969,	 pp.	 39,41.
Represents sum of families and	 unrelated individuals.	 The Census
Bureau's	 $7,000-7,999 income class was divided evenly between
the $6 ► 000-$7,499 and	 $7,500- 9,999	 income classes.
j
iAppendix B
ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE WAGE RATES BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME CLASS
r
Average wage rates by household income class may be ob-
t	
tained by estimating aggregate earnings iz after taxes by all
persons in an income class, and dividing this by an estimate
of the aggregate number of person-hours worked by individu-
als in the income class. Aggregate earnings for an income
class may be estimated by multiplying average earnings of
each household in an income class by the total number of
f	 households in the income class. Both sets of data are given
by the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Aggregate earnings may
then be multiplied by one minus the tax rate to give aggre-
gate earnings by families after taxes (see Table 4). The
Consumer Expenditure Survey shows taxes paid by each type of
+;:, ►
 hence the tax rate may be easily calculated. The tax
rate includes federal, state, and local income taxes. Al-
though it would be appropriate to include Social Security
taxes in the tax rate as well, the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
1	 vey includes Social Security taxes in the "Health Insurance"
IZ As used in this report, "earnings" refers only to wages,
salaries, and self-employment income, while "income" in-
cludes transfer payments, such as social security and wel-
fare, and property income, such as rents and dividends.
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and "Personal insurance, Retirement, and Pensions"
categories. It is unfortunately not possible to recover the
cost of Social Security taxes from this data. After-tax
wages will be used in this study, eince the after-tax wage
is the value of time as perceived by the individual in-
volved.
TABLE 4
Aggregate Annual Earnings by Income Class
Household	 Humber Earnings Aggregate Tax Aggregate
Income Class
	 of Per Earnings Rate Earnings
House- Household (Mil- After Tax
holds(l) (3) ion$)' (Mil-
(Millions) lion $)
<$3,000	 9.572 292.48 2799.6 31% 2693.2
$3,000-3,999	 4.214 1198.56 5050.7 3.6% 4863.9
$4,000- 4,999 	 3.827 2115.49 8095.0 4.9% 7699.3
$5,000-5,999	 3.466 3006.97 10422.2 6.7% 9723.9
$6.000-6,999
	 3.591 4120.37 14796.2 7.9% 13,627.3
$7,000-7,999	 3.43 5350.16 18351.0 9.7% 16,571.0
$8,000-91999	 6.963 7018.49 48,870.0 11.2: 43,396.3
$10,000-11,999	 6.629 9422.01 62,458.5 12.9% 54,501.4
$12,000-14,999	 8.844 11,784.39 104,221.1 14.0% 89,630.2.
$15,000-19,999	 10.555 15,504.39 163,648.1 15.2% 138,774.2
$20,000-24,999	 5.309 20,211.54 107,303.1 16.6% 89,490.8
W5,000	 4.815 32,654.29 157,230.4 18.6% 127,985.6
(1)	 3.773 million	 households who did not	 report their income were
distributed	 over	 income classes	 in proportion to the number of
households	 reporting an income in each class.
Source:	 U.S.	 Bureau	 of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure
Survey:
	
Integrated	 DiarX and	 Interview Survey Data,	 Bulletin
1992,
	
U.S.	 Government	 Printing	 Office. Washinton ► DC,	 1978,	 pp.
24-35.
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hCalculation of the aggregate number of person-hours
worked by income class is a bit more difficult. Beginning
with the year 1975, the Census Bureau began publishing data
on the number of full-time year-round earners' 3 per family
by income class. Thus, one can estimate the number of
full-time year-round earners in families simply by multiply-
ing the number of families by the number of full-time year-
round earners (see Table S).
The Census Bureau, however, defines a family as two or
more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption living
together. :.:.*ice this study is concerned with all house-
holds, including those consisting of only one person, it is
necessary to add the number of full-time year-round earners
among what the Census Bureau calls "unrelated individuals."
Fortunately, data has also been published on this (see Table
6). The result is the number of full-time year-round earn-
ers in each income Class.
The total number of full -time earners may be estimated
from these figures by assuming the number of full-time earn-
ers in each income class is proportional to the number of
full-time year-round earners. Thus, the total number of
full -time earners is distributed among income classes in
13A "year-round" earner is someone who was employed 50 or
more weeks in the previous year.
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TAB6E 5
Number of Full-Time Year-Round Earners in Families
4
1►
Household Number Full-Time Family
Income Class of ,ear-Pound fuil-Time
amilies(1) Earners Per Year-Round
(000) Family(2) Earners
(000)
<$1^000 605.58 .22 133.23
$1,000-1.499 385.37 .22 84.78
$1,500-1 0 999 605,58 .22 133.23
$2.000- 2 499 770.74 l! 84.78
$2,500-20999 935.90 .11 102.95
$3,000-3,499 1101.06 . 10 1 10.1 1
$3,500-4,000 1156.11 .10 115.61
$4,000-4,999 2477.39 .17 421.16
$5,000-5,999 2532.44 .26 658.43
$6,000-6,999 2642,54 .34 898.46
$7,000-7,999 2697.60 .46 1240.90
$8,000-81999 2807..70 .53 1488.08
$9,00-91999 2697.60 .64 1726.46
$10,000-11,999 5890.67 .75 441.8.00.
#12,000-14,999 8147.84 .92 7496.01
$15,000-24,999 14 ► 478.94 1.19	 17,229.94
$25,000-$49,999 4569.40 1.47 6717.02
>$501000 550.53 1.16 638.61
(1)	 Source:	 U.S. Bureau of the Census,
	
Current Population
R eports,	 Series P-60,	 No.	 97, "Money Income in 1973	 of
Families and
	
Persons in the United States",	 U.S.	 Government
Printing office, Washington,
	 DC, 1975,
	
p.	 46.
(2)
	
Source:	 U.S. Bureau of	 the Census,
	
Current Population
Rgoorts,	 Series P-60,	 No.	 105, "Honey income in	 1975 of
Families and Persons in the United States",
	
U.S.	 Government
Printing Office, Washington,
	
DC, 1977,	 p.	 112.
proportion to the number of full-time year-round earners.
In a similar fashion, the number of part-time earners in
each income range may be obtained by distributing the total
number of pant-time earners over the income ranges in pro-
portion to the number of full-time year-round earners in
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ATABLE 6
Number of Full -Time Year-hound Earners Among Unrelated
individuals
Household Humber of Full-Time Unrelated
Income Clasi Unrelated Year-Pound Individual
Indiv- Earners Per Full-Time
iduals(1) Unrelated Year-Round
(000) Indiv- Earners
idual(2) (000)
<$1000 1387.76 .082 113.80
31,000-1,499 1168.64 .040 46.75
s1,500-1,599 1442.54 .024 34.62
$2,000-2,499 1679.92 .029 48.72
1;21500-2099 1278.20 .030 38.35
$3,000-3,499 1095.60 .059 64.64
$3,500-3,999 858..22 .105 90.11
$4,000-4,999 1698.18 .192 326.05
$5,000-50999 1296.46 .300 388.94
$6,000-6,999 1040.82 .435 452.76
$7,000-7,999 931.26 .498 463.77
380000=81999 858.22 .574 492.62
E
$9,000-91999 675.62 .626 422.94
$10,000-11,999 1004.30 .706 709.04
412,000-14,999 913.00 .749 683.84
$15,000-24,999 766.92 .792 607.40
$25,000-49,999 127.82 .812 103.79
>50,000 54.78 .711 38.95
(1) Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 97, U.S.. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 1975, p. 47.
(2) Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 105, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 1977, p. 155
each range (see Table 7). The total number of person-hours
worked may be obtained by assuming each full-time earner
works 40 hours a week 52 weeks a year, while each part-time
earner works 20 hours a week 52 weeks a year.
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TABLE 7
Aggregate Person-Hours Worked
Household Total Total Total Total
Income Class Full-Time Estimated Estimated Annual
Year Round Full-Time Part-Time Person
Earners Earners Earners Hours
(000) (000) (000) Worked(2)
(Millions)
<$11000 247.0 354.4 72.6 812.6
$1,000-1,499 131.5 188.7 38.7 433.2
$1,500-11999 167.9 240.9 49.4 552.4
$2,000-2,499 133.5 191.5 39.3 439.2
$2,500-2,999 141.3 202.7 41.6 464.9
$3,000-3,499 174.8 250.8 51.4 575.1
$3,500-3,999 205.7 295.,1 60.5 676.7
$4,000-4,999 7117.2 1072.1 219.7 2458.5
$5,000-51999 1047.4 1502.8 308.0 3446.1
$6,000-6,999 1351.2 1938.6 397.3 4445.5
$7,000-7,999 1704.7 2445.8 501.3 5608.6
$8,000-81999 1980.7 2841.8 582.5 6516.7
$9,000-91999 2149.4 3083.9 632.1 7071.9
$10,000-11,999 5127.0 7356.0 1507.7 16,868.5
$12,000-14,999 8179.9 11,736.2 2405.5 26,913.0
$15,000-24,999 17,837.3 2.5,592.2 5245.4 58,687.0
$251000-491999 6820.8 9786.2 2005.8 22,441.3
>50,000 677.6 972.2 199.3 2229.4
(1)	 Source:	 Total number of	 full-time and	 part-time employed
persons	 from U.S. Bureau of	 Labor Statistics, Employment and*
Earnings,	 U.S. Government	 Printing	 Office, Washington,	 DC,
January,	 1974,. p.	 145.	 Figures	 based on annual	 averages	 j
for	 1973.
(2)	 See	 text. i
This procedure probably tends to understate the number of
employees in the lower income ranges, where people probably
work on a more intermtent basis, but it seems to be about
the best which can be done with available data. 	 1973 Census
data will be used throughout to ensure comparability with
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the Consumer Expenditure Survey, except for the number of
full-time year-round earners per family by income class,
which will be for 1975, the first year it was published.
Before proceeding to divide aggregate earnings by hours
worked,	 it is necessary to reconcile the income classes used
in the various data sourr•es.
	 Since the income classes given
for the time allocation study are for the year
	 1965,	 they
must be adjusted	 for inflation	 to make them comprable to the
remaining	 data,	 which	 is	 for	 the year	 1973.	 One	 1965 dollar
had	 the	 purchasing	 power	 of	 1.4.	 1973 dollars,	 according	 to
the consumer price index.	 Table 8 shows	 the household econ-
omy study income classes used here, 	 and	 the corresponding
income classes	 in	 the data sources.	 It was	 necessary to
split	 the Census	 Bureau's	 $15,000-25,000	 income class	 be-
tween	 the $12,000-19,999 and	 >$20 ► 000	 classes	 used here.
This was done by dividing the earnings	 in	 the
$15,000-$25 ► 000	 income class	 between	 the	 two classes	 in	 pro-
portion
	 to the number of households	 in the two classes,	 as
reported	 in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Table 9 shows	 the average after-tax wage rates which
	
re-
stilt
	
from dividing	 aggregate earnings	 by aggregate person-
hours worked.	 There are,	 however,	 significant differences
in earnings between	 the sexes.	 The average full-time year-
round male earner earned	 1.158	 times	 as much	 as	 the average
41
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TABLE 8
4	
Correspondence of Income Classes
f
f
Household Time Census Consumer
Economy Allocation Bureau Expenditure
Study Study Income Class Study
Income Class Income Class (1973 3? Income Class
( 1973	 $) ( 1965	 $) ( 1973	 $)
<$5 ► 000 <$4,000 W1000
 <$3,000$1,000-1,499 $3,000-3,999$1,500-11999 $4,110 -4,999$2,000-2 ► 499$2,500-21999$3,000-3,499$3,500-3,999$4,000-4 ► 999
$5,000-7,999 $4,000-5,999 $5,000-51999 $5,000-5,999$6,000-6,999 $6,000-6,999$7,000-7,999 $7 ► 000-7 ► 999
$8,000-91999 $6 ► 000-7,499 $8 ► 000-81999 $8,000-91999
W000-91999
$10,000-11,999 4,500-9,999 $10,000-11,999 $10,000-11,999
$12,000-19,999 $10,000-14,999 $12,000-14,999 $12,000-14,999$15,000-25;000* $15,000-19,999
>$20,000 >15,000 $15,000-25,000* $20,000-24,999
>25,000 $25,000-49,999
>$50, 000
*Number of	 earners in	 $15,000 -25,000	 income class allocated between$12,000-19,999 and	 >$20,000 household economy study income
classes	 in	 proportion to the number of	 families in each class,
	
as
reported
	 in the Consumer Expenditure Sury X.
full-time year-round earner, while the average full-time
year-round female earner earned only .637 times as much as
the average full-time year-round earner.'* It will be
assumed that these same ratios apply to all types of earners
at all income levels.
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TABLE 9
1
Average Wage Rates
Household Aggregate Aggregate Hourly
Economy Earnings Person-Hours Wage
Study Income (Million 0 Worked (After
Glass (Millions) Tax $)
<$5,000 15,261.4 6412.6 2.38
$5,000-7,999 39,922,2 13,500.2 2.96
$80000-9,999 43,396.3 13,588.6 3.19
$10,000-11,999 54,401.4 16 ► 868.5 3.23
$12,000-19,999 228,404.4 65,959.5 3.46
>$20,000 217,476.4 44,311.2 4.91
Total 598,862.1 160,640.5 3.73
t
The before-tak wage rate for housewives was assumed equal
s
3
to the average earnings 	 of a	 full-time year-round	 female
earner	 in	 1973 of	 $6661
	 Per year s	or	 $3.20	 Per hour.	 The
after-tax wage rate for housewives was calculated 	 for each
income class	 by multiplying this	 by one minus the tax rate
for the income class. 	 The tax	 rates are a weighted average
of those shown in Table 4,
	
where the weighting is by number
of	 households.
14 U.S.	 Bureau	 of	 the Census, Current population
	 Reports,	 Se-
ries	 P-60,	 Ho.	 97,	 U.S.	 Government
	 Printing	 office,	 Wash-
ington,	 DC,	 1975,	 pp.	 137-139.
Is U.S.	 Bureau	 of	 the Census,	 Current	 Population
	
Reports,	 Se-
ries	 P-60,	 No.	 97,	 "Money	 Income in	 1973	 of	 Families and
Persons	 in	 the United States". 	 U.S.	 Government	 Printing
Office,	 1975,	 p.	 139.
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APPENDIX C
VALUE OF TIME VS. MARKET EXPENDITURES
BY INCOME CLASSES
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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the effects of present and proposed
Government patent policies on the process of technology trans-
1
fer and the commercialization of inventions resulting from
Government sponsored research. I
The function of the patent system in Government research
and the value of patents resulting from Government sponsored
research are examined.
Three alternative patent policies--title in the
i
contractor, title in the Government, and the waiver policy--
are examined in terms of their effects on the commercializa-
tion of inventions, industrial competition, disclosure of
inventions, participation of research contractors and admin-
istrative costs.
Efforts to reform the present Government patent policy
are also described.
i
1Table of Contents
Page
Abstract .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . i
Table of Contents	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
Introduction	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 1
The Value of Patents Resulting from Government
Sponsored Research . 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 5
Analysis of Alternative Patent Policies
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . _.
(the license policy, the title policy and the
waiver policy)	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 6
A. Commercialization of Inventions .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 6
B. Effects on Industrial Competition .
	 . i3
C. Participation of Contractors
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 16
D. Disclosure of Inventions
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 19
E. Administrative Costs	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 21
Appendices
A. NASA's Patent System	 .	 .	 ..	 .	 . 23
B. NASA's Waiver Statistics, 1959 - 1978 . 	 .	 . 29
C. Utilization/Commercialization Statistics
on Waived Inventions	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .. .	 .	 .	 .	 . 30
D. NASA Licensing Statistics, 1959 - 1978 31
E. Commercial Use of NASA Owned Inventions . 32
F. Comparison of NASA Invention
Commercialization Statistics	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 33
G. Personal Interviews Conducted .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 34.
ii
1i
Introduction
The problems with the present patent policy for federally
funded R&D--(1) lack of uniformity in- individual agency
policies, and (2) a very low rate of commercialization--are
fairly well agreed upon, but which approach offers the best
solution is still being debated with tht= lame arguments as in
1949. But the following factors point to an increasing mo-
mentum towards some means of resolution:
-the growing concern and the resulting administrative
domestic policy review over the declining rate of
U.S. technological innovation
--the recent presidential proposal for a uniform
Government patent policy allowing contractors to
retain exclusive licenses to resulting inventions; and
--the introduction of four bills during the 96th Congress
dealing exclusively with the Government's patent policy.
The present movement in Congress to reform the Government's
Patent Policy has been a long and slaw moving process. Present
efforts to establish a uniform policy date back to the rapid
build up of government sponsored research during the second
world war. Congressional patent policy guidance since that
time has oscillated between a policy where the Government ob-
tains title to all inventions arising from Government research
contracts (the "title policy") and a policy where the contractor
retains the title to such inventions while the Government ob-
tains a paid-up, irrevocable license to use the invention
(the "license policy").
1
The Carter administration recently announced its prop,'red
Government patent policy which would allow small businesses
and non-profit corporations to retain title to resulting in-
ventions while allowing large corporations the right to obtain
only an exclusive license to resulting inventions and only
within a designated "field of use." This proposal is currently
only a recommendation and has not been issued as a binding
executive order.
There are two distinct views of the function of the
patent system--as a reward for an inventor's creativity or as
an incentive for the creation, development and commerciali-
zation of inventions. This paper addresses only the latter
since it is this function that is important in the process of
technology utilization.
The patent system was adopted in the United States to
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts." M it
accomplishes this function by providing the inventor with an
exclusive right (in essence a property right) to the use of
his invention. The patent system attempts to thereby en-
courage inventiveness, development and commercialization of
inventions and the reporting of new inventions and hence the
widespread public availability of new technological ideas.
There are two interpretations of the incentive function
of the patent system; first, that the patent increases the
incentives for people to invent socially useful. (i.e.,profitable)
patentable technologies and that it also increases the in-
centives to develop, test and market (i.e., commercialize)
Z
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these inventions.
outside of Government sponsored research, the patent
system's influence on calculated profit may direct the in-
ventor's activity into channels of general usefulness. [2]
But under Government research contracts, where the area and
amount of research are fairly well-defined prior to the
research, the major determinant of the number of useful
inventions is the quality of the researchers sponsored and
the level of Government funding. The ability of a contractor
or specific inventor to obtain the patent rights to the
resulting inventions is unlikely to greatly alter the type or
quality of the research.
The more important incentive provided by patents in
Government sponsored research is the incentive for the patent
recipient to promote or perform the invention's commerciali-
zation and thus reap the benefits offered by the patent rights.
This function has also been called the prospect function [3],
since it is closely analo.gous to the American mineral claim
system or homesteading system on public lands. The function
of each is to promote the utilization of an otherwise public
resource at an efficient rate which maximizes the amount of
the social benefits produced.
This argument rests upon the assumptions that the $30
billion of Government sponsored research produces patentable
inventions that have social value and that the ability of an
inventor to capture a larger share of the invention's social
benefits as profits increases the probability of the invention's
3
commercialization. Since social benefits are the sum of
producer and consumer surplus, the profits made by the in-
ventor still are a benefit to society. Viewed in this way,
if a license policy increases the prQbability that a socially
useful invention will be made commercially available as com-
pared to a title policy, 'then it results in greater social
benefits and should therefore by preferred. Therefore, the
claim that a license policy is a "giveaway" of public property
seems unreasonable although part of the social benefits will
temporarily be in the form of private profits.
The two primary arguments against the incentive function
are that patents are only a minor inducement to private firms
to develop and commercialize inventions in comparison to factors
such as the expected commercial value of the invention, and
the cost of developing the invention; and secondly that any
social benefits resulting from the patent system are outweighed
by the costs re^alting from the dislocation of resources caused
by the patent system.
The dislocation costs refer to the outputs lost when
resourcesare diverted to the inventing of patentable ideas from
their previous use.
"insofar as induement (to inventive activity) is
furnished only by the expectation of a patent
monopoly, a diversion of resources takes place and
other production is foregone. What grounds are
there for concluding that the output induced by
this type of monopoly has any greater claim to
be regarded as 'generally useful' than that which
would have been induced in its absence by the open
market?" [4)
4
1The Value of Patents Result 	 from Government Sponsored
Research
. There are a number of misconceptions regarding the number
and value of the patents resulting from Government funded
research which have traditionally overestimated both the num-
ber and the value of these patents.
	 As an example, there were
.41 inventions per million dollars of NASA research, funded
in 1978 (NASA R&D expenditures in 1978 = $3.011 billion, fi
1978 invention disclosures = 1239). 	 There were .074 inventions
on which patent applications were filed per million dollars
of research and .044 inventions on which patents were granted
(assuming the Patent Office's historical .6 ratio of patents
granted to applications filed) per million dollars of research.
From this small number of patented inventions different
studies have shown that from 1-20% of these will be commercially
used and even a smaller number will yield any income.
The incomes yielded from those commercialized have usually
been quite moderate.	 Therefore the expected value of the
patentable inventions resulting from NASA sponsored research
has been quite low.	 Similar results can also be found in
private firms, Research Corporation, and others although
the rates of both disclosure per dollar of research and com-
mercialization of inventions disclosed have been somewhat higher.
Therefore, the claims that Government contractors that
obtain patent rights may make millions of dollars is not
supported in fact.	 Nor is the claim that the Government
ownership of rights to inventions results in multimillion
5
dollar losses. But this is not to say that patent rights do
not provide a relatively important incentive to private
firms to commercialize these inventions. This relatively
high perceived value of this incentive can be seen in the very
active support many private firms have given to policies which
allow the contractor to obtain exclusive rights to the invention.
Analysis of Alternative Patent Policies
This section of the paper examines three policies--the
title policy, the license policy, and NASA's present waiver
policy--upon the basis of the costs and benefits resulting from
each policy. The costs and benefits are broken down into the
policies' effects in five sectors:
o commercialization or utilization of inventions,
o competition,
o participation of contractors in Government research,
o disclosure of inventions, and
o administrative costs of the program.
This report does not place quantitative values on these costs
and benefits because of the unavailability of sufficient data
to give reliability to such results.
Commercialization of Inventions
The effect of Government patent policy on the rate of
utilization of Government sponsored inventions has traditionally
been the most important issue in the debate between advocates
of the title and license policies. Commercialization is
6
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important because it is the major means by which an invention
reaches the public and its advantages (cost reduction,
increased product quality, ...) are transformed into social
benefits. Most supporters of the license policy have claimed
that the increased likelihood of commercialization of inventions
is the greatest advantage in allowing contractors to retain
exclusive rights to their inventions. This argument is based
on the assumptions that most high technology companies are
more capable of promoting the dissemination and use of inven-
tions than the Government and that exclusive rights provide a
necessary incentive to bring forth the risk capital necessary
for the development, marketing, and commercialization of new
inventions. Title policy proponents have responded that not
only are patents a minor determinant in corporate decisions
to commercialize inventions, but the potential inability of in-
terested future developers to gain access. to the technology re-
sults in an actual decrease in the likelihood of commercialization.
License Policy Arguments:
I
	
	
There are two major arguments behind the position that
the ability of contractors to retain title to inventions will
increase the rate of commercialization of Government sponsored
inventions;
o a patent provides a contractor with the exclusive
right to license or use an invention,resulting in
t	 a reduction of the risks accompanying its develop-
ment and commercialization and thereby increasing
7
the incentives for the investment of the necessary
risk capital,
o contractors who have retained title to inventions
have been more successful at commercializing those
inventions than the sponsoring agency,in part
because of their closer tie to the marketplace and
prospective developers (oftentimes the contractors
themselves) and the possession of a product "champion"
(the inventor himself).
The first of these two arguments is based upon the
"prospect" theory of a patent (discussed in the previous section).
This view of the patent system envisions the patent not as a
reward for past inventiveness, but as a necessary incentive to
develop, test, and use or market an invention. Traditionally,
the cost required for development and commercialization of an
invention have been an order of magnitude (or more) larder than
the basic research costs. For NASA inventions, the private
or public utilization of space technology usually requires
large costs in adaptive engineering, development and marketing.
By reducing the risk of other companies appropriating the
results of this process of commercialization, patents provide
a greater incentive for contractors to invest capital and, as
the Harbridge House Study on Government Patent Policy pointed
out, it is the lack of full technical development of Government
inventions that has been the most frequent and important barrier
to industrial use [5]
	
A patent does not disallow others from
6
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using a patented technology, it only demands that they
negotiate a reasonable payment for its use with the patent
owner.
one result of this incentive is an increase in the amount
of private resources being expended on technological innovation,
an increase which most economists have regarded as being im-
portant both in reversing the declining levels of U.S. pro-
ductivity and in modernizing technological industries that
have fallen behind foreign competitors.
In support of the second argument, there is statistical
evidence that contractors actually have been substantially
more successful than the Government in promoting the commer-
cialization of Government sponsored inventions,either through
inter-corporate licensing or in-house development. Of the
over 1200 NASA inventions to which contractors have obtained
title since 1959, approximately 16% have been commercialized
(Appendices B and C). In comparison, of the over 3500 inventions
to which the Government has acquired patents since 1959, only
l% have been commercialized (Appendices D and E).
`
	
	 These figures are subject to question because "of the
difficulty in obtaining data many years after initial in-
vention, the variation in definitions of "commercialization"
and the statistical bias caused by contractors requesting
the most commercially attractive inventions under a waiver
policy. This variation is indicated in Appendix F showing the
results of five different studies of the commercialization of
NASA inventions. The most reliable data is probably that
9
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compiled by NASA's patent and licensing office since their
data gathering techniques are the most extensive and their
definitions have been subject to only minor variations over time
(Appendices B, C, D, and E).
These higher rates of commercialization by contractors
are caused in part by contractors requesting waivers on the
commercially valuable inventions, but there are a number of
other factors also involved. Contractors are usually chosen
because of their being the most qualified in a certain field
of research and, therefore, they are often in the best position
to promote the commercialization of inventions in that field.
These companies or universities as a result usually have much
closer ties to the marketplace than do the sponsoring agencies.
These contractors are also guided by the profits that in-
ventions can offer to channel their investments into areas
of public usefulness. They also have greater freedom in the
types of license agreements that they can subsequently negotiate
with other users of the invention.
Contractors also already have a "product champion" since
it is usually the inventor that has the greatest interest in
seeing an invention actually developed and utilized. It is
widely believed that the transfer of a technology from one
organization to another requires the transfer of people familiar
with the technology. One obvious solution is to provide in-
ventions to the organization possessing the technology to
develop it themselves. Patent rights provide this type of
incentive.
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IIt is interesting to note that the patent attorneys at
several agencies,i,ncluding agencies which now pursue a waive,;,
polcy,have informally supported the use of a license policy
in almost all Government research contracts (Appendix 6).
Title Polio Arguments:
There are three major arguments against contractors
being allowed to retain title to inventions in order to
encourage commercialization:
o patents play a minor role in determining corporate
decisions to commercialize inventions in comparison
to factors such as favorable price conditions, the
state of business confidence and costs of capital;
o contractors retaining title to Government sponsored
inventions are oftentimes interested in only making
sure that their competitors don't use the inventions,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of commercialization;
o it is impossible to show that the gains from the
movement of people and funds.to the development of
patentable inventions is not offset by losses'.in
other areas of output--specifically the development
of non-patentable inventions
Waiver Policy Arquments:
The waiver policies adoped by NASA, DOE, NSF, AND HEW have
offered several advantages. They are flexible and therefore
allow contractors interested in commercializing an invention
a chance (a 76% chance at NASA) to obtain exclusive rights to
11
an identified invention. In those cases where the contractor
has not expressed an interest in the invention, or the waiver
has been denied, the Government then has the opportunity to
seek out other possible users on an exclusive or non-exclusive
basis. Such a flexible system initially appears to offer the
advantages of both the license and title policies, but there
are a number of disadvantages as well.
It is obviously impossible for NASA's Invention or Con-
tribution Board or DOE's patent office or any other Government
entity responsible for waiver decisions to be able to know what
the necessary factors are in an invention's commercial zdtlon.
Commercialization is dependent upon a number of complex
unknowns such as future market demand, the quality of the
invention, and the companies interest, in the invention. Also
present waiver guidelines support Government retention of
title in cases where the "principal purpose of the contract is
to create, develop or improve products, processes or methods
which are intended for commercial use" or "which directly con-
cern public health, public safety or public welfare," areas
where it seems incentives to commercialize the inventions are
the most important (see Appendix A).
Past records also show that many contractors perceive
the waiver process as cumbersome and resulting in a waste
of both time and money. Processing time for a waiver by NASA
can vary from several weeks to a year depending upon the
perceived urgency of the request. A waiver must also be
12
accompanied by a general outline of the contractor's proposed
plan for the inventions commercialization. For large com-
panies familiar with NASA's waiver process, the waiver requests
do not pose a high cost. But for small companies or those
unfamiliar with the waiver process, the costs of a waiver request
may appear to be very substantial. Some ITASA contractors have
4
	 reported that they were unaware that waivers were even granted.
Another problem with the waiver system is that it intro-
daces a factor of uncertainty in the commercialization process.
An example of this uncertainty is provided by the changes
that took place in HEW in 1978. Up until that time, HEW
had followed a policy of granting most waiver requests
to universities and small businesses (under Institutional
Patent Agreements). Many contractors had participated in
HEW contracts with this expectation, but in 1978 Secretary
Califano called for a review of all future waivers and essen-
tially froze all future waivers.
Effects on Industrial Competition
Opponents of a license policy have argued that the
ability of contractors to retain patent rights has resulted
in the formation of product monopolies, the increase of product
costs to the consumer,and the lessening of market competition.
Although patent rights do permit the private capture of returns
created by the use of a patented invention, they by no means
assure it. In fact, past studies have shown no significant
examples of monopolization resulting from patents obtained on
13
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Government sponsored inventions with the most extensive patent
policy study concluding "that undue concentration would result
from the license policy is a possibility so negligible that
it may be disregarded" [6].
The main reason that contractor retained patents have
not resulted in monopolization is, as previously mentioned, that
there are few patented inventions of sufficient'quality to
allow the capture of a market. It is interesting to note
that in thirty-four antitrust cases studied by the Harbrdge
House, where forced licensing of the defendent's patent
portfolio had been one of the economic remedies for restraint
of trade, only two companies in the survey have ever received
applications for licenses although the patent portfolios were
in some cases as large as 300 patents [7] .
Monopolization has also not occurred because contractors
have in general been very willing to license the use of their
inventions to other users. In fact licensing has oftentimes
provided the contractor with the most valuable means of op-
timizing the value of the patent, either in addition to or in
place of in-house development.
A more reasonable concern than monopolization is that
s	 a few valuable inventions will be neither utilized nor promoted
by the contractor. Since NASA currently publishes.Tech Briefs
and Technical Support Packages on contractor-owned patents
arising from NASA sponsored research, this lack of use is
presently minimized.
_14
"It should also be noted that the Government.presently
i
has a means of protecting against monopolization, "excessive
profits" or non-use of an invention in the form of "march-
in-rights." March- in-rights give the sponsoring agency the
right either to require the contractor to license an invention
to another company at a reasonable rate or to license the
invention itself under certain limited conditions. Although
march-in-rights have never been enforced, it seems that they
could be used effectively in the few situations where they
might be needed.
Of several agency patent counsels interviewed, a
few stated that for march-In-rights to be effective the
	 j
sponsoring agency must monitor the contractors'use of the
invention through the submission of a contractor's invention
utilization report.
	
The submission of the utilization reports
wa	 said also to increase the likelihood of the contractor
using the invention by encouraging a careful assessment of the
invention's commercial value. 	 Such a monitoring program could
result in enforcement through the action of. the contractor's
competitors who could, in the case of valuable inventions,
monitor their misuse and request the Government to enforce
its march-in-rights.
It has also been suggested that when a contractor has not
used the invention after a certain number of years that the
patent rights should be transferred back to the sponsoring agency,
so that it can promote the invention's utilization.	 However, such
a proposal is plagued by the problem.of defining a "reasonable
15
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period o£ time" and what constitutes use of an invention.
Participation of Contractors
The willingness of a contractor to participate in
Government sponsored research is highly dependent upon -two
factors: the contractor's perceived value of any resulting
patents to which he may retain exclusive rights and the
reason.j u company enters into Government sponsored research.
For those companies that regard patents as an essential
forth 	 protection in developing a new product, the title
policy may oftentimes deter the company from entering into a
Government research contract. Past studies have shown that
such companies are not in the majority and are concentrated
in industries which are technologically based but innovate at
a moderate rate (excluding rapidly innovative industries where
trade secrets provide a more effective means of protection.).
many companies, especial ly* large corporations, have
traditionally regarded patents as beinci essentially defensive
in nature (i.e., means of avoiding laasuits for infringement
by other companies who later patent a similar invention). For
these companies, gaining exclusixto rights to Government spon-
sored inventions has little value since the Government does
not enforce infringement on the patents that it owns. The
participation of those companies which see patents as having
neither offensive nor defensive value are essentially un-
affected b., , Government patent policy although several such
companies have none+;helass vigorously supported ra license policy.
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IThose companies which do value patent rights might be
expected to lower their contract bids under a license policy
by an amount proportional to the perceived value of the ex-
clusive rights in any future inventions,although there has
been no good evidence to substantiate such a belief. The value
of potential patents rights to a contractor before performance
of the contract are estimated to be worth less than one dollar
($l) for an average one million research contract [fl].
Many of the opponents of the title policy have claimed
that that policy's major disadvantage is not the inflated
cost of contractor's research bids but the lower qualit y of
research that the Government obtains. This lower quality is
due to a number of factors including the refusal of many of
the most qualified contractors to perform Government research.
Surveys of companies have shown that only a few companies
actually re'"use to participate because of an agency's patent
policies. Lack of interest in the area of research, unwilling-
i
	 ness to transfer the necessary personnel and facilities away
from commercial research and a general unwillingness to work
under Government supervision have been the more common reasons
for qualified contractors not partici pating in Government
research.
one area where contractor participation has been adversely
affected is in contracts which require the availability to the
public of any background patents; i.e., those privately owned
patents which are deemed necessary for the use of any inventions
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resulting from subsequent Government contracts. c;ompan.i.es
have also claimed that participating in Government contracts
has resulted in valuable proprietary information becoming
publicly available because of the Freedom of Information
Act and the requirement for background patents (Appendix 6).
There have also been claims that a large number of
contractors segregate their industrial research teams from
their Government research,resulting in a lower quality of
Government research. If corporations' proprietary information
has been jeopardized, such segregation seems to be a reasonable
response.
NASA's ability to grant advance waivers should decrease
the likelihood of losing the participation of qualified con-
tractors. Advance waivers have been requested from NASA 906
times and granted 463 times between 1958 and 1978. Although
considering how few advance waivers are requested,contractors
apparently either perceive the waiver requests as time consuming
and/or too expensive, or the value of obtaining patents is too
low to justify such requests. Although the waiver request
requires only the completion of a prepared form and the iden-
tification of the contractor's ability to commercialize or
license any resulting inventions, many small companies are
not aware of the process or view it as too expensive, This
can be seen from the fact that the vast majority of NASA waiver
requests come from large companies familiar with NASA's waiver
policies.
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Disclosure of Inventions
All Government research contracts require that contractors
report any resulting inventions to the sponsoring agency. Ds-
closure is considered so important by some that a draft bill
proposed by the Departments of Commerce and Justice in 1979
recommended criminal sanctions against any contractor not
reporting new inventions. Aside from the complete infeasibility
t
	
	 of such a proposal,* it indicates the fear by some Government
officials that there are contractors who do not disclose in-
ventions they see being commercially valuable and thus de-
crease the social benefits gained from the research.
A high ,rate of disclosure by itself is not advantageous,
as can be seen from NASA's records. Some companies have
traditionally reported large numbers of inventions that never
proved of any commercial  value, while others have only reported
those inventions that they thought to be novel breakthroughs.
t
	
	 Although the cost of screen;ina an invention is not very high,
since 1963 contractors have reported an average of nearly
1800 inventions annuallyowhile only 5% of these have resulted
in patent applications. In comparison, NASA employees have
reported only an average of 335 inventions annually with 34%
resulting in patent applications. It:, therefore, is obvious
that promoting disclosures is of and by itself of little value-.
Due to the inability to definatively define what constitutes
an invention or the inability of, for example, a scientist in
one field to recognize that his ini.nor discovery may be a
breakthrough in a completely different field.
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It is not obvious that any patent policy is clearly
advantageous in promoting the disclosure of valuable inventions.
License policy advocates have claimed that the ability to
retain exclusive rights would remove the disincentives for
not reporting inventions. Yet in those contracts where NASA
has granted advance waivers the number of inventions disclosed
per dollar of research has declined substantially, although
much of this is due to the contractor's diminished need to
disclose inventions that are not of a patentable or otherwise
valuable nature.
As the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
matters recently remarked--
"We do not believe that disclosure has been a problem
in private R&D contracting situations Largely because
of the high costs of concealment and the penalties in
r	 loss of reputation and future business caused by having
concealment later discovered." [9]
Although there is little conclusive evidence to show
that any one patent policy results in a more complete and
effective disclosure of inventions, there is some evidence
indicating that NASA's attempts to promote disclosures from
contractors have resulted in an excess of disclosures of
inventions that have little or no commercial value, wasting
the time and money of both the contractor and the Government
invention review board. This cost must, of course, be weighed
against the possibility that a few valuable inventions might
otherwise not be reported.
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Administrative Costs
The administrative costs of each of the three Government
patent policies is not very substantial and are unlikely to
be a major factor in choosing between each policy. nonetheless
changes in policy could offer some cost reductions in comparison
to NASA's waiver policy.
Presently the costs directly and indirectly attributable
to NASA's waiver policy stem from the following activities;
1) compilation of the inventions disclosed by con-
tractors and employees,
2) screening of the inventions by NASA and IITRI,
3) processing and filing of patent applications,
4). compilation of waiver requests,
5) compilation of licensing requests,
6) determination of waiver and license requests by
the ICB,
7) review of the invention utilization reports, and
8) promotion and description of NASA inventions by the
Technology Utilization office.
The license policy would decrease these administrative
costs by decreasing both the number of inventions that must
be screened for patent applications by the Technology
Utilization office, eliminate the compilation and
determination of waiver requests,decrease the number of
license requests and determinations, and increase the number
of invention utilization reports.
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The title policy would increase the number of inventions
to be screened, patented, licensed, and promoted and would
eliminate the waiver compilation and determinations.
Several critics of NASA's present policty have claimed that
NASA tiles patent applications on many more patents than are
necessary. Since the Government only uses patents defensively,
except when it iz-. granting exclusive licenses, publication
will give the same defense against infringement but without
the cost of the patent application processing and filing fees.
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Appendix A
NASA's Patent System
' NASA's patent policy is based upon Section 305 of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and the Presidential
Memorandum on Government Patent Policy of 1971 (PRIM).	 NASA's
policy and procedures are detailed in NASA's revised im-
plementing regulations (e.'j., NASA Patent Waiver Regulations[10]
NASA Domestic Patent Licensing Regulations [11] 	 ; and NASA
Foreign Patent Licensing Regulations 	 [12]).
NASA's patent policy has evolved into a waiver policy
which retains for the Government a broad, irrevocable royalty-
free license but allows Government contractors to request the
Government to waive its rights to the title of an invention
to the contractor.	 Invention waivers may be requested either
k
prior to performance of a contract for all resulting inventions
(advance waivers) or after identification of an individual
invention under a given contract.	 Recommendations on all
waiver requests are made by the NASA Inventions and Contributions
Board (ICB) to the NASA Administrator although almost no ICB
recommendations have ever been reversed by the Administrator.
Guidelines to be considered by the ICB in considering
F
waiver requests are outlined in the Space Act, Presidential
Memorandum of 1971 and the implementing regulations. The
stated objectives of NASA's patent policy are:
23
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• serving the public interest;
• protecting public health, safety and welfare;
• fostering inventiveness;
• encouraging reporting of inventions;
• providing for the widest possible dissemination of
new technology;
• promoting the investment of risk capital in new
inventions;
• promoting industrial competition;
• promoting early utilization of inventions; and
o avoiding undue market concentration.
There are similar guidelines of each Federal agency but
widely varying interpretations of these objectives has resulted
in each Federal department or agency developing a different
patent policy.
Statistically, NASA's policy has been largely one of
title in the Government with contractors acquiring title to
only 4% of the contractor inventions disclosed. [13] This
low percentage of contractor acquired rights is due primarily
to the small number of contractor requests for waivers. Be-
tween 1959 and 1979, 76% of the requests for individuals'
waivers had been granted with 51% of the requests for advance
waivers being granted.
From these figures it would appear that either NASA has
been patenting many inventions that their inventors do not
perceive as having significant commercial potential and for
24
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which the Government's rights could probably be just as
effectively protected by publishing, or the process of request-
ing a waiver is or at least appears to contractors to be an
overly expensive or time consuming obstacle to gaining title
to an invention, or both.
t
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NASA'S PATENT POLICY
Title In The Government
1) National Aeronautics and Space Act (195$):
"any invention conceived or actually reduced
to practice in the performance of any work
under any contract... becomes the exclusive
property of the government unless the
Administrator determines that the interests
of the United States will be served by waivinfi
all or any part of the Government's nights....
(section 305)
2) Presidential Memorandum (1971):
(a) Where
(1) a principal purpose of the contract is to
create, develop or improve products, processes, or
methods which are intended for commercial use (or
which are otherwise intended to be made available
for use) by the general public at home or abroad,
or which will be required for such use by govern-
mental regulations; or
(2) a principal purpose of the contract is
for exploration into fields which directly concern
the public health, public safety, or public
welfare; or
(3) the contract is in a field of science or
technology in which there has been little signifi-
cant experience outside of work funded by the
Government, or where the Government has been the
principal developer of the field, and the ac-
quisition of exclusive rights at the time of con- x
tracting might confer on the contractor a preferred
or dominant position; or
(4) the services of the contractor are
26
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(i) for the operation of a Government-
owned research or production facility; or
(ii) for coordinating and directing the
work of others,
	 (Section 1)
Title In The Contractor
1) National Aeronautics and Space Act:
No such allowance mentioned.
f
2) Presidential Memorandum:
(b) In other situations, where the purpose of the
contract is to build upon existing knowledge or
technology, to develop information, products,
processes, or Methods for use by the Government,
and the work called for by the contract is in a
field of technology in which the contractor has
acquired technical competence (demonstrated by
factors such as know-how, experience, and-patent
position) directly related to an area in which
the contractor has an established nongovernmental
co=ercial position, the contractor shall normally
acquire the principal or exclusive rights through-
out the world in and to any resulting inventions.
(c) ...the agency may prescribe by regulation
special situations where the public interest in the
availability of the inventions would best be served
by permitting the contractor to acquire at the time
of contracting greater rights than a nonexclusive
license.	 (Section 1.)
3) Institutional Patent Agreements:
In accordance with the language regarding exceptional
circumstances in 61-9 107-3(a) and/or the language
regarding special situations in 91-9 107-3(c), agencies
may enter into Institutional Patent Agreements (see
81-9 107-6(c)) with universities and nonprofit organ-
izations having technology transfer programs meeting
the criteria of 61-9 109-7(b). The agreements permit
those institutions, subject to certain conditions, to
retain the entire right, title, and interest in inven-
tions made in the course of their contracts.
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Waivers
1) National Aeronautics and Space Act:
(f) Under such regulations in conf.,rmity with this
subsection as the Administrator shall prescribe,he may waive all or any part of the rights of the
United States under this section with respect to
any invention or class of inventions made or which
may be made by any person or class of persons in
the performance of any work required by any contract
of the Administration of the Administrator determines
that the interests of the United States will be
served thereby. 	 (Section 305)
2) Presidential Memorandum:
Advance Waivers;
In exceptional circumstances the contractor may
acquire greater rights than a nonexclusive license
at the time of contracting where the head of the
department or agency certifies that such action will
best serve the public interest.
	
(Section l(a))
...the agency may prescribe by regulation special
situations where the public interest in the avail-
ability of the inventions would best be served by
permitting the contractor to acquire at the time of
contracting greater rights than a nonexclusive
license.	 (Sect.ionl(c))
Deferred Determination Waivers
Greater rights may also be acquired by the contractor
after the invention has been identified where the
head of the department or agency determines that the
acquisition of such greater rights is consistent with
the intent of this Section l (a) and is either a
necessary incentive to call forth private risk capital
and expense to bring the invention to the point of
practical application or that the Government's con-
tribution to the invention is small compared to that
of the contractor. Where an identified invention
made in the course of or under the contract is not a
primary object of the contract, greater rights may
also be acquired by the contractor under the criteria
of Section l(c).	 -(Section 1(a) )
28
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Appendix B
NASA WAIVER STATISTICS
1959 THROUGH 1978*
I
Individual Waivers
1. Number of inventions reported
by NASA contractors
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 31,357
2. Petitions for waiver requested
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 1,366
3. Waivers grp.nted	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 1,035
4. Petitions denied
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 148
5. Petitions withdrawn .
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 139
6. Petitions pending	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 44
Advance Waivers
1. Advance waivers requested .
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 906
2. Advance waivers granted .
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 463
3. Advance waivers denied
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 293
4. Requests withdrawn	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 111
5. Requests pending	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 39
6. Number of inventions reported under
contracts having advance waivers and
contractor intends to file
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 216
Inventions Waived
1. Total inventions waived .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 1,254
Under individual waivers	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 1029
Under advance waivers .
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 225
2. Inventions for which waivers have been
voided
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 266
* Statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, NASA Deputy General
Council, before the U.S. Senate Subconuliittee on
Science, Technology and Space, July 23, 1979.
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Appendix C
UTILIZATION/COMMERCIALIZATION STATISTICS ON WAIVED INVENTIONS*
Number of Waived Inventions Surveyed:.
	 121
Percent of Total (788) Activet Inventions:	 15%
Total Number of Responses:
	 102
Percent Response:
	 84%
Reports Reports Percent
Types of Inventions Surveyed Requested Received Response
Previous Indications of
Probability of Use in 1977-1978 100 83 83%
Newly Waived Inventions 13 12 92.3%
Nonresponsive to 1977 Request 8 7 87.5%
Status of Surveyed Inventions Number of Inventions
Utilized/Commercialized 7
(First Use-2 inventions)
Development Efforts Continuing 	 39
Licensing/Promotion Only	 34
No Further Development Expected 	 22
Total Number of Active s Inventions (Through 1977): 788
Total Number of Inventions Voided:
	
258
Total Number. of Inventions Utilized/
Commercialized:	 193	 (18.5%)
* See Appendix B
F Waiver not voided
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U.S. PATENTS HELD BY NASA
U.S. Patents and Patent Applications
Available for Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . .
	 3,512
Employee Inventions . . . . . . . . . .
	 . . . 2,378
Contractor Inventions . . .
	 . . . . . . A . . 1,134
NONEXCLUSIVE LICENSES
Licenses Granted to Date . . . . . . . .
	
.	 502
Licenses Revoked or Terminated . . . . . . . . .
	 260
Licenses in Force as of this Date
	 242
Inventions Covered by Licenses in Force . . . .
	 1241
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES
Licenses Granted to Date . . . . . . .
	 . . . .	 21
Licenses Revoked or Terminated
	 . . . . . .
	 12
Licenses in Force as of this Date . . . . . . .
	 9
Inventions Covered by Licenses in Force . . . .
	 9
NASA LICENSING STATIST:
U.S. PATENTS AND PATENT APP]
December 31, 1978*
t
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Appendix D
Appendix E
COMMERCIAL USE OF NASA OWNED INVENTIONS
LICENSED BY NASA IN THE UNITED STATES
December 31, 1978*
NONEXCLUSIVE LICENSES
Nonexclusive license in force .
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 242
Utilization reports received from licensees 138
POSITIVE USE REPORTS
P--,ports of commercial use .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 50
Inventions covered by these reports 34
Employee inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 28
Contractor inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 6
NEGATIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of no commercial use	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 88
Inventions covered by these reports . 	 .	 .	 . .	 56
Employee inventions	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 40
Contractor inventions.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 16
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES GRANTED TO DATE	 . . .	 .	 .	 21
Employee inventions	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 14
Contractor inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 7
POSITIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of commercial use . 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 6
Employee inventions	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 4
Contractor inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 2
NEGATIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of no commercial use	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 15
Employee inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 10
Contractor inventions 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . 5
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Appendix G
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
In order to gain a better perspective on industry's
views OF NASA's patent policy, personal interviews were
conducted with the owners of several small firms and patent
attorneys from several medium and large firms that have
performed NASA research in the past. Interviews with the
patent counsels from eight Federal agencies (NASA, DOE, DOD,
USDA, HEW, DOI, NSF, DOT), the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP), the American Patent Lawyers Association,
Research Corporation, and numerous industry associations
were also conducted.
These interviews proved invaluable in providing
insight into the industry and Government views of alterna-
tive Government patent policies. Findings from these inter-
views have been included in the report where relevant.
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Summary
This paper focuses on ways to improve NASA's technology
transfer system. The analysis in this paper assumes that
an improvement of the current status can be achieved if the
technology transfer process is better understood. This
understanding will only be gained if a detailed knowledge
about factors generally influencing technology transfer is
developed, and particularly those factors affecting tech-
nology transfer from government R&D agencies to industry.
Secondary utilization of aerospace technology is made more
difficult because it depends on a transfer process which
crosses established organizational lines of authority and
which is outside well understood patterns of technical
applications.
In the absence of a sound theory about technology trans-
fer and because of the limited capability of government
agencies to explore industry's needs, a team approach to
screening and evaluation of NASA generated technologies is
proposed in the analysis which follows. The proposal calls
for NASA, and other organizations of the private and public
sectors which influence the transfer of NASA generated tech-
nology, to participate in a screening and evaluation process
to determine the commercial feasibility of a wide range of
technical applications.
1
Introduction
In providing for the widest practicable and appropriate
dissemination of information about its R&D activities, NASA
faces a task of vast scope and substantial complexity.
In fulfilling its task NASA must solve two complex
prcblems:
o The Information Problem
The secondary utilization of aerospace technology poses
a question that is difficult to answer: "How can an unknown
target group in industry be provided with a technology having
unknown applications?" In order to respond to this challenge
NASA must necessarily initiate "horizontal" technology trans-
fer through a communication process which crosses institutional
and organizational boundaries. This process is not well
understood.
To transfer the right information to the right target
group is a difficult task. But, this is only Qne part of the
technology transfer process. Information dissemination is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for technology
transfer (see also: Baer et al., 1975, p. 27).
o The Application Problem
There exists a spectrum of potential reasons why industry
does not accept a known technology. Technological feasibility
is no guarantee of commercial success. Furthermore, new
technologies are very often not only market-creating but also
market-destroying.
^P
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Studies indicate that NASA performs excellent work in
disseminating information. That is not to say that there do
not exist ways of improving the NASA information dissemi-
nation system. In addition, based on an interpretation of
investigations performed by the Denver Research Institute, it
appears that opportunities for substantial improvement exist
in'the'application process.
Rather than attempting to improve the technology dis-
semination system through a new kind of technical report, it
may be more beneficial to improve the information itself.
R	 More potential value could be added to the information system
F
by detailing competitive technologies, by indicating neighbor-
ing technologies which already exist, or are developing, by
suggesting possibilities for useful applications, and by
providing commercial feasibility information. Such activities
impact on the application problem in a positive manner (see
also: Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 7).
i
In order effectively to provide this "value added infor-
nation", one must understand the supply characteristics of
NASA technologies, with regard to potential commercial appli-
cations and specific demand characteristics of potential users.
In addition, one should know about "what is going on"
in industry and between industry and government agencies.
s
How ca p such a task be accomplished? An important step
is to enhance the screening/evaluation process of NASA
generated technologies. That is to say, enhancing the ability
w	 3
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to anticipate the future value of a NASA technology and
thereby choose an effective transfer medium. Since no com-
prehensive detailed knowledge about the many facets of
technology transfer exists,two possibilities seem worth
pursuing in the screening/evaluation process.
o Statistical Analysis
Based on existing historical data, one cay try to
determine the relevant characteristics of technologies
which enhance their value for potential users.
Such statistical analysis could provide substantial
insights. Industry, however, frequently reorganizes its
structure and changes its needs, so statistical analysis
is of limited value. But, statistical analysis might be
used for preevaluation, thereby filtering out presumably
valuable technologies to be evaluated by a team.
i
_.
o Team. Approach
Evaluation using a team approach is suggested here using
teams that include members of the user community, such as
professional associations,and governmental agencies which are
concerned with regulation and commercial R&D. Such an
approach would enhance the technology transfer process.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potentials
of a team approach to the screening/evaluation pro:^ess. This
approach creates two substantial benefits:
M Given a lack of knowledge about the complexities of
technology transfer, this approach could become a powerful
tool in overcoming those complexities.
4
(ii) Technology transfer is important for all members of
a society and should therefore not be the sole concern of an
R&D agency like NASA. A team approach would promote accept-
ance of the view that technology transfer is the common re-
sponsibility of all participants in ta, commercial utilization
of advanced technologies.
To outline the characteristics of a team approach to
screening/evaluation, this paper is organized as follows:
Description and Evaluation
of the NASA Technology Transfer Program
Analysis of Factors Influencing the
Application of New Technologies
Factors Influencing
	 Factors Influencing Technology
Technology Transfer
	 Transfer from a Government R&D
in General	 A enc to Industr
Summary Evaluation of Factors
Influencing Technology Transfer
Assessment of Arguments for
Screening/Evaluation by Team Approach-
advantages	 ;[. Disadvantages
Review of Screening/
Evaluation by T eam Approach
Potential Members for Screening/Evaluation by Team Approach
5
tIn the first section below, the NASA information system
is described and evalua ;tMd. This evaluation suggests that
NASA improve the information itself rather than modifying
the information dissemination system.
An assessment of factors which are likely to impact on
technology transfer is made in the second section. At the
end of this section, improvements achievable using a team
approach are discussed.
The third section assesses arguments for a team approach
to screening/evaluation.
Potential members of a screening/evaluation team are
noted and their capabilities explored in the fourth section.
1. Description and evaluation of the NASF Technology Transfer
Program
The NASA Technology Transfer (TT) program consists primarily
of Information Dissemination, Application Teams, information
Dissemination Centers, and Applications Engineering. For the
purpose of this paper, this transfer system is viewed as three
phases:
INFORMATION PHASE
o library service
o delivery service (t^:^;hnical reporting)
MARKETING PHASE
o identification of potential users' needs
o identification of technologies matching users' needs
.wr
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APPLICATION PHASE
o demonstration projects
o reengineering projects
o production of marketable products
The development of the process can be thought of as an
evolution. In its information phase, information is provided
for the users. In o,7-1 ,er for technology transfer to happen,
the user must play an active role. NASA's role is more passive,
once information has been made available. The library service,
for example, consists of a set of interrelated services. In
the literature search service ("remote") the user is active;
he defines key words which are used for information retrievals
performed by industrial. Applications Center's (IAC) personnel.
The next extension is an interactive retrieval service (on--site);
the user sits beside the "Information Specialist," who now
plays an active part due to his knowledge about the NASA data
base. He is able to identify keywords the user might never
think of. In a current awareness search service (period-,
ical reports which supply the user with up-to-date information
in his field of interest, generally delivered on a monthly
basis), the user defers to the search service totally. NASA's
role is more active in cases where the user requests inter-
pretative services and NASA participates in the exploration
of the retrieved information.
Staffed with highly qualified scientists and engineers,
Industrial Applications Centers provide not only information
but potential ajjplications of information. An IAC's staff
7
Ipersonnel may initiate contact between a requester and com-
panies, universities, etc., already working in a certain field.
In the marketing phase, performed by State Application
Centers and Technology Application Teams, NASA takes a more
active role: exploration of a user's needs, search for a
technology which will match those needs and then implementation
and commercialization of the technology (see Anyos et al., 1978.
p. iii). In the application phase, NASA reengineers technologies
in order to bring them closer to commercial feasibility.
Studies investigating the benefit-to-cost ratios concerning
the main elements of the NASA Technology Transfer program
show a positive relationship. The aggregate benefit-to-cost
ratio was estimated to be 6 : 1. The single elements of the
program are characterized by ratios lying in a spectrum 3 : 1
to 26 : 1 (Johnson et al., 1977b, p. v, vi). For each dollar
NASA invests in its TT Program, benefits equivalent to six
dollars are produced.
WY?en interpreting these numbers, one must take several
factors into account. First, such benefit-to-cost ratios
cannot be directly compared with those of other NASA projects.
Of course, the ratios calculated for the NASA TT program do not
reflect the investment in developing the technology. Second,
each NASA contractor must write a contractor report, which can
be thought of as an initial step toward producing an information
product, the costs of which are not covered by the TT program.
In assessing possibilities for further improvements of the
TT program, an analysis of the .
 NASA Tech Brief Program, under-
8
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taken by the Denver Research Institute, is most valuable
(Johnson et al., 1977a, p. 36). They classified TT applicatic
in four modes:
mode 0 no application at all
mode 1 used for information only
mode 2 used to improve already existing production
technologies, products and services
mode 3 used to develop new production technologies,
products and services
The probability for any of the individual modes occurring were
calculated as follows:
mode	 probability
0	 34%
1	 54%
2	 11%
3	 1%
The 54% for mode 1 indicates that NASA is providing an
excellent information service. There is no other information
service available which covers the aerospace area and related
fields in such a comprehensive way. This is true partly be-
cause the NASA data base includes information produced by other
organizations. For example, due to a special information ex-
4
Scientific and Technical
European Space Agency (ESA),
rnational developments in
show a very different picture
products from NASA technical
change agreement between the NASA
Information Office (STIO) and the
a user can obtain the latest inte
this field.
The results of the DRI study
concerninq the development of new
9
information: "Successful efforts to develop new products from
TSP's have occurred but the y
 are exceptions. More typically,
such attempts lead to a new financial loss for the TSP requester.
Even for successful Mode 3 application (development of new
technologies, products, services), the TSP information is
usually a minor technical input (about 5 percent) to the new
economic activity" (Johnson et al., 1977a, p. 48).
At the present time, it seems that the most positive out-
come of NASA's TT program is that the information about its
technologies is available promptly and comprehensively.
The calculated net benefit for the Industrial Application
Centers is moderate compared to those of the technical reporting
program. One might expect the contrary, due to the comprehensive
and thorough services provided by IACs. Moreover., it isimpor-
tant to emphasize that while technical reports are free, users
are charged for the services of the IACs. The benefit-to-cost
ratios currently available may not describe the true picture.
Out of a vast set of new technologies, most will have little
or no impact on new products and services. There is a small
subset of technologies which are, unexpectedly, so successful
that they pay for the whole R&D program of an organization.
To enhance the effectiveness of NASA's TT program, it
would be useful to know about the underlying factors which
influence technology transfer. For example, it is not particu-
larly useful to calculate time-lags :between the technological
feasibility and the first commercial application of a technology;
1'0
indeed, those calculations show substantial variations (see:.
Rosenberg, 1976a, pp. 72-74). There are many different factors
at work and without a detailed understanding of those factors
it is hard to initiate efforts to make technology transfer
more effective.
NASA technology k.aa the potential to improve existing
technologies and to develop new production technologies, pro-
ducts and services. However, an improvement of the technology
information dissemination system by itself is not likely to
lead to a substantial change. Producing and reporducing in-
formation about a technology where there are barriers in the
application of this technology is not likely to lead to better
results. In one case hundreds of TSPs were requested regard-
ing a new gas turbine seal, but there were no applications
because no firm was willing to take the necessary substantial
commercial risk. If a procedure existed, e.g. a team approach
to screening/evaluation by which :7ASA anticipated such a pro-
blem, NASA could offer more help. For example, where potential
users of a new technology such as governmental organizations
are identified, NASA might develop a prototype if the technical
risks were so high as to inhibit further development.
The key for solving the applications problem is a mechanism
which enables NASA to explore the potential commercial environ-
ment for a certain technology which is announced through the
TT program. This is the underlying basis for the suggestion
of technology screening/evaluation using a team approach.
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2. Analysis of factors influencing the application of a new
technology
Technology transfer is a complex: process which is not well
understood (Hoelscher, Hummon, 1977, p. 76), especially hori-
zontal technology transfer or secondary utilization. There
may be hundreds of potential secondary applications of aero-
space technology, but it is extremely difficult to identify
them. Indeed, it might be difficult to think of any useful
applications of a new technology at all. Thomas Edison is
reported to have thought that a phonograph would be used to
record the wishes of dying men (Rosenberg, 1976a, p. 197).
In the secondary utilization of aerospace technology, it
is often remarkable how remote the secondary utilization is
from the original space application. A joint NASA/military
project on helicopter rotors produced a vibration dampening
technology, now used in buildin g guitars (Haggerty, 1978, p. 34).
In anticipating secondary utilization one faces an
"open-end" problem. There will never be a method for identifying
all the possible or useful non-aerospace applications of a
NASA technology. "It is important that one never knows in
advance if spinoffs will occur, or what their benefits may (or
may not) be. Because of this uncertainty, spinoffs are nothing
to bank on." (Thurow, 1978, p. 69.) It might be worthwhile
to initiate a potential applications "creativity-session" for
selected technologies. Such value added to a purely technical
description of a new technology might enable a reader of a
TECH BRIEF to envision many possible applications and ultimately
to develop a useful application.
f
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Before one explores the potential value of a technology,
an idea for the application of that technology is necessary.
One can then begin to assess the impacts of factors influencing
the technology transfer process. A knowledge of such factors
and their impacts on technology transfer is important in esti-
mating the probability of an industrial application of a
technology. In the following paragraphs some of those factors
are discussed.
2.1 Factors which influence technology transfer.
The following section describes some factors which generally
influence technology transfer as well as specific factors which
influence transfer from government R&D agencies to industry.
o All technologies have certain characteristics making
them advantageous for some applications and useless for others.
The application of numerical control in the machine tool in-
dustry is not economical for long production runs. other
factors like preparatory and maintenance work have to be taken
into account, especially if a skilled work force is scarce.
(see also: Ray, 1969, p. 58). One must also check the impacts
of a new technology on the organization of the whole production
system. This is extremely important in industries like the
chemical industry which is characterized by close and inter-
dependent relations between materials, energy and information
flows. Often, a new technology - even if only a small piece -
can only be used advantageously if the whole production system
is reorganized. if the investment expenditures for the re-
A
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organization are greater than the anticipated cost reductions
caused by the use of the new technology, the la#:tez will be
ignored.
It is extremely difficult - if not impossible - to detail
the general characteristics of technologies, due to the fact
that production systems differ front industry to industry and
even within a certain industry. Quite a few mathematical
models have been developed to describe the behavior of an
industry, e.g. the oil industry. But the value of those models
for the explanation of industry's behavior concerning the
adoption of new technologies is only moderate (Lapple, 1978,
p. 284). Assume that there are two different technologies for
the production of a certain product, one of which is relatively
more energy consuming than the other one. Without specific
knowledge about the production system of a firm, there is no
way to anticipate which of the two technologies will be applied.
For example, the more energy consuming technology might produce
valuable by-products which far outweigh the cost advantages
achieved by using the less energy consuming technology.
In the screening and evaluation of NASA generated tech-
nology it is valuable to know about the factors described above.
It is extremely difficult to achieve such detailed knowledge
on an industry by industry basis. In this context, technology
screening/evaluation using a team approach would be a valuable
asset in gaining knowledge about those characteristics of
specific technologies which are relevant to the technology
transfer process.
I
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o The degrees of technical and business alignment
between industries is an important parameter in the technology
transfer process. It is reasonable to assume that the less
alignment between industries exists the less likelihood there
is of successful technology transfer between industries, and
the more important technology transfer programs become in
promoting the transfer process (see also: Kottenstette,
Rusnak, 1973, p. 106). Therefore, knowledge of the degree of
technical and business alignment between industries is essential
to planning technology transfer programs.
o Due to the fact that each field in science and tech-
nology has develop^Ai its owrr, iiifozr«a- i, n channels and has
created individual problem solving methodologies, there exist
interdisciplinaryary barriers. Normally, people not trained in
a special field are unable to communicate with people who are.
The party unable to understand a certain professional language
may be unwilling or unable to learn this language. Consequently,
there exist barriers between fields in science and technology.
The difficulty of overcoming interdisciplinary barriers can be
assessed by analyzing an interdisciplinary field. In the.
American Journal of Operations Research about 10% of published
articles are of interest to a special target group but actually
only 2% to 4% reach this target group (see: Pierskalla, 1979,
P. 8) due to "Language" problems.
Of course, to overcome those problems specialized journals
can be issued. The Operations Society of America is doing this,
15
for example, by issuing the Journal of Transportation Science.
Within this Society there are plans to pursue this approach
in other areas by issuing journals on such topics as public
systems and marketing (Little, 1979, p. 4). NASA uses a
similar technique when it issues bibliographies in areas such
as Aerospace Medicine, Biology, Earth Resources, and Energy.
This approach, issuing journals in selected areas, has
limited advantages. It is impossible to issue journals in all
areas of potential interest and, furthermore, people are
often reluctant to use new journals.
A different approach could be ado pted. Rather than issue
journals, it is possible to develop close relationships with
societies already covering a certain field and publish articles
in established journals. A team approach to technology
screening/evaluation is based upon strong relationships with
organizations which cover different areas in science and
technology. Doors to these areas would then be opened.
o Estimation of the relative efficiency of a new tech-
nology in comparison to already existing ones is an important
factor to take into account. Often a new technology offers
few or no advantages in terms of technical and cost aspects
when compared to those already in use (see also; Cooper, et al.,
1973, p. 56). Sometimes engineers need a substantial amount of
time to find out efficient ways to operate a new process. This
is particularly true for chemical process industries due to
the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the production
process in many cases.
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Often, technologies already in use experience substantial
improvements when a new technology is expected to enter the
market. For example, the slow diffusion of the steam engine
in the United States was caused by improvements in water wheel
technology (Rosenberg, 1972/73, p. 24). Estimation of
"switch-over-points", and the efficiency curves, of old and
new technologies is a difficult task. in most commercial
enterprises, it is rare that a new technology can be used
with great success immediately. This situatioh delays the use
of a new technology. The knowledge of this delay is of major
interest due to the fact that the new technology might itself_
become obsolete prior to implementation.
o In some cases one would fail in judging the value of
a new technology without analyzing its "neighboring" technologies.
To some extent, each technology is dependent on other technologies.
For some new technologies, essential neighboring technologies
might not be available. Consequently, one must overcome numerous
bottlenecks (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 125). Often, efficient tech-
nologies cannot be used because "parallel necessary technology
did not arise elsewhere." (Locke, 1978, p. 25.) It takes time
to make neighboring technologies available due to the fact that
6 to 10 years are often required to develop a process from pilot
stage to industrial scale. If such bottlenecks are anticipated,
one can initiate appropriate steps to make the new technology
more readily available for applications in the commercial area.
o In almost all cases production technology is capital-
intensive. if an industry is dominated by a small number of
17
big firms, they might agree to ignore a new technology in
case it would cause•a major impact on existing production
technology. A study of Du Pont Rayon Plants points out that
delays in applying new technology stemmed from the fact that
the new technology required new investments (Hollander, 1965,
p. 199). Tf capital goods already in use are relatively
new and characterized by long lifecycles, the long-run cost
advantages of a new technology might be outweighed by short-
term financial returns (Ray, 1969, p. 45).
The behavior of the American steel industry in the fifties
4	 can be cited in this context. Although the oxygen furnace
prook-_ss had proven superior to the open-hearth process in
Europe (Gruber, 1969, p. 43), the U.S. Steel industry switched
over to the oxygen furnace process relatively late. The capi-
tal intensiveness of the production technology seemed to be a
major reason for this delay (see also: Gruber, 1969, p. 49,
50). A .spokesman for the U.S. Steel Corporation said that:
"Nobody who has efficient open-hearth furnaces is going to
throw them out to buy oxygen furnaces. We waited until we
needed to replace old capacity." (in: Ray, 1969, p. 45.)
On the other hand, if a new technology is able to overcome
bottlenecks in an existing production system and thereby offer
incremental change compatible to the existing technology, it
is likely that such a technology :could be used immediately.
An investigation performed by Wright points out that industry's
interest regarding those :NASA generated technologies offering
improvement on existing technologies was nearly eight times
18
greater than industry's interest in technologies not compatible
to those already in use (cited in: Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 7).
o An important factor in technology transfer is the
comparative advantage a firm gains in using a new technology.
In judging contractual arrangements one should take into
account that "the smaller the variation in comparative ad-
vantages among prospective innovators of the same idea the
less will the exclusive right to invent be worth, even if
the returns were fully capturable" (Cheung et al., 1976, p. 19).
Regulations requiring mandatory use "of the best available
technology" are also an ;important consideration. In a case
where a new technology will turn out to be a "best available,
technology,"" an innovator will not enjoy a comparative advaYacag
due to the fact that other firms are forced by law to follow.
Furthermore, other firms then have an incentive to hinder
potential. innovators {Dill, 1975, p. 139) .
Another case to consider is a major change of the pro
duction technology in an entire industry branch. At present
some 80 percent of products in the chemical industry depend on
oil. To switch to coal, major changes must take place. If
one firm goes ahead, it will. face tremendous risk. Other firms,
choosing the "second is fastest" strategy, would gain technical
knowledge by monitoring the research work of the innovator
(Thurow, 1978 0 p. 70). They will follow only if it is econom-
ical to so do. The first firm may not gain substantial compaa-,
tive advantages. if one is able to anticipate such factors, one
19
can arrange appropriate steps, for example, joint projects
I 	 between NASA and all major firms within an. industry branch,
or an industry association.
0 New technologies are both market-creating and market-
destroying.. Market-destroying effects will be greater the
more existing technology is integrated into the production
system. It is important to realize that it is insufficient
to assess those effects only at the firm level. For example,
replacement of pesticides might impact the cosmetics industry
because both industries use common raw materials. Also,
restrictive sulphur emission standards caused oil companies
to develop technologies to produce sulphur out of their residuals.
Consequently, medium-sized f i.rms ..:hich produced sulphur out
of elementary sulphur were nearly eliminated. Finally, West
Germany exporionacd labor strikes due to the introduction of
text processing technologies. Printers were frightened of
losing their jobs overnight.
Attempts of oil companies to achieve control over com-
petitiva uranium and coal technologies "may be seen as
attempts to assure long-term market control by minimizing the
potential throats arisIng from technological breakthroughs in
the provision of substitute products." (Rosenberg, 1.976b*
4	
p. 533). A recent example is the; behavior of the electric
utilities -towards solar power due to the fact 
that 
such a
(lecontralized energy source , does not fit the structure of
existing centralized powot- lino, notworks (Cornmoner, 1979,
Epp. 69-71).
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Those examples clearly show that tciG ,uarxer_-ueszruying
effects of a technology may lead to the non-application of a
new technology or at least a delay in the diffusion process.
In assessing the value of a new technology, it is important to
keep in mind that it must "Lccome an element of the socio-
technological fabric" (Hoelscher, Hummon, 1977, p. 78) and
for a firm "of the various kinds of environmental change,
few are more pervasive or important than technological change"
(Cooper et al., 1973, p. 54).
o Regulation is an important factor to take into account.
A major influence is expected from regulations implemented in
the ,form of so-called design characteristics. A firm may feel
it is inconvenient to try to change governmental rules for the
benefit of a minor improvement and thereby will not use a
technology which only leads to moderate benefits.
However, careful analysis can help anticipate industry's
behavior. Regulation causes technology arrestment as well as
technological advance. One of the industries most affected by
environmental regulation is the chemical and allied products
industry. This industry claims that this kind of regulation
leads to a decline in capital productivity due to the fact
that investments for reduction of emissions decrease the amount
of capital used for the production line. This argument holds
true, but only assuming that no technological advances are
made. indeed, under this assumption a substantial quantity of
capital has to be invested for the treatment of residuals
without any benefit for the production processes. An investi-
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gation performed in West Germany (.1-ieissner, Hoedl, 1978)
showed that industry has strong incentives to change this
"unpleasant" situation, and one 'efficient means to do so is
to change the production technology. in this case, regulation
t	 caused a need for new technologies. In general, only detailed
analyses will lead to a well balanced judgement about the
impacts of regulation on technology transfer.
o Another extremely important factor is the relation
between the development of a technol.`gical innovation and the
development of the diffusion process. It seems reasonable
to assume that industry will slow down the adoption of new
technologies if the speed of innovations is high. This
assumption is based on the fact that firms face the danger of
investing in "soon-to-be-obsolete technology." (Rosenberg,
1976b, p. 534.) While such a pattern might be characteristic
of a lot of cases, it does not hold for all. in the computer
industry, important innovations are characterized by a diffusion
time of 3 to 5 years; innovations of less importance are
delivered to the market within l year. Firms must be heavily
active in R&D in order to achieve a competitive position in the
market (Dunn, 1979, pp. 3-4).
Competition is a strong force in promoting the application
of new technologies (Gruber, 1969, p. 40). In assessing rates
of innovation and diffusion, competition should be taken into
account.
o Dependent on its stage of development, a firm shows
different responsiveness to different kinds of innovations.
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Utterback offers the following model for exploring this
phenomena (1976, p. 36);
During the first stage, development is based on product
change primarily. Consequently, product innovations have
priority over process innovations. Based upon experiences,
e.g. in the semi-conductor industry, firms concentrating on
process innovations in this early stage face the danger of
improving the production-technology of a product which soon
becomes obsolete.
The second stage finds established firms in an industry
looking for process innovations. These small changes, com-
patible with the existing production system, reduce costs of
existing products.
In the last stage, established firms have an incentive
to delay major technical changes because the inflexibility
of capital-intensive production systems. It might be possible
to obtain such knowledge by monitoring the development of an
industry.
Those factors influencing technological change mentioned
above provide a few hints; the list is neither complete nor
exhaustive. Yet, the rather brief discussion showed the
importance of those factors and the difficulty of exploring
their impact on technology transfer. To make technology
transfer more effective, however, kno;•lledge about such factors
seems to be essential (see also McClain, 1976, p. 116). There-
fore, I will now explore the impacts of such factors on the
secondary utilization of aerospace technology. Anticipation
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of those impacts is a necessary condition for choosing
appropriate steps in "putting technology to work."
2.2 Factors influencing technology transfer from a government
R&D agency to industry.
The factors discussed above are generally important.
Those factors analyzed in what follows are of particular
interest if the transfer process takes place between a govern-
mental agency to industry. The analysis will focus on such
facotrs important to NASA's TU program.
o For the successful introduction of a new technology the
relation between innovation and innovator is most important.
Therefore, many firms have adopted a procedure whereby the
innovator becomes the product manager for his own product. This
reflects the fact that an innovation needs a key individual
who pushes it from innovation to commercialization. An empirical
investigation of NASA generated technology further points out
that the involvement of the innovator in the usage of the inno-
vation is important for success (Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 28).
Furthermore, an investigation of federally funded demonstration
projects showed that in cases where the project initiative
originates from nonfederal sources, the diffusion processis
better than projects initiated by a federal agency (Baer et
al., 1976, p. 48).
o Psychological barriers to the use of government in--
formation and technology and, to some extent, the restricted
availability of government information must be taken into
account. Up until now industry has hesitated to use govern-
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mental information and technology. There is - justified
or not a concern that government might try to influence its
activities or at least monitor requests. This problem is re-
inforced because NASA's data base is not as easily available
as other federal data bases. But it seems likely that such
barriers can be overcome. A DRI study points out that users,
if they have once used NASA services successfully, are likely
to do so in the future. A review of the number of users of
NASA's data base, appears to show an educational process taking
place.
Concerning the restricted availability of NASA literature,
it is worthwhile to think about improvements. It normally
takes a user l to 2 weeks to receive the printouts of a
literature search service. The information is rarely published
in widely available professional journals. Instead it is
published in NASA journals which are in most cases only avail-
able in NASA Centers and through the National Technical
Information Service. Consequently, it takes at least one to
two months before a user receives the information.
Further, it might be valuable to improve the "On-Site"
literature search service. An intelligent user should be
able to screen the information while sitting at the terminal;
undercurrent conditions, it is too time consuming to do so.
To improve the procedure, "touch-panel" terminals could be
installed at the Industrial Application Centers. Those in-
dustries remote from the aerospace industry are more likely to
be attracted if access to NASA information is made easier.
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o The value of NASA generated technology is of critical
importance. NASA's philosophy - especially that of the IAC`'s -
that it is wasteful "to reinvent the wheel".- is often not
accepted by industry regarding 14ASA generated technology (see
e.g. Olken, 1972, p. 617). It has been argued that NASA
technology is the result of reorganizing what was already at
hand, that is to say NASA technology ,lacks novelty. Miniatur-
ization was a new concept in the sixties but is now a well-
known design technique. In general, government information
is characterized by the label: too much, low value.
To counter such labels, many factors must be explored.
At first, it is quite natural thaw "massive-mobilization R&D
projects" (Thurow, 1978, p. 30) like Apollo and the Space-Shuttle
can be successfully performed only if the basic knowledge
about the technologies employed already exists.
This means that NASA technologies are in a much more
advanced application stage. This should not be confused
with the value of such technologies.. This situation reinforces
the need to develop a technological classification scheme which
separates basic knowledge, engineering-application knowledge,
etc. This classification scheme would enable NASA "to shoot"
at appropriate target groups with efficient transfer mechanisms.
f	
It is extremely important that a rapid transfer of engineering-
applications take place due to the fact that such knowledge
rapidly becomes obsolete. In such cases, it is not a question
of technological availability but of whether the technology
is known to all potential users.
	
This leads to a second
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important fact. A certain technology might be well-known; a
special technique might be general knowledge in one industry,
but there is no way to know if this knowledge is available to
other industries as well. Vertical technology transfer, a
process within one industry, works quite well. In contrast,
there are no established mechanisms for horizontal technology
transfer, a process which takes place across organizational
and industry borders. Kottenstette and Rusnak describe this
three caveats (:973, p. 106):
(i) "Firms have varying degrees of technological alignment
with aerospace and their relative alignment is of
primary importance in effecting secondary utilization."
(ii) "Increased distance from the aerospace sector (less
alignment with :aerospace) decreases the likelihood
of new technology adoption through diffusion."
(iii) "Increased distance from the aerospace sector implies
that a planned effort is required to provide access
to the aerospace technology."
Communication between firms is important to the transfer
of technologies (see Utterback, 1971, p. 82, 83). To estimate
the value of aerospace technology for other industries, one
might use an "alignment structure"plan: (described below) and
organize transfer efforts around such a plan.
Such an alignment structure plan can be illustrated in
the form of a graph or a matrix which describes relations
between firms. Such an approach was used by Czepiel (1975) to
explore the diffusion of the continuous casting process in
the steel industry. The arcs in the graph or the elements in
the matrix, represent two kinds of flows, material and informa-
tion. It is valuable to consider firms and other organizations
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1of the private and government sector which influence the
technology transfer process. That is to say, the alignment
structure plan should represent the entire "technology
delivery system." The main components of a technology
delivery system are: source of R&D funding, R&D performers,
material supplier, manufacturer of the capital goods, pro-
ducers of the product, distributors, ultimate users (see
also: Yin, 1978, p. 13).
In exploring the value of NASA technology for industry
one should keep in mind that this technology has been developed
for NASA mission-oriented R&D projects. This is to say that
the technology is not developed in a commercial environment.
There is a trend, as in the military field, to produce such
technologies as soon as it is technically feasible. Technical
feasibility is no guarantee of commercial success. of course,
there are a lot of fine, commercially successful technologies,
like integrated circuits, jet airplanes, etc. But there are
other cases, like the nuclear driven ship.
To sum up, estimating the value of NASA technology is not
easy; it requires knowledge or at least three primary components.
First, the stage of technological development, from vague ideas
to.prototypes. Second, the relation of other industries to
the industry generating the technology. Third, the commercial
"shape" of the technology.
f
2.8
_1
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o Aside from the specific value of NASA generated
technology the value of externally generated information
about technologies in general has to be taken into account.
Many firms believe that externally generated knowledge, when
compared to its own R&D, is not as unique as is often claimed
(VDI, 1979, p. 18). It is important to realize that in any
case the firm mush: check the information. As a result, the
value of a Tech Brief is known to a firm only after a check
of its content, that is to say after the firm has invested
time and money (Johnson et al., 1977a, p. 11).
Refusing to adopt externally generated technology seems
to be typical of U.S. firms, at least when compared to firms
in Japan and West Germany. There is some feeling that "an
overall increased sensitivity to and utilization of outside
technology must be developed..." (Gee, 1978, p. 212). In
general, such behavior is caused by factors described in the
previous section. For example, in chemical industries there
are huge and complex integrated production systems. The
change of one element might impact on many other elements.
Therefore, incremental improvement is typical; major changes
of the production technology tend to be delayed. Major new
technologies are often created outside the established firms
but are, in many cases, neglected due to the large capital
investment in existing technology (see also: Abernathy,
Utterback, 1978, p. 41). Firms in the U.S. have also been
reluctant to undertake cooperative programs. While these
29
kprograms are quite common in Europe only a few exist in the
United States (U.S. General Accounting o ffice, 2978, p. 58).
In the future this problem might be partly eliminated. The
experience of MIT after working with industry under a NSF'
grant for several years indicates that once firms "enter into
cooperative research # they discover that it does not threaten
their competitive position" (U.S. C^neral Accounting Office,
1978, p. 60).
The factors discussed above are only a few out of a large
set. It is not intended to provide a complete list. An
attempt was made to demonstrate that government R&D agencies
face specific difficulties in promoting technology transfer,
difficulties which add up to those confronting technology
transfer in general.
2.3 :summary evaluation of factors influencing technology transfer.
After having discussed factors influencing technology
transfer in general and in particular those factors influencing
transfer from a government R&D agent", to industry, a short
summary is provided in the following:
Factors Influencing Technology
Factors Influencing Technology 	 Transfer from Government R&D
Transfer in General	 Agencies to Industry
o relative efficiency of new	 o Psychological barriers to use
technologies compared to	 of government generated in--
those already in use 	 formation and technology
• availability of neighboring	 o value of PJASA generated
technologies	 technology to industry
• capital intensiveness of	 o relation between innovation
new technologies	 and innovator
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Factors Influencing Technology
Transfer in General (Gont'd)
o comparative advantage
achieved by the entre-
preneur
o market-creating and market -
destroying characteristics
of new technologies
o interdisciplinary barriers
o technical and business
alignment between
industries
o major changes of the pro-
duction technology in a
whole industry branch
o regulation
All of these factors may influence technology transfer in
a negative manner--at least to delay the adoption of a new
technology. Therefore, to solve the application problem
described in the introduction of this paper, it would be ex-
tremely useful to explore NASA technologies with regards to
such factors. If the results of such investigations are added
to information about a certain technology, benefits might be
achieved. In case a new technology is announced by NASA, it
might be useful to know to what degree this technology fits
current industrial patterns. One can identify material sup-
pliers, producers of equipment, etc. which are able to supply
the technology. Such knowledge - gained by exploring factors
influencing the transfer process, - provides a basis from
which to choose the right steps to put a technology to work.
To some extent such value-added functions are performed by
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staff members of the Industrial Application Centers. Users
of the IACs' services can be directed to other organizations
working in a certan field. Furthermore, staff members of the
IACs provide valuable information concerning market analyses.
In order to realize a real breakthrough in technology transfer
such services should be provided on a comprehensive basis.
Under current conditions the screening and evaluation
process concerning the Tech Brief is performed mainly by the
Technology Transfer officers at the single NASA Research
Centers in conjunction with the Illinois Institute for Tech-
nology Research Institute. The screening/evaluation process
employs the following criteria:
o marketing potential
o novelty
o technology
o nonaerospace potential
if an in-depth analysis of the factors influencing tech-
nology transfer is performed, it is likely that procedures can
be developed providing for substantial improvement in the
screening and evaluation process.
	 Concerning the screening
and evaluation criteria of "marketing potential," the following
procedure might be developed.
o	 Marketing Potential
Market Destroying o	 Identification of already
Effects existing technologies to be {
replaced in part or in total.
o	 Anticipation of improvements
of technologies to be replaced.
o	 Pelative efficiency of existing
and new technologies over time.
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Market Destroying
	 o Estimation of future rate of
Effects (Cont'd)	 innovations concerning the
new technology.
o Necessary reorganizations of
existing production systems
to integrate the new technology.
As mentioned before, new technologies are both market-
creating and market-destroying. The market-destroying effect
is important in the development of market potential estimates.
First, existing technologies which are likely to be replaced
in whole or in part should be identified. In many cases
those technologies already in use undergo substantial im-
provements if a new technology is expected. Therefore, such
improvements should be anticipated. Such investigations
establish a comparison of the relative efficiency of the
technologies already in use, and the new technology to be
introduced. This relative efficiency is one of the important
decision criteria in determining if a new technology will be
used. Furthermore, the potential for further technological
innovations should be checked due to the fact that industry
is reluctant to invest in soon-to-he obsolete technology.
Also, necessary reorganizations of existing production systems
in order to integrate the new technology should be considered.
The information dissemination process might be made more
effective if the dissemination strategy were based upon a
structure alignment plan which indicated to what extent organi-
zations influencing technology transfer are linked together.
After discussing a screening and evaluation procedure
which takes into account factors influencing technology transfer,
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I will undertake an analysis of policy options to enhance
0	 technology transfer.
Technology transfer has often been described as "technology
push" or "demand pull." Most empirical studies point out the
superiority of demand pull. However, R&D agencies, like NASA,
are likely to push technologies. New technologies need pushing
in order to overcome barriers, especially in early transfer
phases. Often R&D agencies fail to push a new technology when
industry has a need for it. In exploring factors influencing
technology transfer, as mentioned before, NASA should incor-
porate industry's needs in its information dissemination
policies. The outcome of this approach would be a mixed policy,
linking technology push and demand pull. This approach is
in line with recent findings. An investigation performed by
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) provides an in-depth analysis of
eight of the best known empirical studies on technological
innovation which all support the demand pull. policy. The
authors of the investigation, in analyzing these empirical
studies, claim that "the role of demand has been overextended
and misrepresented, with serious consequences for our under-
standing of the innovative process and of appropriate government
policy alternatives to foster innovation" (Mowery, Rosenberg,
1979, P. 3). In the conclusion of their study, the authors
point out
The existence of an adequate demand for the
eventual product is, of course, an essential--a
necessary--condition. nut, we suggest, the demand
pull approach simply ignores, or denies, the operation
of a complex and diverse set of supply side mechanisms
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which are continually altering the structure of
production costs (as well as introducing entirely
new products) and which are therefore fundamental
to the explanation of the timing of the innovation
process.
At a more general level, the conceptual under-
pinnings of the "demand-pull" case are perhaps even
more fundamentally suspect. Rather than viewing
either the existence of a market demand or the
existence of a technological opportunity as each
representing a sufficient condition for innovation
to occur, one should consider them each as necessary,
but not sufficient for innovation to result; both
must exist simultaneously. (Mowery, Rosenberg,
1979, p. 57.)
In sum, successful technology transfer must be based upon both
technology-push and demand-pull (see also: Hoelscher, Hummon,
1977, p. 82; Gilpin, 1976, p. 170).
As such, NASA might consider the "timing of publishing."
To push a new technology at a time when industry has an urgent
need is likely to product more success than announcing a new
technology at any time. An empirical study of NASA generated
technologies published in a TECH BRIEF points out, that "the
degree of urgency of the problem to which the technology was
related seemed to be an important .factor..." (Chakrabarti, 1972,
p. 162). At a time of low gasoline prices, where no substantial
change is expected, it is not appropriate to push electrical
automobile engines. But when gasoline prices are increasing,
industry might well be responsive.
of course, one might argue that it is not NASA's task to
explore industry's needs and that NASA should announce new
technologies when they are produced, making sure that the infor-
mation can be retrieved by industry at any time. nevertheless,
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3hitting the right target group at the right time with the
right information might lead to more effective technology
transfer and "timing of publishing" might be a method worth
4	
consideration.
in general, incorporation of users' needs in policies for
technology transfer is essential. This hind of approach is
now commonly employed by R&D funding organizations (Yin, 1978,
p. 12, 13); NASA's TT program is an example. ' It is not a
question of whether or not a government R&D agency (like NASA)
should employ such an approach, but rather it is a question
of how to implement it.
3. Assessments of Arguments for a Team
Approach to Screening/Evaluation
3.1 Advantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation
The objective of this discussion is to describe possible
positive effects on the technology transfer process of tech-
nology screening/evaluation using a tears approach.
o one main advantage of screening and evaluation by a
team of industry/government individuals is that this approach
may come to grips with everchanging factors which influence
technology transfer. The discussion in previous sections has
outlined the difficulty of determining which factors influence
(positively or negatively) technology transfer. Furthermore,
unlaying cause-effect relations are not constant but change
1
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over time and are difficult to anticipate. The author of
this paper assumes that a complete understanding of the factors
influencing technology transfer will never exist. This is
probably the main reason that the vast number of empirical
studies on technology transfer have provided only limited help
to policy makers formulating policies to enhance technology
transfer.
However, an effective transfer system should allow a
rapid check of which factors influencing technology transfer
are relevant--even in a time of rapidly changing cause-effect
relations--and thereby make possible the choice of an effective
transfer mechanism. A team approach might fulfill this task
because organizations influencing the technology transfer
process would participate in the screening and evaluation
process. Thus, the opportunity for all relevant information
to be promptly available exists. For 21ASA this approach would
provide a valuable opportunity to ask "what-if" questions of
extremely knowledgeable and technically capable partners.
o Assuming that other'organizations joined the screening/
evaluation process, it is likely that a balanced assessment
of the potential value of NASA generated technology would be
possible. Furthermore because most NASA technology is pro-
duced under relaxed commercial restrictions, and because tech-
nological feasibility alone is no guarantee that a certain
technology will be commericializable, industry hesitates "to
pick up" such technologies.
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Also, shortcomings in technology transfer occur because
potential users lack relevant information concerning commercial.
feasibility (Udell, Johnson, 1978, p. 177). With the help of
other organizations, NASA might be able to provide such valuable
additional information and thereby increase the probability
of successful transfers.
o An important "by-product" of a team approach to
screening/evaluation would be access to other transfer mediums.
In case a professional society participates, one might think
of announcing NASA generated technology in a variety of ways:
- in a professional society journal
under NASA's name
anonymously
as a standard publication
in an "innovation column"
- in a journal issued by both NASA and the professional
society, etc.
There are many possibilities.
	 The outcome of such options would
be (amongst others);
-	 a higher reputation for NASA technology because the
reader will consider NASA information as competitive
with other information announced by a 'professional
society
-	 better access to NASA information
Concerning access to NASA information, it was mentioned
previously that under current conditions NASA information is
not that easily available to a potential user. 	 Most information
is only published in NASA journals, such as contractor reports,
and it often takes a month or more to receive them. 	 That is
too long a time lag for serious inquiries.	 In contrast, pro-
fessional society journals are available everywhere, and it is
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likely that a potential user of NASA generated technology
would be a regular reader of such journals.
Further, technical information is only one factor in
stimulating technological innovation. Education, training
and experience also play an important role in that they prepare
target groups for new technologies (Utterback, 1971, p. 80).
If universities and professional societies join the screening
and evaluation process, it would create an opportunity to
disseminate NASA generated technology by means of training
and education. In the long run this might lead to a sub-
stantial increase in technology transfer. To sum up, NASA
technology could be disseminated on a much wider basis using
existent and effective non-NASA channels.
o It is possible that the screening and evaluation process
itself, through the participation of other organizations, would
become a transfer process. This is particularly true when so-
called industry "gatekeepers" join the screening and evaluation
team (see also: Utterback, 1971, p. 64). This characteristic
of the team approach is of substantial importance.. Several
studies point out that oral communication is an effective means
for the transfer of innovations because it provides rapid feed-
back communication (see: Tushman, 1978, p. 625). However,
along with this benefit, there is the possibility that NASA
might Lose some control of the transfer process.
o Technology transfer is a national goal and is not the
exclusive responsibility of any government R&D agency alone.
The aim of the transfer process is to improve the nation's
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economy and is therefore the joint responsibility of all
societal groups. Participation of other groups should not be
Judged as a shortcoming within NASA, but rather as a construc-
tive means to enhance technology transfer.
o Concern about competition between government R&D
agencies and industry is frequently mentioned. It is argued
that national laboratories engage in "research on technology
of commercial significance and thereby directly compete with
private industry" (Hollomon, 1979, p. 39). For instance, the
McNeil-Schwindler Co. protested NASA's maintenance work on
NASTRAN (A NASA computer program), claiming that such work
should be performed by private software houses. Evidence is
also cited to the effect that commercial R&D performed by a
government agency alone might be inefficient (Hollomon, 1979,
p. 32; Gilpin, 1976, p. 170). A team approach would establish
a forum in which the parties concerned could discuss such
r
problems at an early stage.
o A team approach to screening/evaluation would be
effective as well, due to the screening of technologies which
have no value for industry. In some recent literature on
technology innovation, technology, etc., the need for a team
effort to promote technology innovation and technology transfer
has been identified and evaluated.
3.2 Disadvantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation.
Since the early sixties, government--industry relations--
enforced mainly through regulation--have been of major concern
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to both parties. All major firms now have at least one full-
time Washington, D.C. representative. Industry does not
passively accept government procedures. To the contrary, in-
dustry plays an active role. Established firms have large, and
high-quality staffs dedicated to government relations. One
of these tasks is to monitor government agencies' performance
and to anticipate their future activities.
Keeping this in mind, it is rather naive to assume that
industry would not use the possibility of a team approach to
screening/evaluation to try to influence NASA's activities.
A possible outcome would be the overidentification of NASA's
work with industry's interest. overidentification of govern-
ment agencies with industries is a well-known fact. One
opinion of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) states
that: "...the root of the FCC's problems is the agency's
overidentification with the industries it regulates, its over-
identification with the powerful and entrenched elements, in
4	 contrast to new and emerging facets or technologies, of the
industries regulated" (Geller, 1975, p. 706). In this view,
s
cause and effect are clearly described. Overidentification of
a government agency with industry leads to a slowdown of tech-
nological advance. This is discussed in greater detail below.
o one of NASA's roles as a governmental, R&D agency is
to undertake R&D projects with high risk, long-term pay off,
high social rate of return as compared to the private rate
of return, etc. Normally, private industry is unlikely to
engage in such projects. The lack of private sector initiative
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0in the development of communication satellite technology after
1972, when NASA's efforts were curtailed, is a case in point
(see: Office of Science and Technology, 1978, p. 4).
o	 Some of NASA's projects stem from high priority
industry needs.	 For industry, NASA is a prime source of
R&D funding.	 Potentially a team approach to screening/
evaluation could be misused for "doing =ndustry's work."
o	 Also, the possibility of unfair technology transfer
exists.	 If a team approach to screening/evaluation is estab-
lished, NASA must offer the body of its knowledge to all
participating parties.
o	 The team approach will only work if an appropriate
climate of confidence is created.
	 Members might not express
their thoughts if they are likely to read them in the news-
papers.
	
Therefore, the team approach might not work under the
conditions within which government organizations must operate.
Strictly speaking, the "protection of the public interest" is
critical.	 But it is often claimed, for example, that labor
unions and "consumer representatives" should join industry
committees	 (see e.g.:	 Brown, 1970, p. 31).	 In'the past, in
connection with follow-up analysis of industry's use of IAC
services, NASA
	 .,,,s experienced industry's sensitivity to
information.	 The team approach has the potential of indicating
to NASA, which NASA generated.technologies are of substantial
interest to industry and thereby provides a most valuable
basis from which 21ASA can make its information dissemination
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program more effective. But if the necessary condition of
confidence cannot be created, the value of a team approach to
screening and evaluation will only be moderate.
o In establishing procedures where other parties join
the planning and decision-making of a government organization,
one must recognize that the non-governmental members of the
team are likely to try to shift the risk of failure to the
government agency. On the other hand, NASA cannot delegate
its responsibility for secondary utilization of aerospace
technology to the team. If the team approach is adopted,
NASA must maintain the ultimate responsibility for technology
transfer.
A team approach to screening/evaluation then has ad-
vantages as well as disadvantages. The disadvantages--at
least most of those mentioned above--occur by an overidentifi-
cation of NASA with industry's interests. Yet, this possibility
seems unlikely. Government agencies can be put in two main
categories; industry-oriented (e.g. FCC) and functionally-
oriented, or crosscutting (e.g. EPA). while industry-oriented
agencies may be captured by the interest of the industry they
regulate, this may be less likely for functionally-oriented
agencies (see also: Weidenbaum, 1978, p. 10). In the secondary
utilization of aerospace technology, NASA can be described as
a functionally-oriented agency, with the task of transferring
technology to all non-aerospace industries. The possibility
of being captured by the interests of a single non-aerospace
industry exists but does not seem to be a real threat.
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3.3 Review of a team approach to screening/evaluation.
only a comprehensive analysis will indicate the advantages
and disadvantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation
of NASA generated technology. Critical to the success of such
an approach is the organizational structure which provides the
basis for cooperation between NASA and the participating
parties:
o Should other participating parties serve as an
advisory board to provide suggestions and recommen-
dations, leaving decisions to NASA?
o Should NASA be only one party among many, that is to
say should NASA have no special poser concerning
decisions?
o Should NASA and other parties be bound together in an
advisory board and the responsibility for decisions
be given to another federal organization?
These and other organizational options should be comparatively
analyzed.
The advantage of a team approach to screening/evaluation
is provided through the direct participation of private and
government organizations which influence the technology transfer
process. It can be assumed that the team approach has particular
potential when the operations are based upon people rather than
on fixed procedures. Procedures, most valuable for routine
tasks, are not appropriate to the e:tiploration of the changing
factors which influence technology transfer. But this pattern
f	
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is twofold, in being dependent on the capability of the in-
dividuals joining the team, the performance of team members
is a source of potential success and failure. This should be
taken into account, especially in the implementation phase.
It might he effective for NASA--before announc Ag the im-
plementation of its team approach to sczcening/evaluation-
to very carefully select individuals who are both capable and
willing to perform the task. This selection process might
best be achieved through informal contacts, keeping publicity
very low. Furthermore, in case this screening/evaluation
method is adopted, NASA should resist any moves to demonstrate
its potential before the team is stabilized; that is to say,
not until all individuals joining the team have accepted
their role iaithin the team and a climate of confidence has
been created.
4. Potential members for the team.
The intention of this section is to cite and briefly
describe organizations which could participate in the team
approach to the screening/evaluation. Once again, only a
comprehensive analysis can provide in-depth insights.
o One source of participants are industry specific
R&D institutes. Besides the R&D effort of specific firms,
there are often R&D projects undertaken by al:l (or the most
important) firms within an industry branch. In some industries
those R&D activities are institutionalized in the form of
R&D institutes, e.g. the Chemical Industry Institute of
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Toxicology. This Institute is funded by the largest U.S.
chemical companies and investigates the toxicology of non-
proprietary chemicals (Eiiss et al., 1975, p. 97) . In West
Germany the "Institut der Stahl- and Eisenindustrie," has
performed important studies for the steel industry on the
development of mathematical process models for control of
blast-furnace processes.
Normally, such institutes know the characteristics of
technologies already being used and those in research
programs.
	
This knowledge would be extremely useful in ` iden-
tifying those NASA technologies having potential value for a
certain industry.	 Furthermore, such institutes might prove
useful in aiding NASA's development of prototypes.
f o	 Another valuable organization mi ght be industry
associations.
	 Industry associations possess substantial
knowledge about the R&D performance of the industry they
represent.	 For example, the association of the chemical
industry knows under which circumstances this industry will be
willing to switch from coal to oil.	 Therefore, NASA is
able to grasp "what is going on in industry" and to prepare
appropriate transfer efforts at the right time.	 NASA might
also gain knowledge about typical industry R&D policies. 	 For
example, in areas such as semiconductors, electronic sub-
assemblies and scientific instruments, process innovations are
f
not "manufacturer dominated" but "user dominated" 	 (Hippel,
1976; Hippel, 1977, p.
	
60; Abernathy, Utterback, 	 1978, p.	 42).
In other industries, raw material suppliers or the producers
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of capital goods might dominate innovative behavior. In
processing such knowledge, NASA would enhance its ability to
address the right target group with information about new
technologies.
As mentioned earlier, NASA technology transfer managers
may lack "commercial experience." With the help of industry
associations NASA might be able to use commercial facts to
provide useful value-added technological information.
o The possibility also exists that single firms might
join the screening and evaluation process of NASA technology.
At first glance, it seems that industry R&D line managers
would be highly qualified to perform such work. But diffi-
culties in selecting firms would undoubtedly arise. These
difficulties can be avoided through the use of industry
associations and professional societies.
o Professional societies might be a valuable organization
for screening and evaluating NASA's technologies. In most
eases such societies represent a substantial part, of pro-
fessionals working in a certain field, and they generally
have good reputations. In some cases those societies already
evaluate new technologies and offer education to their members
concerning those technologies. Education is important. The
1
mere existence of a technology is not sufficient; a capability
to use it must be developed (Gee, 1978, p. 109)
In ,lest Germany, starting in 1978, the ministry of
science and technology realized the high potential value of
I
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professional societies.
	
The societies perform work similar
11
	to that of NASA's Industrial Application Centers.
In an investigation about "diffusion and utilization of
scientific and technological knowledge within state and
local governments" it is noted that professional engineering
societies, e.g. the American Society `or Mechanical E ►igineering,
are interested in becoming involved in the area of technology
transfer (Feller, Flanary, 1979, p. 111-41).
o In some cases it might be worthwhile to think about
the possibility of including certain government agencies in
the screening and evaluation process, at least on a case-by-
case basis. This is due to the fact that while technologies
might improve productivity or dampen inflation, they might
also have side-effects for health, safety, environment,
etc.
The costs `.f determining if a new technology will obtain
regulatory authority approval can be an important factor in
the introduction of innovations in technology (I1ollomon, 1979,
p. 33; see also: Weidenbaum, 1978, p. 17-20). If the concerned
government agencies participate in the proposed screening and
evaluation process of new technologies, they could facilitate
the innovation process. If regulatory information were added
to the technical description of a ne,y technology, a potential
entrepreneur could more readily assess its commercial prospects.
o organizations within the university community present
another possibility. There are two groups of major-importance,
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scientific and technology utilization personnel. Professors
are a very valuable group to have join the screening and evalu-
ation process. Furthermore, in this case it is worthwhile to
consider a secondary benefit of using universities. Univer-
sities are of substantial importance as a transfer medium and
would link NASA directly to the professionals of tomorrow.
one might also think about university technology utili-
zation personnel. In recent years university administrations
have explored the revenue generating value of university
generated inventions (Udell, Johnson, 1978, p. 175) and by now
quite a few universities are active in this area.
Conclusions
Underlying the analysis in this paper is the assumption
that the NASA technology transfer could be substantially im-
proved if the application process of technologies were better
understood. NASA is successful at information dissemination,
but there is a lack of knowledge about why certain technologies
are adopted and other technologies are not. A comprehensive
understanding about factors influencing technology transfer
might indicate ways of developing improvements. By including
non-federal organizations, such as professional societies and
industry R&D institutes, in the screening and evaluation process
of NASA generated technology, opportunities may develop to
enhance technology transfer from NASA to industry.
I
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